Why China Has No Donald Trump

“China is in many ways a nasty place,” Steven Pinker said in a 2014 interview, “but nowhere near as nasty as it was under Mao.” This is consistent Pinker’s view that humanity is progressing beyond the violent barbarity that was once so common it inspired Thomas Hobbes to describe life as “nasty, brutish, and short.”

Bradley A. Thayer of Utah State University, however, has argued that with regard to China, three issues in particular challenge Pinker’s thesis: escalating border disputes, military expansion, and troubling alliances. Indeed, the South China Sea dispute illustrates Beijing’s distaste for territorial diplomacy and its military expenditure, now the world’s second highest, is projected to approach U.S. spending by 2045. Also, of course, it’s no surprise that countries like Japan, Turkey, Germany, India, or the United States are alarmed by Chinese alliances with Russia, Iran, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.

But take a look at a comparison made by Francis Fukuyama in a 2011 dialogue with Zhang Weiwei, professor of International Relations at Fudan University. Fukuyama discussed the disadvantages of the Chinese system, chiefly its insufficient rule of law and lack of public accountability, but also noted one widely acknowledged benefit by citing two contrasting examples. When the Mumbai-based automotive company Tata Motors tried to build a plant in Bangalore, protestors shut the project down; meanwhile, Beijing successfully completed its Three Gorges Dam project despite heavy domestic opposition.

In other words, the advantage of the Chinese system is the incredible power its leaders wield, affording a height of efficiency unattainable by U.S. politics, for example, bogged down as they are by partisan intransigence. But every blessing has its price, and Fukuyama’s concern here is the “bad emperor” problem, or the idea that such power is helpful only so long as the person wielding it isn’t, as he says, another Mao.

Zhang replied to this by comparing post-Mao China to post-slavery America, noting that both nations have made mistakes and since moved on. This is a weak comparison since slavery ended in the United States 150 years ago, is taught in public schools, and is an active part of the national dialogue. In contrast, Mao’s rule ended only 35 years ago and remains soaked in the bleach of state propaganda. Still, putting aside Zhang’s poor analogy, is the claim fundamentally true? Has the Chinese system evolved beyond the “bad emperor” problem?

For one thing, contrary to popular Western opinion, Chinese citizens are an integral part of the process of selecting Chinese leaders. After all, like the United States, China is a republic. Its citizens elect members of their local congress, who then elect members of their provincial congress, who in turn elect delegates to the People’s National Congress, which elects the president.

Moreover, as Fukuyama himself is careful to note, China has a robust tradition of meritocracy, beginning with the first imposition of civil service examinations in 605 CE. As a result, the further up the ladder you go, the more experienced and professional Chinese politicians generally are. The process is very impersonal. Since the public has no direct say in who moves forward, identity politics and demagogy don’t play the supporting roles that they do in other countries. Instead, a politician’s rising star is often tied to factors such as how many jobs he or she created, how much the economy in their region improved, or how much pollution they managed to cut.

This, coupled with its added layers of representative election, means China’s leaders are selected with public participation, but more directly, by a professional elite who attained their positions largely on the basis of their performance records. China is a massive and rapidly developing nation, so political corruption is, of course, a problem, but as Zhang notes, China is tackling this problem with uncompromising vigilance whereas in the U.S., for example, the financiers behind the 2008 financial crisis faced few consequences.

So while Chinese leaders enjoy a dangerous level of power, becoming president is highly dependent on a candidate’s winning approval among thousands of political professionals whose jobs depend on their competency. Compare this to the situation in the United States, where leaders enjoy less power, but becoming president is highly dependent on a candidate’s popularity among the general public. So, rather than a “bad emperor” problem, Zhang worries about another “George W. Bush” problem:

If the American political system continues as it is today, I am really concerned that the next elected U.S. president could be even less competent than George W. Bush. As a superpower, American policies have global implications. … What the West is practicing is increasingly an election system which I sometimes call ‘showbiz democracy’ or ‘Hollywood democracy.’ It’s more about showmanship than leadership. As long as the procedure is right, it doesn’t matter who is elected.

I wish I shared Fukuyama’s optimism that the American system will, in the end, ferret out the best solution and ultimately appoint the best leader, but then of course I’m obliged to explain the fantastic popularity of presidential candidate Donald Trump, who’s not only soaring in the polls but seems to become more popular the more he proves himself ill-suited to the task. If that isn’t Hollywood democracy, what is?