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Thailand’s Self-Absorbed Dictatorship
Toru Hanai, Reuters
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Thailand’s Self-Absorbed Dictatorship

It has been a bleak year for democracy in Thailand.

By Serhat Ünaldi

A mad man is ruling in the land of smiles. A year after taking power it has become clear that General Prayuth Chan-o-cha is a malign dictator who offers no solution to the problems Thailand is facing. Instead, he makes death threats against journalists, drags those who speak their minds before martial courts, postpones democratic elections time and again, and overlooks the drafting of a constitution that may legally prolong his stint as prime minister, or at least allow for his return when and if elections are eventually held. His aggressive comments before the media are as legendary as they are dangerous in that they reveal his temper, his lack of rationality, and an absence of any even-handedness. The world should have long lost patience with the man who has dragged Thailand into an economic and political no man’s land.

Almost twelve months have passed since Prayuth staged a coup on May 22, 2014 against the Phue Thai Party-led caretaker government at that time. The move was an attempt to eliminate once and for all the political influence of the exiled former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who was ousted in a previous coup in 2006, and of his sister Yingluck, who had been elected prime minister in 2011. Prayuth’s putsch was followed by the passing of an interim constitution and the formation of a rubber-stamp parliament, which dutifully handed him the premiership. Since then he has overseen an anemic economy, with consumer confidence hitting a nine-month low in March and growth forecasts trimmed to 2.8 percent by some estimates. These economic numbers are closely tied to Thailand’s gloomy political outlook, as none of Prayuth’s actions has restored investor or consumer confidence.

The international community watches a country that was once – it now seems ages ago – considered a beacon of hope for democracy in Southeast Asia slipping further into the abyss. But opposition has become more vocal in recent months. On his visit to the country in January, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Daniel Russel, voiced the Obama administration’s concerns over “the significant restraints on freedoms since the coup,” over a political process “that doesn’t seem to represent all elements of Thai society,” and over the treatment of Yingluck Shinawatra, who was removed from office shortly before last year’s coup, impeached, and then targeted with criminal charges in a process Russel considered “politically driven.” As was to be expected, his comments did not go down well with Thailand’s dictatorship. It responded by summoning the U.S. charges d’affaires; Prayuth defending himself as a “soldier with a democratic heart.”

At least Russel’s call for the lifting of martial law, which had been imposed after the coup, was eventually heard, although what came next was probably not what Thais were anticipating. In early April the law was revoked, only to be replaced by the invocation of section 44 of the interim constitution, which provides for even tougher measures against dissidents. Prayuth now commands near-absolute power to deal with unrest, however defined. Notably, Thais were warned that the authorities would act swiftly to prevent and suppress offensive acts through the deployment of “peacekeeping officers” – a label that, ironically, closely resembles the brutal “Peacekeepers” from the dystopian novel and movie series The Hunger Games, which has provided Thai dissidents with a plethora of symbols for resistance, among them the outlawed three fingers salute. Under Prayuth, Thailand comes ever closer to resembling the books’ fictional state of Panem, where a privileged elite oppresses its economically and geographically marginalized fellow citizens by robbing them of their political voice under the deceptive banner of peace and harmony.

“Good Intentions”

Although he tried to convince the international community of his good intentions by claiming that people would not have to be afraid of section 44 as long as they did not do anything wrong, observers find it worrying that it is Prayuth who decides what is right or wrong. In a statement, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Frederica Mogherini, complained that the replacement of martial law with the new order “does not bring Thailand closer to democratic and accountable government,” criticizing in particular the use of military courts to try civilians. The UN Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein expressed alarm at the possibility of “serious violations of fundamental human rights” under section 44.

In light of this criticism, Thailand’s dictator should be alarmed. His actions have already had real consequences. To the chagrin of Thai and some European traders, the EU has not yet resumed its free trade talks with the country, after shelving them in the wake of the coup. Granted, this was more due to technical considerations rather than Europe’s commitment to human rights and political principle – according to a source in the EU’s Directorate General for Trade, Brussels was worried that a future civilian administration might retroactively reject agreements concluded by an unaccountable military government. But the economic effects will nevertheless continue to be felt in Thailand, which recently lost the tariff privileges it had enjoyed in its trade with the EU. The Thai military itself may suffer the consequences of its actions even more immediately. The U.S. recently postponed indefinitely a preparation meeting for the 2016 Cobra Gold military exercise. Following the coup last year, the U.S. had already scaled down the number of participating service members significantly. An outright cancellation has become a real possibility. It would be a blow to Prayuth who, by testing the water of closer ties with China and Russia, is exhausting the patience of Thailand’s democratic allies.

To what worrying extent Prayuth has lost touch with reality becomes clear if one considers the timing of the invocation of section 44. It came a day prior to the 60th birthday celebrations for Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn, a supposedly happy occasion that was marked by the release of 38,000 prisoners, cultural activities, and the issuing of a special banknote. As in football-crazy countries where the distraction of a championship is often used by lawmakers to pass controversial legislation, Prayuth might have thought that Princess Sirindhorn’s allegedly universal popularity was sufficient to divert public attention away from his tightening grip on Thai politics. He was wrong. National and international audiences are no longer fooled by the gilded facades that once seemed to shield the Thai monarchy from scrutiny. These walls have come down since the royally sanctioned coup against Thaksin in 2006. And yet, political actors still try to latch on to royal charisma to legitimize their attack on democracy, failing to realize the futility of their endeavor. It smacks of desperation that, under Prayuth, a record number of people have been taken to military court under a lèse majesté law that provides for a maximum jail term of 15 years for each offence against the monarchy.

The most recent case involved a 58-year-old businessman who used Facebook accounts to criticize the king’s concept of “sufficiency economy,” which is, in fact, an ideological tool to dampen the economic aspirations of people in Thailand’s provinces. The man also alleged that Bhumibol was an ally of Prayuth, calling him names, and implying the king’s involvement in the opium business. The truth value of these claims notwithstanding, most observers agreed that the man’s sentencing to 50 years in prison was excessive. While the judge called it a “light” sentence given the offense, Amnesty International said it was “preposterous.” Only because he pleaded guilty was the man’s jail term halved to 25 years.

If there is hope left in Thailand, it must be directed towards a post-Bhumibol future when the cruel waiting game ends, the already thin layer of royal legitimacy for the country’s dictators vanishes, and their agenda spills out into the open, making them vulnerable to internal and external opposition. In light of Thailand’s tectonic political and social shifts, which the military top brass continues to ignore, and in light of Prayuth’s economic underperformance, it will not help much that the constitution – which may or may not be adopted in the coming months, either in a sham public referendum or not – has been devised to weaken political parties and the executive while enshrining outside intervention as a principle.

Constitution

It is futile to discuss the details of a Thai constitution because it is often not worth the paper it is written on. It will be torn apart anyway if a power-hungry general deems this necessary. But even if left as it is, the next constitution will be harmful to politics in Thailand. It will likely include a clause allowing for an unelected prime minister if there is a political crisis, a provision that will hang like the Sword of Damocles over the head of any democratically elected leader. By introducing an electoral system based on Germany’s mixed-member proportional representation, which produces coalitions rather than governments dominated by a single powerful party, the drafters hope to prevent a figure like Thaksin from ever emerging again. With party lists becoming more important, Thaksin-affiliated parties may indeed be slightly weakened as they have been stronger on the constituency vote in the past. But even under the new system it is likely that Phuea Thai will still win a majority. And given the tendency in Thailand for smaller parties to jump on the prime ministerial bandwagon rather than stick to their own vision, Thaksin or an incarnation is likely to continue to play a role. In that case, chaos would be incited to prepare the ground for an unelected prime minister to take power.

The central problem of Thai politics is that political competition is still seen as divisive by the country’s old guard and not as part and parcel of a healthy democratically constituted state. That is why the country’s old and grey charter drafters try to force politicians to work together in coalitions and to water down the agendas of civilian political leaders who are viewed with suspicion. They are potentially loose cannons because they are accountable to their voters, not to the military or the monarchy. But what the drafters forget is that the political culture in Germany is poles apart from that in Thailand and coalitions work differently. Imagine a Thai party like the Social Democrats (SPD) in Germany being a junior coalition partner but setting the agenda and shaping policies, as the SPD has done, and then having to watch the prime minister from the bigger party – a Thai version of Chancellor Angela Merkel – take credit for its work. Thai party leaders are not known for such modesty and humility. Thailand’s self-absorbed dictator Prayuth, of all people, should be able to sympathize with them. Instead, he attacks Thailand’s political camps for pursuing their agendas as if he himself was a disinterested savior of the nation.

In the face of international criticism, Prayuth defended the decision to invoke section 44 by saying: “After all, how could we deal with all these problems if we didn’t have section 44? You should not think it’s so peaceful now. As you may know, some political camps are still active.” Prayuth must understand that a country needs active and differing political camps, that their development needs to be nurtured by letting democratic processes run their course, rather than stifled through military intervention. If Thailand’s malicious dictator does not learn this lesson quickly, opponents at home and abroad will need to get tough sooner rather than later. It is time for Prayuth to go.

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The Authors

Serhat Ünaldi is Project Manager in the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s “Germany and Asia” program. He has recently completed a doctorate at Humboldt-University in Berlin where he worked on the Thai political crisis.

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