Philippine Peace Pact Under Siege

On January 25, 44 police were killed in a major clash between elite Philippine National Police (PNP) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) rebels in the southern Philippines. The incident, which resulted in the largest single day loss in the PNP’s history, threatens to undermine the landmark peace deal reached between the government and rebels in March which ended nearly a half-century of bloody conflict.

The clashes – known locally as the Mamasapano incident – occurred when members of the Special Action Force (SAF) of the PNP were pursuing notorious terrorist and Malaysian bomb expert Zulkifli Abdhir – better known as Marwan – in MILF territory. Abdhir, who  was on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s most wanted list, was killed in a raid that kicked off the larger incident. Government accounts suggest that the SAF came under fire from the MILF as well as the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), a splinter group with whom the government has not signed a peace deal. The MILF has said that the government should have notified it about its presence in the areas in line with the existing peace agreement and ceasefire, and insists that it was forced to act in self-defense.

Regardless of the specifics, the incident has stirred passions in the country. Philippine President Benigno Aquino III declared a National Day of Mourning on January 30 for the so-called “Fallen 44” and replaced the head of the SAF. The public, however, is still asking tough questions about the incident itself, such as why the police conducted such a risky operation in the first place, why they were not adequately supported by army personnel, and what Aquino’s role was in the decision-making process. Several investigations have been launched, and some have even called for Aquino’s impeachment or resignation.

Given the seemingly endless twists and turns in the Philippine peace process over the years, it is tempting to dismiss this as just another blip. But this incident comes at a pivotal time. The Aquino administration had initially wanted to pass a law – the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) – which essentially implements the  peace deal the government signed with the MILF  by the first quarter of 2015 before Congress goes into a long summer break. Passing the law before summer would ensure that there is enough time for the peace process to progress as scheduled with a plebiscite on the BBL, Bangsamoro elections in June 2016 and the decommissioning of the MILF. The intention was to complete the process before the end of Aquino’s term in 2016 so that there is no risk of a future administration derailing or disrupting the peace process. Philippine lawmakers had initially said that this timeline was possible, and even showed flexibility in trying to schedule expedited hearings so that everything could be wrapped up quickly.

The Mamasapano incident was the first major violation of the October 2012 ceasefire agreement between the MILF and the government in over a year and it could have significant repercussions for the peace process. The Senate has suspended hearings on the BBL, while several key legislators have withdrawn their support for it altogether. Politicians have also been far too willing to play to the nationalist sentiments of the public with an eye to the 2016 elections; some have even called for revisions to critical terms of the BBL. Even a mere delay in passing the BBL could prove problematic. There is the risk that the MILF will not fully complete its transition from a rebel group to a governing entity in time and that it will face a government after the 2016 elections that may not be as committed to the peace as Aquino has been.

These events have broader implications for the rest of Aquino’s term and the Philippines’ future outlook more generally. It is no secret that the president views the peace process as a critical component of his political legacy, and he is likely to expend significant political capital to achieve it in spite of the challenges ahead. Despite the insistence by administration officials that they are able to walk and chew gum at the same time, observers worry that this might mean that other priority economic bills before the legislature may not be passed. That could in turn affect the trajectory of key reforms on easing foreign investment restrictions as well as in specific sectors like mining and infrastructure that could help improve domestic growth and facilitate Manila’s entry into the ASEAN Economic Community scheduled for the end of 2015.

Uncertainty about the Philippines’ domestic security environment may slow the conceptual reorientation that undergirds Manila’s current military modernization efforts. Reductions in internal threats, as evidenced by the peace process, has allowed a gradual shift to begin toward focusing on external threats. Current Philippine defense plans are divided into a series of three horizons, with the “second horizon” from 2018 to 2023 projected to focus more on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and the South China Sea rather than internal security operations. But as the Philippine Department of National Defense’s undersecretary for finance munitions and materiel Fernando Manalo recently said, that is based on the assumption that internal security threats will be “not so intense in the next five years.” A botched peace deal and a return to violence in the country’s south could potentially delay the planned reorientation, which has been a driver of  the country’s defense outlook and spending.

In his address to the nation on January 28 following the Mamasapano incident, Aquino issued an impassioned plea for the Philippines to “link arms more tightly” to move the peace process forward rather than taking up arms again against Muslim rebels. The deadly insurgency has already claimed tens of thousands of lives over the decades, and the president is right to ask how many more graves must be dug before all this is over.