Politics of Persecution: Jakarta’s Election Is Unraveling Indonesia

Massive protests in Indonesia’s political epicenter, Jakarta, and scaremongering by Islamists and prominent Indonesian military leaders are shredding any hope that Indonesia’s relatively tolerant pluralistic political landscape will endure. All of this has occurred against an alarming backdrop of increased religious intolerance, vigilantism, and large numbers of Indonesians traveling to join the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

There is no straightforward explanation for what is happening in the Indonesian political arena. The issue at the top of the nation’s news feed has been the alleged criminal blasphemy of incumbent Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, also known as Ahok, and the huge backlash that this has generated amongst Indonesia’s conservative Islamist groups. Even with the elections for Jakarta governor slated for February 15, the country looks set to remain mired in political uncertainty for far longer. The uproar enveloping Ahok, who is Chinese-Indonesian and Christian, reached its apotheosis in November and December last year when over one million people took to the streets in Jakarta demanding he be arrested for criminal blasphemy.

Ahok’s troubles stemmed from public outrage in response to provocative statements he made last year asserting Quranic scripture was being used deceptively by some political elites. Since then, his criminal trial has received saturated media coverage just as gubernatorial candidates, including Ahok himself, frantically campaign to be elected Jakarta governor – the second most influential publicly elected office in the country after the presidency.

On the heels of the protests, Ahok’s investigation and trial were rushed through with presidential urgency – amidst rumors of a plot to overrun the parliament, accusations of treason, and several high-profile arrests. The ensuing drama has consumed the country with its tearful moments and histrionics, including a plaintive testimony by Ahok himself. However, the viral video footage quite clearly shows he did in fact say to a group of people in the Regency of Thousand Islands that a particular verse in the Quran warning Muslims against conflicts of interest with non-Muslims was being used to deceive people for political gain. Assertions that his words were taken out of context or that he did not intend to offend have only aggravated Indonesia’s increasingly conservative Muslim majority. Intriguingly, Ahok’s overall electability remains strong in the face of a candidate field that is capitalizing on the incumbent governor’s devastating political faux pas.

In conversations with rally-goers in December, The Diplomat was informed that their grievances extend beyond Ahok’s verbal transgressions and hinge on old racial prejudices and fears of Chinese-Indonesian political and economic dominance.

Ahok’s indiscretion was quickly seized by evangelical Islamist groups, which have used the issue to coronate the vigilante group, the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI), as standard-bearers of Indonesia’s conservative Islamic lobby. What is remarkable about the toxic diatribes of FPI’s leader, Habib Muhammad Rizieq Shihab – a man who claims to be a descendant of the Prophet Mohammed – is how closely the issues he has raised correspond to the rhetoric of the commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces, General Gatot Nurmantyo, and Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu. All three men have come out openly warning of threats posed by capitalism, radicalism, neoliberalism, and communism.

Evangelical Islam: A First Recourse or Last Resort?

FPI’s founder and leader, Habib Rizieq, is well known for his fiery oratory, regularly staring down two of the largest Muslim organizations in the world, Nadlhatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. Both organizations initially urged their supporters not to participate in the largest of the two rallies held on December 2, going so far as dueling fatwas with the quasi-governmental governing body responsible for issuing religious edicts, the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI). The divergence in religious opinion concerned whether it was permissible for Muslims to conduct the Friday prayer on the street. When MUI issued its own fatwa explicitly endorsing the rally, NU's and Muhammadiyah's collective bluff had been called. Acting as a mediator between the army and police chiefs on the one hand, and FPI on the other, MUI Chairman Ma'ruf Amin was able to hammer out a settlement which allowed the rally to go ahead in a new location and under certain conditions. After the protest went off without any violence, Muhammadiyah Chairman Haedar Nasir was quick to commend the rally-goers for their “maturity and magnanimity.”

Rizieq spent his formative years in Jakarta, later studying Islamic jurisprudence in Saudi Arabia, and earning his MA in Malaysia. He has a long scholarly interest in the intersection of Indonesia’s nationalist philosophy – Pancasila – with an ultra-conservative interpretation of Islam. Rizieq’s worldview is best understood in the context of his rages against liberal democracy, witchcraft, vice, and secularism, all of which he sees as threats to the Indonesian state and society. He justifies FPI’s regular raids on churches, bars, and other Islamic sects’ places of worship, many of which have become violent, as being a form of “constitutional resistance.”

FPI and MUI both have ties with pan-Islamic political organization Hizb ut-Tahrir, including actively supporting the formation of a Muslim "Caliphate.” Hizb ut-Tahrir’s Indonesia chapter, known as HTI, is one of the largest in the world and has held mass gatherings of over 100,000 people in order to call for the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate as a panacea to Indonesia’s and the world’s problems. Neither FPI nor HTI are banned or appear to be considered a threat by Indonesian officials. What is clear after the two huge rallies in November and December last year is that FPI and HTI together represent a huge voting bloc for national political parties and the government. At the provincial level, all three organizations – MUI, FPI, and  HTI – wield influence over their supporters and are adept at subtly indicating which political candidates they prefer in local elections, whilst simultaneously claiming to keep a dignified distance from the political arena.

What is less clear is how evangelical political groups like FPI, MUI, and HTI have become both a first recourse for some people and an actor of last resort for different voter cohorts. The phenomenon of abstention and protest voting (i.e. white votes) in Indonesia has increased threefold since 1998, with some 57 million or 29 percent of voters in the 2014 presidential election either abstaining or leaving the ballot blank (or spoilt). Groups like MUI, FPI, and HTI offer political recourse for conservative Muslims in Indonesia that don’t want to directly participate in elections (i.e. democracy), but nevertheless want to be heard. 

It is hard not to see the "Rally to Defend Islam" held in Jakarta on December 2, which brought nearly one million people to the streets, as a watershed moment in Indonesian politics since the reform era. It symbolizes the rise of conservative Islamist groups, nourished by MUI, HTI, and FPI, as a major stakeholder bloc. The message sent by the rally-goers was unmistakable: the political cost of not taking us seriously will be high. There is no guarantee that the next rally will be as peaceful as the one on December 2.