Napoleon, Persia and India

While 2014 marked the centennial of the start of the First World War, 2015 will be the bicentennial of the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars. That event ended years of almost perpetual warfare across Europe, which grew out of the wars of the French Revolution. But the Napoleonic Wars also had a major impact on the Middle East and South Asia, shaping the future evolution of these regions in a way that echoes to the present. While the story of Napoleon’s conquest of Egypt and the impact this had on the Ottoman Empire (of which Egypt was then part) is well known, the repercussions of the Napoleonic Wars for India and Persia (today’s Iran) are just as important.

Napoleon’s conquest of Egypt in 1798 was intended primarily to disrupt British naval power in the Mediterranean and ultimately to threaten British possessions in India, whence came much of the wealth the British were using to fund European armies fighting France. In the meantime, control over Egypt would give France access to the Indian Ocean and the power to disrupt British trade. In a letter to the Directory which then ruled France, Napoleon wrote of his intentions to use Egypt at a base for 60,000 French soldiers to attack British possessions in India and link up with the rulers of Indian states hostile to the British.

It is unclear whether or not Napoleon actually intended to lead an army all the way across the Ottoman Empire and the Qajar Dynasty of Persia to India. He certainly had grandiose dreams of conquest, and as his later career would demonstrate, he was not above comparing himself to famed generals like Julius Caesar and Hannibal. Throughout his Egyptian campaign, Napoleon dreamed of becoming another Alexander in Asia, claiming: “I would found a religion, I saw myself marching to Asia mounted on an elephant, a turban on my head, and in my hand a new Koran that I would have composed to suit my needs.” It was not to be. Napoleon never got further east than the city of Acre, in today’s Israel, where a siege held him up for several months in 1799. This, along with domestic turmoil in France convinced Napoleon to return to France instead of pressing on to India or Constantinople (Istanbul).

While Napoleon was held up at Acre, the British decided to pre-empt any mischief he might cause in India. On January 25, 1799, Napoleon had written to Tipu Sultan, ruler of Mysore (in today’s state of Karnataka in South India), and chief enemy of the British in India. Napoleon told Tipu of his “arrival on the shores of the Red Sea with a numerous and invincible army, animated with the desire of delivering you from the iron yoke of England.” At the time, Mysore stood the best chance among Indian states of fighting the British, thanks to the introduction of a modern army, drilled by mostly French soldiers, the creation of a navy, and the establishment of factories for the production of modern weaponry, such as rockets and cannons. Unfortunately, Napoleon’s letter was intercepted by a British cruiser and the British went on to attack Mysore with three armies and kill Tipu Sultan in May 1799. Ironically, then Napoleon’s Egyptian adventure had only strengthened the British position in India by bringing much of South India under its power. 
Still, Napoleon did not forget Asia, even after he returned from Egypt, soon becoming the effective leader of France as its First Consul. In early 1801, having become friendly with Russia, he concocted a plan for a joint Franco-Russian invasion of Central and South Asia. This plan involved 35,000 French soldiers joining 35,000 regular Russians to cross Persia, take Kandahar in Afghanistan, and invade India. Although the plan never came to fruition, derailed by the assassination of the Russian Tsar Paul I that year, it alarmed the British and began their century-long obsession with Afghanistan, Persia and Central Asia, fueled by fears of a Russian invasion of India over land. Thus, Napoleon had a hand in initiating the famed Anglo-Russian “Great Game.”

In 1803, Napoleon attempted to interfere with the British in India yet again. He sent a squadron of ships, sailors and soldiers to India in March 1803 to “communicate with the peoples or princes who are most impatient under the yoke of the English.” At this time, the greatest Indian power was the Maratha Empire, which controlled – theoretically, at least – more of India than the British. Unlike Mysore, however, it was large and decentralized and could more accurately be described as a confederacy of princes and local rulers. Most other Indian rulers by this time had either been conquered or become allies of the British. After the defeat of Mysore, the British decided to eliminate French influence from India by defeating the Marathas, though their grievances against the Marathas were also driven by Indian politics.

Led by Arthur Wellesley, later the Duke of Wellington, the man who eventually defeated Napoleon at Waterloo, the British in India fought the Marathas from 1803 to 1805. The French were too busy and too far away to provide effective aid and the British were able to make significant headway. In 1803, the British captured Delhi from the Marathas, giving them the seat of the Mughal Emperor, who though weak and powerless, carried enormous prestige. By becoming a dependent of the British, the Mughal Emperor conferred upon them enormous soft power. Although increased fighting in Europe precluded the British from launching further campaigns in India until the defeat of Napoleon and the French from assisting any more Indian rulers, the British effectively controlled most of India by this time (and had seized Mauritius, located in the Indian Ocean on the route to India, from France in 1810). It was a simple matter, then, for the British to finish off the Marathas in 1818. The threat of France therefore had the effect of consolidating British power in India. It is unclear as to whether the British would have defeated and conquered territory from Mysore or the Marathas if there was no Napoleonic threat.

Napoleon’s wars also had significant implications for Persia, albeit more indirectly. In 1805, while at war with Russia, Napoleon wrote to Shah Fath Ali of Persia, warning him against the British and Russians, asking him to fight with France against the Russians. Yet this Russo-Persian War, which had begun in 1804 and would last until 1813, proved disastrous for the Persians, partially because of the changing politics of Europe. Although the French promised to help the Persians, in 1807 Paris elected to make peace with the Russians, giving the latter a free hand to fight Persia and leaving the Persians flailing against a much stronger enemy. Napoleon’s subsequent invasion of Russia in 1812 did not dent the momentum the Russians had already gained in Persia. The subsequent Treaty of Gulistan between Russia and Persia in 1813 added Georgia and Azerbaijan to the Russian Empire, beginning centuries of Russian dominance over the Caucuses.

While Napoleon dreamed of conquests in Asia and the use of Asian powers to fight his enemies, especially Britain and Russia, he himself and the French did very little to bring this about, being tied down by European issues. Ultimately, this led to British and Russian gains at the expense of native rulers, who, although encouraged by Napoleon to fight his enemies, could do little to win.

Thus, as we reach the bicentennial of their denouement at Waterloo, we can reflect on the lasting legacy of the Napoleonic Wars: the entrenchment and expansion of British influence in India and the replacement of Persian power with Russian control in parts of Central Asia and the Caucuses.