An Evolution in China-India Relations?

The late January 2015 summit between President Barrack Obama and Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi has had unexpected fallout. Beijing has suddenly begun to show a willingness to urgently discuss the resolution of its 4057 km contested border with India. A flurry of statements and opinions that have been released in China since February, discussing a possible resolution to the 60-year-old dispute, suggest changing mindsets in Beijing. For more than a quarter century, China’s India policy has been driven by a consistent stand that resolution of the border issue should be left to future generations. And during 17 rounds of talks at the special representatives level over the past decade, India was happy to go along with the Chinese position.

On the eve of the 18th round (the first under the government of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi) of talks in New Delhi on March 23-24, however, there are distinct signs that Beijing is keen to get a move on with the talks. Of course, a complex and historical dispute such as that between China and India cannot be resolved overnight, but recent foreign ministry briefings on both sides have indicated that the process to clarify the line of actual control, as the disputed Sino-Indian border is called, would top the agenda of the Special Representatives talks.

The Global Times, an English newspaper considered close to the establishment in Beijing gave an indication of Chinese thinking in an article in late February. It said: “Identifying the lines of control on each side will be a key step to facilitating the long-stalled process of bringing the disputes to a peaceful resolution. In that case, border standoffs between India and China, such as the one in September last year which started before Chinese President Xi Jinping’s trip to India, should be avoided, helping create a friendly atmosphere to further deepen bilateral ties.” The desire to “identify” the line of control –or line of actual control – has not often been articulated in Beijing in recent years. This could well be a phase during which India and China focus on working towards a resolution of the dispute rather than being content with managing it, as they have done for the past three decades.

What has prompted this change in approach? Undoubtedly, it is the assessment in Beijing that the Modi government is politically much stronger and therefore in a better position to take a final decision on the border issue than the previous two UPA regimes. That the Chinese were cognizant of the new reality was evident very early on in the Modi era. Beijing dispatched its foreign minister to meet the new leadership in Delhi within a month of Modi’s inauguration.

After meeting Modi at the BRICS summit, President Xi Jingping became the first leader of a P-5 nation to make a trip to India in September 2014. Clearly, the Chinese had grasped the changing dynamics in Asia as fast as Modi had done.

Almost immediately after storming to power in May 2014, Modi took India’s foreign policy by the scruff of its neck. He invited all heads of state from the SAARC nations, including arch rival Pakistan, to his swearing in; he chose to visit Bhutan for his first overseas trip; and then he not surprisingly went to Tokyo. In the meantime, Indian President Pranab Mukherjee made a visit to Vietnam.

The Chinese realized the Modi approach to foreign policy was much different than the previous government’s and Beijing needed to quickly engage with the Indian prime minister to prevent the formation of any anti-China coalition of India, Japan and Vietnam.

Consequently, Xi’s visit was planned for September 2014. Just before Xi was due to arrive, Modi met with a group of Chinese journalist and outlined his vision for the China-India relationship. After the meeting he tweeted: “If I have to describe potential of India-China ties I will say — INCH (India & China) towards MILES (Millennium of Exceptional Synergy)!”

Of course, Sino-India ties are much too complex to be captured in a tweet. Besides the contentious boundary issue, Xi knew China had many issues to iron out with India. The bilateral trade imbalance for one. The trade deficit had risen to a massive $31 billion in 2013. Bilateral trade had actually fallen from $74 billion in 2011 to about $65 billion in 2013. Even bilateral investment was limited, with both sides complaining about market access in the other. Meanwhile, Xi’s advance party had promised more than $100 billion in investment in India, but by the end of the visit all that was forthcoming was about $20 billion, much lower than promised.

Incursion

In fact, that September visit was almost torpedoed by the incursion of a 1000-strong PLA force into the Ladakh region along the LAC. A swift build up of almost 3,000 Indian troops in response led to an unprecedented stand off. In the past, face offs on the border had either preceded or followed high-level visits from either side. But in this case Xi was already in India on what was seen as an important visit and yet here was the PLA provoking a confrontation on the border.

This time, though, a firm, no-nonsense message by Modi that such provocations are unacceptable, together with India’s quick response in deploying a force almost thrice the size of the intruding troops, forced Xi to order the PLA troops back. Although the mini-crisis was resolved without a shot being fired – in contrast to several past incidents – many theories were put forward to explain why the PLA chose to create a crisis when Xi was in India. Some reports said the PLA – some of whose top generals have been investigated and purged by Xi in his sweeping anti-corruption drive – wanted to send a message to the president that they are capable of taking precipitate action. This theory was immediately junked by China experts, since Xi is considered to be in total control of the military. Unlike his immediate predecessors, Xi, it should be noted, simultaneously became president and chairman of the all-powerful Central Military Commission (CMC). Consequently, there is very little likelihood of the PLA stepping out of line or acting unilaterally. In fact the other possibility – that of Xi being in the loop about the intrusion plan but feigning ignorance – is more realistic. Whatever the reason, the Chinese were clearly trying to gauge the Modi government’s ability to handle a mini crisis. The outcome of the standoff must have allowed Beijing to conclude that it was dealing with a tougher chief executive of India than any they had encountered in the past decade.

But Beijing’s newfound urgency in mending fences with India – or at least stabilize the relationship – is also clearly being propelled by U.S. President Barack Obama’s successful visit to India in January. Concerned at the growing India-U,S. relationship, Beijing wants to ensure India does not lead an anti-China alliance in Asia at Washington’s behest.

As noted China expert Jayadeva Ranade has noted in a recent piece: “Reliable interlocutors recently disclosed that in addition to assessing that the Modi government has shown ‘a tougher attitude’ by beefing up border patrols and giving a massive push to improving infrastructure, China has assessed that India’s military establishment has reverted to being ‘formal’ and ‘stiff’ in its interactions with the PLA … According to them, Beijing senses a similar formality in interactions with India’s political establishment and attributes this to its ‘nationalist’ orientation. These interlocutors also disclose that the new defence attaché in the Chinese embassy in New Delhi, now of the rank of a major general, has been instructed to ensure that Sino-Indian relations do not deteriorate. To facilitate his task he has been brought into the loop with regard to flag meetings held between the commanders at the border. The Chinese defence attaché has additionally been tasked to ensure that communications between China’s ministry of national defence and India’s ministry of defence are conveyed quickly to avoid the possibility of tensions increasing due to misunderstanding.”

Modi and his pragmatic foreign policy team has rightfully decided to respond to Beijing’s hand of cooperation with an attempt at rapprochement on the border issue. If successful, there is potential economic benefit for the multitude of people in both countries.

Given the rigid positions on either side on the border issue, any negotiations are surely destined to be long and difficult. All indications are that the starting point for the renewed phase of special representatives talks will be the desire to try and clarify the line of actual control. However, Beijing and New Delhi have differing perceptions about the next steps. For instance, while India regards the status of Arunachal Pradesh (claimed by China as South Tibet) as non-negotiable, Beijing also sees the area as vital and has been consistent in protesting against visits by Indian heads of state and government to the region.

It was unsurprising, then, when China vehemently protested a visit by Modi to Arunachal Pradesh in late February to celebrate statehood day. In addition to delivering the usual verbal broadside at the foreign ministry’s weekly press briefing and summoning the Indian envoy in Beijing, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Liu Zhenmin said the “Indian side undermined China’s territorial sovereignty, right and interests.” Liu also alleged the visit had “artificially amplified differences between the two countries on the border issue” and reiterated that China “has never recognised the so-called ‘Arunachal Pradesh’ unilaterally set up by the Indian side.” That unusually strong and loaded statement was met with near radio silence from New Delhi. Except for a perfunctory statement by the Ministry of External Affairs reiterating that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of Indian Union, New Delhi chose to ignore the Chinese criticisms. That suggests a new approach by the Indian government, in which will deal with border issues on a broader plane, rather than responding to episodic events.

So what next for this on-again, off-again relationship between the world’s two most populous countries? As they compete for leadership roles in Asia, China and India will no doubt to continue to size each other up, but it may well be that they are edging towards the conclusion that the rising cooperation of late needs to continue to be strengthened. In that regard, the proposed visit to China by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi could be revealing.