An Arms Race in Southeast Asia?

The South China Sea (SCS) tensions, which captured media attention before and right after the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) announced its award in the Philippine-filed lawsuit against China on July 12, have gone from a near boil to a slow simmer. Indeed, several moves had been made by various parties – both claimants and non-claimants – to de-escalate tensions following that fateful day.

It is likely no coincidence that the navy chiefs of both China and the United States had a discussion shortly after July 12, ostensibly to agree on ways to keep regional tensions under control. In this context, it is interesting to note that the U.S. Navy did not conduct any freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) to capitalize upon the PCA award and, except for more normal “routine patrols” in the SCS, has yet to conduct another. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China agreed on expediting the proposed Code of Conduct and set guidelines on a maritime hotline as well as implementing the code on unplanned encounters at sea (CUES) in the SCS. For its part, Manila dispatched former President Fidel Ramos to China for icebreaker talks, which helped defrost ties somewhat. The G20 Summit in Hangzhou in September added to the optimism that dire predictions about post-July 12 may not materialize after all.

But it is too early to say.

Amid these positive moves, underlying tensions remain. It is not clear, first of all, whether China will in fact embark on further provocative moves in the SCS. There are some possibilities being speculated – either an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) or island-building on the Scarborough Shoal or even both. Amid speculation that Beijing may start to build an artificial island on the shoal after the G20 Summit and before the U.S. presidential elections, Manila had made worrying revelations about having observed Chinese dredgers in the area.

It is with regard to this uncertain strategic context in the SCS that commentaries emerged – in fact preceding the July 12 award – that there is an ongoing arms race in the region. Before we delve into whether there is indeed an arms race, one may turn toward existing theories that could help better explain the regional arms processes.

Turning to Theories: What is in A Name?

The arms race theory has often been invoked as an analytical lens to determine the consequences of military modernization. But it suffers from limitations. The first revolves around definitions. Indeed, there is not just one definition; contending definitions were put forth by arms race theorists. In his seminal paper on this topic published in 1971, Colin Gray described an arms race as being fulfilled by four basic factors: 1) there must be two or more parties, conscious of their antagonism; 2) they must structure their armed forces with attention to the probable effectiveness of the forces in combat with, or as a deterrent to, the other arms race participants; 3) they must compete in terms of quantity (men, weapons) and/or quality (men, weapons, organization, doctrine, deployment); and 4) there must be rapid increases in quantity and/or improvements in quality.

In an attempt to address the conceptual flaw of distinguishing the abnormal condition of arms race from normal behavior, Grant Hammond came up with a more extensive set of criteria in his 1993 book Plowshares into Swords: 1) two or more participants, though the relationship is in essence a bilateral one; 2) specific designation of an adversary or potential adversary; 3) military and diplomatic planning based directly on the capabilities and intent of the other; 4) a high degree of public animosity or antagonism between the parties involved; 5) political-military linkage of state actions between or among rival force structures and strategies; 6) an extraordinary and consistent increase in the level of defense effort in excess of 8 percent per annum; 7) the focus on a particular weapons environment or weapons system vis-a-vis the opponent with an explicit ratio goal; and finally, 8) the purpose of the effort, which is to seek dominance via intimidation over the rival in political-military affairs.

Gray was one of the first to critique Hammond’s criteria, pointing out that criteria 3, 4 and 5 are difficult to measure and operationalize, whereas criterion 6 seems arbitrary. Criterion 7 was deemed unnecessary because, as Gray argues, it happens too commonly. Criterion 8 was said to be unnecessarily narrow because an arms race could also be pursued for deterrence, improving one’s ability to fight war should one occur, or avoiding the other’s attempt to achieve dominance. In fact, Gray not only criticized Hammond’s criteria but deemed arms races a non-existent phenomenon, going so far as to repudiate his own 1971 paper.

Barry Buzan and Eric Herring concurred with Gray’s critique, but they regard arms races as the most extreme manifestation within a continuum called “arms dynamics,” which they defined as “the entire set of pressures that make actors (usually states) both acquire armed forces and change the quantity and quality of the armed forces they already possess.” Arms-racing remains significant because it reflects intensified political rivalry and because it consumes more resources than less intense manifestations of arms dynamics, they argued.  

Military Expenditures: A Misleading Indicator?

Southeast Asian arms processes fulfill some, if not all, of the criteria espoused in the existing theories. Notably, commentaries on an ongoing arms race in Southeast Asia often center on the somewhat phenomenal rise in military expenditures. Military spending in Asia and Oceania, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), rose by 5.4 percent in 2015 and by 64 percent between 2006 and 2015.

For Southeast Asia, military expenditures amount to $39.7 billion out of the total of $436 billion for the whole of Asia and Oceania. East Asia, fronted by China, accounted for the bulk of this total spending, at $302 billion. Military expenditures in Southeast Asia increased by 8.8 percent in 2015 – the highest increase compared to the other sub-regions, with Oceania ranked second at 7.7 percent and East Asia third at 5.7 percent. But the change in military expenditures for Southeast Asia is not the highest compared to other contiguous sub-regions over the 2006-2015 period; it was just 57 percent compared to 75 percent for East Asia.

Here comes the problem of looking at military expenditures as a tell-tale sign of arms dynamics: even if such indicators may provide a singular, comprehensive measure of capability, the focus obviates the need to make judgments about quality and how to combine disparate elements (personnel, equipment, etc.) together.

Sean Bolks and Richard Stolls pointed out that using total military expenditures to measure interstate arms competition can be problematic on the following counts: 1) it does not take into account that some countries rely on conscription, whereas others have a professional military, thus personnel costs can vary widely and a comparison of expenditures between states with different personnel policies can be very misleading; 2) states do not have the same concept of what constitutes military expenditures; 3) states have different economic systems and/or very different economic policies, and associated differences in policies on subsidization of military industries; 4) states may engage in deliberate deception about the level of their expenditures; and; 5) total expenditures imply that all of the armed services are engaged in competition when in fact this may not be the case.

Assuming that there is indeed an “arms race” taking place in Southeast Asia, one needs to consider the feasibility of such a phenomenon in the context of internal and external balancing.

Internal Balancing: Less of a Problem These Days

Where internal balancing is concerned, one refers to intra-ASEAN dynamics – a more likely prospect since most ASEAN countries (in particular, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) are appropriately positioned to match each other’s acquisitions given their more or less equivalent baselines of military capabilities.

Yet one would be hard pressed to argue that the current spate of arms acquisitions in Southeast Asia has been aimed at fellow ASEAN neighbors. Intra-ASEAN animosities, much related to the post-1945 historical legacies and some outstanding geopolitical differences, would have constituted strong rationale for this internal balancing argument from the 1990s through the early 2000s. But since then, most of the outstanding territorial and sovereignty disputes between ASEAN governments have been resolved peacefully – the Indonesia-Malaysia Ligitan/Sipadan Islands case in 2002 and the Malaysia-Singapore row over Pedra Branca in 2008 count as shining examples.

In the recent years, while neighborly differences over unresolved disputes continue to flare up from time to time, none has erupted into the explosive situations observed in the 1990s and early 2000s. The last serious Indonesia-Malaysia maritime standoff over the disputed Ambalat hydrocarbon block in the Celebes/Sulawesi Sea took place in 2009, for instance, during which an Indonesian warship almost fired upon its Malaysian counterpart. Initial concerns about the re-emerging dispute between Kuala Lumpur and Manila over Sabah were dispelled after both capitals, along with Jakarta, agreed on collective maritime security arrangements against a growing seaborne militant “kidnap-for-ransom” threat in the Sulu Sea. As such, the external pressures for an arms race are not as applicable in the present context between ASEAN countries as was the case in the past.

If one insists on the label “arms race” to describe the phenomenon taking place in Southeast Asia, then the picture is a somewhat positive one from the internal balancing perspective. More accurately, one could ascribe the present spate of military modernization processes to technological drivers – that ASEAN countries may acquire weapons simply because they felt the need to keep up with the general regional trends, not necessarily for reasons of animosity. Chances of arms procurements destabilizing intra-ASEAN peace are considered lower than in the past due to the removal of many potential causes, chief among them territorial and sovereignty disputes.

External Balancing: A Non-Starter?

As far as external balancing is concerned, one would associate arms processes taking place in Southeast Asia as a reflection of extra-ASEAN threat perceptions. One invariably turns to the SCS for indicators. According to SIPRI, the substantial growth in military expenditures in 2015 by Indonesia (16 percent), the Philippines (25 percent), and Vietnam (7.6 percent) reflected heightened tensions with China over the SCS disputes. Suffice to say, non-claimant ASEAN countries such as Singapore would have also beefed up military capabilities not in response to a specific adversary but as a hedge against an increasingly uncertain situation in the SCS, given the importance Singapore attaches to continued safe and secure access to sea lines of communications – on which the tiny island-state depends for national survival and prosperity – plying through the tense waters.

But if arms racing is used as a label with China in mind, from the external balancing perspective, then it is a misnomer to begin with. An “arms race” ought to refer to, in layman’s term, a sort of relentless competition in which the parties involved seek to gain advantage over the other at all cost. The label cannot be appropriately applied to the SCS scenario. In 2015, China spent a total of $214.8 billion (in constant 2014 dollars) for defense, a whopping sum that no single ASEAN country -- or even all ten of the member states combined -- could possibly match.

Next, one could possibly look at the quality and quantity of weapon systems. The first aspect represents a much more mixed picture. Emerging Chinese military technologies still represent an unknown quality, though altogether these amount to a mixed picture. On the one hand, Chinese military technologies have achieved some notable successes – the export of warships to Bangladesh, Nigeria, Pakistan, and more recently, Algeria, for instance. On the other hand, Chinese military technologies appear to still be far from shaking off the label of being unreliable and of low quality. The Indonesian Navy’s recent test firings of Chinese-made C-705 ASCMs reportedly ended in failure.

Nevertheless, on the whole it is evident that China has made impressive strides in its military modernization over the recent decades, in particular introducing new classes of warplanes, warships, and submarines already put into service in the SCS. The more frequent appearance of Chinese military assets capable of long-range force projection, such as Sukhoi-27/30 and its Chinese J-11 variant multi-role fighter jets, the HQ-9 surface-to-air missile system Beijing deployed to Woody Island early this year, and flotillas composed of some of its newest guided missile destroyers, frigates, and large amphibious assault landing ships, speaks of the widening qualitative military gap between China and its ASEAN neighbors.

To be sure, China’s massive preponderance in military power does not stop ASEAN countries, especially those who stake claims in the SCS, from beefing up their own defenses if only to complicate Beijing’s military campaign planning and, if push comes to shove, to exact higher price for the latter’s aggression.

Vietnam is the epitome of a SCS claimant, disadvantaged by the growing asymmetry in military capabilities relative to China, that decided to raise the cost of any prospective Chinese belligerence in the SCS. Its purchase of six Kilo-class submarines, armed with Klub long-range cruise missiles for anti-ship and land attack, shore-based Bastion-P coastal defense missiles, Su-30MK2 fighters optimized for maritime attack, and a plethora of Russian- and locally-built fast attack craft festooned with ASCMs indicates Hanoi’s resolve to blunt any Chinese military adventures in the SCS, even if the outcome is preordained to be a defeat for Vietnam should Beijing bring its full military power to bear.

Other ASEAN countries continue to make inroads into qualitatively beefing up their capabilities, even if small quantities of those assets are being procured for most of them (except in the case of Singapore and Vietnam). This is well reflected, for instance, in the spate of submarine acquisitions among ASEAN countries other than Vietnam, such as Indonesia, Singapore, and most recently Thailand with its plan to acquire three boats (furthermore, China is the supplier). Likewise, the same applies to multi-role fighter jets, major surface combatants, and -- for some countries – improvements in command, control, communications, and computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) as “force multipliers” to maximize the effectiveness of their limited though advanced arsenals.

On the whole, continuing from and building upon the military modernization traits in the 1990s, ASEAN militaries have gained in terms of long-range force projection, enhanced firepower, mobility, and precision, as well as combat persistence. Still, some of these advantages – especially where those technologies are acquired from the West and could be deemed as superior to those developed by China – could be nullified by Beijing’s quantitative preponderance.

At the same time, however, ASEAN countries clearly do not seek to engage in an arms race in the SCS. For example, Vietnam’s Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc was quoted in foreign media saying that Hanoi has no intention to join such a race in the SCS. In fact, the term “arms race” has become an oft-used label by not just commentators but also policymakers in the region to broadly describe any aspect of the arms dynamics taking place. Suffice to note, an arms race between China and its ASEAN rivals in the SCS – be it in any form – is a non-starter to begin with. Whatever military technology any ASEAN country may choose to acquire, China would be able to acquire an equivalent, and more of such as its resources allow.

Unilateral, or Tacit, Restraint?

Going by a strictly academic definition, then, an “arms race” does not really apply to Southeast Asia, even when examined from the lenses of internal and external balancing dynamics. Concerned members of the academia would mostly agree that the less extreme “arms competition” is what reflects the processes taking place in recent times.

But the problem is that the label “arms race” has become so broadly and loosely applied by policymakers that any further attempt at trying to make rigorous, analytical sense of what it means becomes nothing more than a mere academic exercise that is devoid of policy utility – especially not with regional defense planners who continue to conflate “arms races” with less extreme forms of arms dynamics, or overzealous commentators who decide that sensationalism is the order of the day.

Still one thing is certain: the rapid infusion of cutting-edge, increasingly lethal armaments in Southeast Asia, especially when seen in the context of the simmering SCS disputes, does provide fertile grounds for concern about what will happen in the future. As such, it has become arguably less important to try to characterize the arms acquisition processes as an arms race--or to try to uncover the somewhat onerous “laundry list” of actual or possible (or perceived) external and domestic forces that drive procurement decisions--than to try to examine the consequences of such phenomena.

It is true that the simmering tensions could be attributed in part to the influx of military capabilities in the region. Such an influx gives rise to a sharpened sense of unease and suspicions toward the strategic intent of neighboring states. Yet existing studies attempting to examine the relationship between arms dynamics and the outbreak of armed conflict – many of which have utilized statistical models drawing on historical case studies – have proven less than conclusive. Suffice to note, besides ratcheting up of tensions in the SCS, none of the parties involved have slipped into the outright use of force.

For example, consider the tense almost two month long stand-off between China and Vietnam over the controversial China National Offshore Oil Corporation deep sea rig HYSY-981 in mid-2014. Despite recurring provocative actions both sides claimed were committed by the other against their vessels, and -- in the case of China -- the massive deployment of military forces in the vicinity of the rig and Beijing-controlled Paracel Islands, the incident ended without further antagonism. Cynical observers may attribute this absence of escalation to the overwhelming show of Chinese military might,, which furnished an effective deterrence against any Vietnamese attempt to escalate. But it is evident that both parties exercised a certain degree of self-restraint that might have helped averted a repeat of what happened between the two countries back in 1974 and 1988.

As such, notwithstanding the rapid arms buildup, and skepticism toward the war-preventing functions played by economic interdependence and the efficacy of regional institutions such as those revolving around ASEAN, one aspect that has often been overlooked has been the desire by regional governments to avoid escalation, through the exercise of unilateral – or even tacit – restraint even in their application of militarized forms of coercion.

Putting Things in Perspective

It is worth repeating Colin Gray’s “weapons don’t make war” argument here. Ultimately it is the human operator – the political master or commander – who chooses to give a stabilizing or destabilizing character to the weapon system, no matter how offensive its inherent characteristic may be. There is much at stake when it comes to the decision to fire an aimed shot at a rival in the SCS. The potential political and socioeconomic repercussions associated with the escalation of tensions may unerringly invite undue world attention. Moreover, for such a diverse region as Southeast Asia, where the diverse and complex multitude of maritime safety and security challenges far transcends just the SCS disputes, weapons purchases help address day-to-day problems ASEAN governments face in maintaining good order at sea. As some naval officials and defense policymakers have openly remarked, pooling capacities to collectively deal with complicated, transnational maritime security threats does require each participating government to possess requisite capacity in order to bring meaningful contributions to the table. In other words, arms purchases, rather than being seen as a cause for concern when viewed single mindedly as a tool of destabilization, could well be stability-inducing for Southeast Asia.

Finally, “preaching” about what constitutes “legitimate defense acquisitions” (as was popularly done especially in the 1990s by arms control enthusiasts) would go nowhere so long as defense planners regard national interests – broadly and even ambiguously defined – as their foremost consideration for acquiring armaments. In other words, one needs to admit, it is ultimately each individual government which is the final arbiter of what constitutes “legitimate defense acquisitions,” even if one could argue that whatever policy undertaken ought to also take into consideration other countries’ interests. One example of this is the ongoing tensions between China and South Korea over the latter’s decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system – a move Beijing deemed as detrimental to its security interests whiles Seoul sees it as fundamental.

More importantly for Southeast Asia, besides acknowledging that arms purchases are essential and legitimate approaches in dealing with persistent maritime safety and security concerns that go beyond just the SCS, it is more pertinent to encourage ASEAN governments to persist in regional confidence-building efforts, establish closer practical security cooperation, and invest more in the enhancement of military operators’ professionalism. Recent developments have been encouraging to note: ASEAN governments like those in Indonesia and Malaysia have moved to expedite the processes of resolving outstanding territorial and sovereignty disputes. The Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines Sulu Sea Patrol Initiative is a noteworthy achievement.

Keen observers of Southeast Asian security should not just focus on the negatives but also the positive aspects of arms acquisition processes in the region. Such dynamics are certainly more nuanced than first meets the eye.