U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Seeing Other People

A cartoon in Pakistan’s The Express Tribune perhaps best captured the country’s reaction to U.S. President Barack Obama’s January visit – his second – to India. It showed Obama and his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi meeting amicably in a tent while Pakistan is outside looking in. Understandably, many Pakistani officials are both jealous and upset over the recent bonhomie between Obama and Modi; the Pakistani foreign office said as much.

Obama’s concerted efforts to court India as part of Washington’s own shifting foreign policy objectives, coupled with the end of its military operations in Afghanistan, has tremendous implications for the security and economy of South Asia and beyond – for the better or not, remains to be seen.

Separation

Pakistan’s singular foreign policy objective is parity with India. But with neither the size nor the capital, Pakistan has recognized that it needs American assistance. Therefore, for much of its history, Pakistan has relied on American military and economic aid to maintain a bloated military disproportionate to its size. That same military has maintained a grip on Pakistani politics, either directly under a dictatorship or indirectly through rigging elections, coercing governments, and intimidation.

For the most part, the United States hasn’t especially minded. Even as late as 2008, former dictator Pervez Musharraf was a willing ally in America’s so-called War on Terror, and received billions of dollars in aid for his efforts. As the U.S. experimented with state building in Afghanistan, it required Pakistan’s help, given the influence Pakistan had with Afghan militias and warlords. But Pakistan had other ideas, and played what critics call a “double game.” It only fought militants that it thought posed a direct threat to the Pakistani state, and continued to fund, train and support militant groups that the Pakistani state thought would give it influence outside its border: Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Muhammad in Indian-held Kashmir, and the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network in Afghanistan.

The latter groups unremittingly thwarted American and Afghan efforts at stability, and derailed Pakistani-American relations in the process. Pakistan’s “Good Taliban Bad Taliban” policy, as it was called, coupled with continuing tensions between Pakistan’s civilian and military rulers brought Pakistani-American relations to a particularly low ebb during the last Pakistani civilian government’s tenure from 2008-2013.

The 2009 Kerry-Lugar Bill, officially known as the Enhanced Partnership With Pakistan Act, authorized $1.5 billion in aid for five years, but was met with derision and anger from the Pakistani military because the aid was contingent on strengthening civilian institutions. The Pakistani military conducted a smear campaign in the local media and organized anti-American protests to air their disapproval.

Meanwhile, the United States escalated its drone program. While the strikes were initially conducted in cooperation with Pakistan, the U.S. began to step up the frequency of unilateral strikes without Pakistani consent, in reaction to what it saw as the latter’s refusal to chase after the militants the U.S. was targeting. Drone strikes also reignited anti-American fervor. Many Pakistanis asked why their country was allies with a nation that was bombing its people. Many Americans asked why the U.S. was giving money to a country that was helping militants to kill American troops.

Irreparable Damage

In early 2011, Raymond Davis, an American contractor, killed two people in broad daylight on a busy street in Lahore, in doing so causing irreparable damage to the relationship. The American government claimed the contractor had diplomatic immunity, while the Pakistani government was incensed that the U.S. had not told it about his activities. The Pakistani government deliberately leaked information about Davis to the media, inciting more anti-American protests, and formally charged him with murder. A deal allowed the U.S. to free him by paying $2.4 million in blood money to the families of the victims, but the damage was done. Intelligence cooperation between the CIA and the ISI, Pakistan’s military-controlled intelligence service, ended.

On May 2, 2011, American navy SEALs assassinated Osama Bin Laden in a clandestine raid in Abbottabad, an operation the Pakistani government knew nothing about. Despite then president Asif Ali Zardari’s op-ed in the Washington Post the next day – an attempt at damage control – the military was angry that the U.S. didn’t share intelligence with it and conducted the entire operation without its knowledge. More embarrassing for Pakistan’s generals was the revelation that two American military helicopters had violated its airspace, flew in and out again without it even knowing, exposing a high level of incompetence for a military that prides itself for its ability and size. That Abbottabad was also home to the Pakistani equivalent of West Point only made matters worse.

Soon after, Admiral Mike Mullen, the U.S. military’s highest ranking officer, went on record and called the Haqqani Network a “veritable arm” of the ISI in a congressional hearing, directly accusing Pakistan of hindering American efforts in Afghanistan. In November the same year, NATO airstrikes killed 24 Pakistani soldiers at a base in Pakistani territory by mistake. In response, Pakistan closed the land routes into Afghanistan for NATO supply trucks for seven months, demanding an apology. Despite repeated American calls for action, the Pakistani military refused to go after militants in North Waziristan, a tribal region on the border with Afghanistan that had become a hub for Islamist militants from all over the region. In keeping with the marriage metaphors applied to the Pakistan-American relationship, divorce was nigh.

Turnaround?

But changing attitudes, appointees and government have salvaged the relationship from the lows of 2011-12. In 2013, Nawaz Sharif won a majority in parliamentary elections, and was keen to mend relations. Whether at Sharif’s behest or not, the U.S. significantly scaled back its drone program, allowing the issue to subside. The Pakistan Army had also gotten around to accepting the threat Islamist militants posed to Pakistan itself, and were more eager to fight militants. This change in attitude can partly be credited to a change in personnel. The new Chief of Army Staff, General Raheel Sharif has been vocal about the threat that militants pose, while his predecessor was more reclusive. The new chief also appointed a new ISI head, Rizwan Akhter, who had studied in the United States and who has even written a paper on promoting democracy in Pakistan.

In June 2014, after an attack on the Karachi international airport that killed 28 people, the military finally launched an operation in North Waziristan, greeted with encouragement from Washington. And last December’s horrific attack on a school in Peshawar that killed 150 people, mostly children, only strengthened its resolve, the Army claimed. The Army has also been keen to publicly denounce all forms of terrorism, saying that it has abandoned its policy of selectively targeting militants. The Army chief, the prime minister, and his foreign policy advisor all visited the United States bearing that message.

The turnaround has also mirrored Pakistan’s improving relations with Afghanistan. Former Afghan President Hamid Karzai did not hesitate to blame Pakistan for virtually all of Afghanistan’s security problems. It also did not help that Afghan intelligence was cultivating its own militants to operate in Pakistan, much as Pakistan had done to Afghanistan. Even now, the Pakistani Taliban chief Mullah Fazlullah is known to be in Afghanistan. But since Ashraf Ghani’s election as president, relations have improved. Heads of state and army chiefs have made frequent visits (the Pakistani Army chief was visiting Kabul again on the day this was written), and there is promise of greater security and economic cooperation, as well as Pakistani promises of non-interference. Also, Ghani needs Pakistani assistance in brokering a peace deal with the Afghan Taliban that still controls large parts of southern and eastern Afghanistan. For its part, Pakistan says it will not interfere in Afghan affairs.

Unfortunately, there is little to suggest that Pakistan’s vows to tackle militancy and to not interfere in Afghan affairs are genuine. While Pakistan has repeatedly promised not to discriminate between militants, its actions suggest otherwise. The Haqqani Network had plenty of warnings before the Army launched the military operation last year, and many of its operatives have escaped to other tribal areas or Pakistan’s major cities. The Army has not gone after them. Hafiz Saeed, the leader of Lashkar-e-Taiba, which executed the Mumbai attacks in 2008, lives freely under government protection in Lahore; the LeT, operating under a different name and claiming to be a charity, functions with impunity. Pakistan has been lethargic in investigating the Mumbai attacks. Recently, it even freed the alleged mastermind, before sheepishly remanding him again in a case that has dragged on for years without progress. The government has also been unwilling to prosecute Mumtaz Qadri, the man who killed Punjab governor Salman Taseer for speaking against Pakistan’s blasphemy laws.

So it seems that while Pakistan’s determination to tackle its own militancy problem is convincing, its determination to do the same with groups that don’t directly threaten it is less so. Without demonstrated commitment to fighting all forms of terrorism, Pakistan cannot possibly hope for good relations with Afghanistan and the U.S., or even with China, whose own deteriorating security situation in Xinjiang province is directly related to Uighur militant activity in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

As far as Afghanistan is concerned, with little American presence it is likely that Pakistan will continue to bankroll the Haqqani Network and the Afghan Taliban. This is particularly likely since India has also tried gain influence there, providing scholarships, business opportunities, and investment (the Afghan parliament was built by India as a gift). Pakistan is eager to minimize India’s presence in Afghanistan and increase its own once more, and its tried and tested method of doing that is by using militant proxies. While Pakistani interference is not inevitable, especially given the improvement in its relations with Afghanistan, it is likely if security cooperation breaks down.

Reality Bites

In either case, even improved relations may not provide the kind of assistance Pakistan thinks it needs. This is because American interest in Pakistan and Afghanistan is just not as urgent as it used to be, and the U.S. is looking to improve relations with India.

First, as the U.S. pulls out, it is looking to drastically reduce its military and economic footprint in Afghanistan. Which means both Pakistan and Afghanistan’s economies, so dependent on American money, will have to do without it. Given the difficulties the U.S. has had in dealing with both countries, there is little to suggest it is keen on maintaining close ties. Current security threats to the U.S. emanating from the region, while still present, simply do not have the urgency that they once did, and war fatigue has played its part. Drone technology has meant that the United States can both gather intelligence and conduct military operations without devoting significant human resources or diplomatic effort. A recent New York Times editorial argued that foreign aid to Pakistan should be gradually phased out; few in Washington disagree.

Second, the United States is making a greater push for better relations with India at Pakistan’s expense. India is an essential part of Obama’s “pivot” to Asia, which seeks broad, multilateral cooperation between the U.S. and Asia-Pacific nations in an effort to counter China. India also sees China as a military and economic rival, and it is looking to partnerships with other countries, most notably Japan, to give it an edge. (Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was the chief guest at India’s Republic Day celebrations the year before Obama was.)

India has recently emerged as the world’s biggest arms buyer, as well as the U.S. arms industry’s biggest customer. New Delhi is looking to diversify and expand its military capabilities, and is moving away from Russia, its traditional arms supplier. This has presented a lucrative opportunity to the United States to sell both weapons and weapons technology to India, including billion dollar contracts for drones, helicopters and missiles. This progression is natural, given that both India and the United States face similar threats from Islamist militants based in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia. Obama and Modi’s recent joint statement called for broader intelligence sharing and cooperation, especially with regard to counter-terrorism efforts.

After Modi’s promises to improve India’s economy, he is looking to cut through the red tape that made his country notoriously difficult for business and is inviting American companies to invest in India. (Mark Zuckerberg and Sheryl Sandberg of Facebook, Jeff Bezos of Amazon, and Satya Nadella of Microsoft all visited India last year.) Modi also launched the “Make In India” campaign, meant to kick start India’s own manufacturing and export capacity. The U.S. fits snugly into these plans since it can both invest in and buy from India, especially as the U.S. bounces back from its recession. It also has the technological expertise to assist India in its own endeavors to modernize and diversify its economy. A civil nuclear pact signed in 2008 was finally cleared to proceed on this visit, allowing for the U.S. to transfer nuclear technology. Apart from allowing India to explore nuclear energy to meet its perpetually rising demand for electricity, the deal also legitimizes India’s long-stigmatized nuclear program. (It was the United States, in fact, that had slapped economic sanctions after India, a non-signatory of the NPT, tested nuclear weapons in 1998.)

The effects of reduced mutual dependence have already started to make themselves felt: Pakistan is diversifying its allies. China has been trying to fill the regional vacuum in some capacity, as it recently attended a trilateral summit with the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan, presiding over a joint commitment to security and greater economic cooperation. China is also providing investment and technology transfers, not least a civil nuclear pact similar to the one between India and the United States. By calling for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to step down, Pakistan has sided with Saudi Arabia in its regional tussle with Iran. Pakistan is rumored to be placing troops, training and weapons at Saudi Arabia’s disposal if need be. In return, Saudi Arabia kept Pakistan’s patchy economy afloat by giving $1.5 billion in assistance last year and providing discounted deals on fossil fuel purchases. Islamabad is meanwhile close to signing a $20 billion deal with Qatar to import liquefied natural gas. In a reversal, Pakistan has also begun to look to Russia for weapons as the United States moves closer to India. Russia’s defense minister visited Islamabad last year to seal the deal on the sale of 20 MI-35 helicopters. Pakistan, it seems, is aware of the revision of its relationship with the United States, and is making the logical arrangements.

Looking Ahead

A lukewarm Pakistan-American relationship may not, in fact, be such a bad thing. For one, it would allow Pakistan to have greater independence in formulating foreign policy. Under American influence, Pakistan was discouraged from pursuing a gas pipeline with Iran that could have helped it meet its energy needs. While Pakistan continues to pursue another, more expensive pipeline through Central Asia and Afghanistan, the U.S. may have less of a say in Pakistan’s economic activity, and Islamabad will perhaps be less reverential. Pakistan’s diversification of allies also means that it will be less dependent on a singular power, and also less indebted. China in any case is far less intrusive in domestic affairs than the United States has been. It is doubtful that either Russia or China would play the kind active role in Pakistani politics the U.S. has. While that may mean that neither would make as much noise about the state’s human rights abuses, there would be fewer unauthorized drone strikes or covert CIA bases.

A closer relationship between India and the U.S. could also bring attention to an issue Pakistan has long lobbied for: Kashmir. In his speech in New Delhi, Obama spoke at length about religious freedom and women’s rights – two areas of notable weakness for Modi’s government. Obama showed that he is not afraid to point out faults in India’s socio-political makeup. Human rights abuses in Kashmir and India’s northeastern states may be another such obstacle. An unconstitutional law called the Armed Forces Special Powers Act allows Indian troops to operate with impunity in sensitive areas, and given India’s own democratic credentials, it may be difficult for the U.S. to continue to ignore India’s human rights violations.

Better relations with India may also allow the U.S. to promote a settlement with Pakistan. While previous attempts at brokering a peace have failed, it in America’s interest to have friendly relations between the rivals, as Daniel Markey argued in Foreign Policy. Peace on Pakistan’s eastern border would permit it to continue its military operation in the tribal areas without hindrance. More broadly, it is in the world’s interest to keep these nuclear-armed rivals from fighting each other. A closeness with India might give the U.S. the leverage it lacked before to broker a mutually satisfactory agreement.

Still, Pakistan will not be able to rely on American military and diplomatic support against India as it has in the past. While Pakistani officials may bristle at the thought, even that may ultimately be beneficial for the nation. Former Pakistani ambassador to the U.S. Husain Haqqani has long argued that Pakistan has been “delusional” in its expectations, both of its itself and its allies. It is impossible for Pakistan to achieve the kind of economic or military clout it needs to compete head to head with India. (And since Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons, it doesn’t even need to compete militarily.) Greater self-reliance and reduced dependence on the United States may compel Pakistan to abandon parity as a strategic objective. It is difficult to see any of Pakistan’s latest partners provide the kind of support that the United States has. Even China, Pakistan’s “all-weather” friend and traditionally India’s rival, has economic interests and diplomatic obligations with India that are too compelling to allow it to explicitly side with Pakistan against India.

While delusions are by definition formed in spite of reality, perhaps South Asia’s changing alliances might be just the jolt that Pakistani foreign policy status quo needs to place it on a more realistic path.