Steven Rood

In yet another interesting turn in Philippine politics, controversial, tough-talking mayor Rodrigo Duterte won the 2016 presidential elections held on May 9. Duterte, a self-avowed leftist from the country’s Muslim-dominated south, ran a populist campaign centered on an iron-fisted approach to eradicating crime and headline-grabbing comments on subjects ranging from rape fantasies to his links to extrajudicial killings. Duterte’s victory has sparked worries about a dramatic reversal from his reform-minded predecessor, Benigno Aquino III, who had ushered in a six-year period of impressive economic growth and begun to address the manifold political, security, and human rights challenges that have caused the country to lag behind some of its Asian neighbors for decades.

The Diplomat spoke to Steven Rood, the Asia Foundation’s country representative for the Philippines, about the significance of Duterte’s victory and what we might expect from him at home and abroad.

This is just the sixth Philippine election since the overthrow of dictator Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. How would you characterize this election?

This is the third time the Philippines has had a fully automated election and, like the first time in 2010, things went remarkably smoothly.  Despite some last-minute changes (for instance, the Supreme Court ruling that the voting machines had to issue receipts), there was a record turnout and results were known within hours or days. Like in 2010, a large margin for the winning presidential candidate made concessions easy and the transition smoother. The only remaining close race is for vice president (which is voted separately from the presidential election), where Liberal Party candidate Leni Robredo has an unofficial lead of some 200,000 votes over Senator Bongbong Marcos, son of longtime (1965-1986) president Ferdinand Marcos. That race will officially be decided by the sitting Congress as it canvasses the votes beginning May 25.

Violence, despite dozens of incidents, was down in these elections. 

In short, despite considerable doubts expressed during the campaign, and some isolated charges of systematic fraud, the Philippine Commission on Election accepted congratulations from many quarters for a job well done.

How should we read the significance of Rodrigo Duterte’s victory in the presidential election in the context of Philippine politics?

There is a tendency to overread the significance of Duterte’s victory. He won in his home region of Mindanao, and in the national capital region, a traditional way for a politician to win national office. It is ironic that an outsider from the far south was boosted so much by the “imperial Manila” he decries – the Manila-centered media consistently gave him free publicity beginning with the “will-he-or-won’t he” of his delayed declaration of candidacy, and throughout the campaign with the coverage of his many controversial statements. 

So, Duterte doesn’t necessarily represent “new politics” but rather a rejection of the normal Manila elite.  His cabinet choices have tended to be experienced people, but coming from Mindanao and the central Visayas rather than from the previously dominant metropolis. 

What, in your view, were the factors that enabled Duterte to defeat his opponents in the election?

Perhaps most importantly of all, he was underestimated. Only once before had a mayor jumped directly to a nationally elected office, and that was in 2010 when Makati City Mayor Jejomar Binay became vice president. And Binay’s victory capped a decades-long organizing effort, as he reached out by using his Makati base to build sister-city relations with hundreds of localities, and his position heading the Boy Scouts of the Philippines to reach out to hundreds more. Thus, at the beginning of the campaign, when the ruling Liberal Party wanted to have Mar Roxas run for president, it was Binay who was the target of sustained attacks for almost two years. Such attacks did not erode Binay’s support but clearly prevented him from expanding his base as the campaign wore on.

Duterte only began to figure in the surveys in March 2015, and as late as March 2016 he was still running third, if you look at data released by Social Weather Stations (SWS), a nonprofit social research institution. His surge began then – he got very valuable exposure from the three nationwide televised debates where he managed to be himself (folksy, abrasive) and proved that he belonged on the stage with the rest of the candidates. His opponents, Roxas and first-time senator Grace Poe, waited until the last minute to even begin to think of a united front, but nothing came of that.

There is his “man of the people” image that he shares with Binay. Unlike Binay, who really did come from a poor family, Duterte had a governor for a father. But Duterte has lived a simple life and for his entire career cultivated the image of a street-tough man of action.  Both men had a common touch, so when Duterte finally surged at the end of the campaign he seemed to be taking votes from Binay.

Finally, and most importantly, there is his anti-crime message. When he took over as mayor of Davao City in the late 1980s it was one of the most violent cities in the country. As he cleaned it up, and introduced disciplines like strict speed limits and smoking bans, he has reveled in his “Dirty Harry” image and has repeatedly threatened criminals with death. The result is that some estimate 1,400 victims of extrajudicial killings in the city, conducted by shadowy “Davao Death Squads.” This is not unique in the country – recently re-elected Cebu City Mayor Tommy Osmeña has been linked to similar methods, and former Manila City Mayor Alfredo Lim also had the nickname “Dirty Harry.” Whether poor and living in informal settlements, or middle class with valuables vulnerable to theft, city dwellers rate crime--especially drugs--as the most important problem facing their locality.  Duterte duly won the urbanites’ vote with his promises to have so many corpses in Manila Bay that the fish would get fat. That message resonated with voters, no matter how much it might have appalled foreign observers or human rights advocates.

Domestically, Duterte has talked about some bold proposals, including changing the Philippines into a federal state. What should we make of ideas like these, and what prospects do they have for succeeding?

Duterte has long been an advocate of federalism, a change to the Philippines’ unitary constitution, and began nationwide tours a couple of years ago talking about the issue. He has made it clear that he expects to press ahead with this, and there is certainly some appetite for such a change in areas outside of Manila. Federalism was bruited briefly during the 1986 Constitutional Commission, but eventually it was decided that a unitary state would have just two autonomous regions – for the indigenous peoples of the Cordillera up north and for Muslim Mindanao. There has been appetite for Charter Change (inevitably, in the Philippines, ChaCha) to remove the economically protectionist provisions of the constitution, and his economic team has endorsed this thrust also. The Manila elite is often leery of federalism, fearing national breakup, but in favor of economic changes to increase investment. It may well be that a deal can be struck to achieve both changes, with a ratification plebiscite to occur during the midterm elections in 2019.

A shift to federalism is often paired in advocates’ minds with a change from a presidential to a parliamentary system. There is, of course, not necessary a connection (witness the United States), and survey data show that the average Filipino dislikes a parliamentary system. Filipinos wish to vote for their head of government, instead of delegating that choice to members of parliament.

Taken in isolation, changes to the constitution have a good chance. However, there is bound to be controversy over Duterte’s law and order thrusts (“criminals have no rights”) and his authoritarian style of leadership. This may well slow down the change process, but in the end, particularly in the first three years of his term before the midterm elections, a president can get most of what he wants done.

A spectacular initiative, which only a few perceptive analysts foresaw (emphatically excluding me) was his robust reaching out to the Communist Party of the Philippines. It was long known that he would try to reinvigorate stagnant peace talks with the National Democratic Front of the Philippines but Duterte’s offer of four cabinet posts (Social Work, Labor, Environment, and Agrarian Reform) took most observers by surprise. While this will no doubt encourage the NDFP to take peace talks more seriously, it sets up even more controversy between more mainstream financial advisors in the Finance and Planning agencies and those skeptical of capitalism from the left. Cabinet meetings are likely to be very lively!

In the peace process with Muslim rebel groups, there seems to be some disarray within his camp. Duterte himself had promised the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) that the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) which had been negotiated would be passed, and could serve as a template for other “states” in the shift to federalism. On the part of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), founding chairman Nur Misuari explicitly endorsed Duterte. Incoming advisor on the peace process, Jesus Dureza, had talked of an extensive series of consultations to arrive at a road map for peace in Mindanao. Yet in the week after the election, Duterte’s candidate for Speaker of the House of Representatives, Pantaleon Alvarez, repeatedly stated that Congress will not take up the bill, but will rather focus entirely on the shift to a federal state. This has led MILF leaders to wonder publically which is the direction that will be taken – that outlined by Duterte or that asserted by Alvarez.

On foreign policy, much has been made of Duterte’s more cordial tone towards China, as well as his perceived suspicion of the United States, which some date back to his time as mayor of Davao City. Do you foresee any changes in how the Philippines approaches the United States and China, and what effect could this have on issues such as the South China Sea disputes, which the Philippines is a claimant in?

Two things are often overlooked in discussions of Duterte’s positions on the West Philippine/South China Sea. First, he asserts Philippine sovereignty over those features that the Philippines claims, and would demand as a condition for discussion with China that they not assert their sovereignty over any area for joint development. In short, mutual practical forbearance. Secondly, he always reiterates that he will wait for the decision of the UN Tribunal currently hearing the case brought by the Philippines (as long as that decision is not too long in coming out) before undertaking any initiatives.

That said, he is indeed more skeptical of relations with the United States than the outgoing administration. In 2002 an explosion happened in the hotel room of an American, who was then whisked out of Davao City under murky circumstances. This only fed Duterte’s resentment of what he saw as high-handed actions by U.S. officialdom. Still, U.S. President Barack Obama was the first head of state to call and congratulate him on his victory, and it seems that their talk was “frank” (in diplomatic terms) – Obama bringing up human rights, and president-elect Duterte probing the extent of U.S. support in the West Philippine/South China Sea.

Looking ahead, apart from Duterte’s rhetoric, what are some early signs that we should look for in the coming months to gauge where his presidency is heading in terms of actual policy?

Two waves of indicators are coming: the first are his appointments. Here the indications are less about policy directions (for example, yoking leftists with businessmen in the cabinet) and more about the appointees being persons that Duterte knows and trusts. In that situation, we will learn less about thrusts from those who are appointed, as they wait for policy direction from the incoming president.  Perhaps the exception to this generalization was his naming of Ronald dela Rosa to head the Philippine National Police, a man who shares Duterte’s affinity for tough action; clearly Duterte aims to follow-up on his campaign rhetoric about crime.

The second set of indications will come from the struggle to get policy proposals, statements, and directions into the State of the Nation Address (SONA) scheduled for the opening of the new Congress on July 25. The SONA, more than the inaugural speech on June 30 upon having been sworn into office, will be the venue for detailing what the president has agreed with his team on (or the instructions he has given) to be the initial activities of his presidency.