Governing Myanmar

The National League for Democracy (NLD) government’s first year in power has not been easy. While there have been some important achievements, Aung San Suu Kyi and her party have struggled with economic policy, the peace process, and political violence. The NLD lacks governance experience, and the executive branch does not have control over the armed forces. As a result, the government has often appeared ineffectual. Still, much of the population is grateful to have leaders of their own choosing in office, and they are prepared to give the ruling party time.

A year ago, despite her party’s landslide election victory, it was not clear what position Aung San Suu Kyi would take in the government. She could not assume the presidency due to a constitutional clause barring those who have foreign spouses or children. After it became clear that the military was not going to make an exception for her (indeed the clause may have been written specifically to block her), the NLD came up with an ingenious solution. They created a new position, state counselor, approved by the NLD-dominated parliament, which has given her authority akin to a prime minister. She is also the foreign affairs minister and minister of the president’s office. With her loyal friend, Htin Kyaw, serving as the president, Suu Kyi has acted as the de facto head of government.

Finding qualified people to serve in senior positions in the government was another challenge. Few outside of the former regime had policymaking experience. Many long-time NLD members were eager to take posts but had never worked in government. Suu Kyi wanted a clean government, and a unified, loyal government. For the cabinet, she ultimately chose a few NLD members and several former civil servants whom she believed would act in accordance with her vision. She reduced the total number of ministries from 35 to 18. This cost-cutting measure also facilitated closer oversight of the government. Decision-making has remained highly centralized.

To demonstrate inclusiveness, Suu Kyi placed a few ethnic minority NLD members in prominent positions, but only one politician from an ethnic political party received a post, that of ethnic affairs minister. This new ministry has not played a significant role so far. Strikingly, she did incorporate a few senior ex-military people who had held high level positions in the past. They brought institutional knowledge, and the gesture suggested that cooperation with the armed forces was possible. Three key positions in the cabinet – defense, home affairs, and border affairs – were reserved for military appointees as laid out in the constitution.

Civil Liberties

Extending civil liberties was one of the first orders of business for the NLD government, given that so many party members had spent years as political prisoners. Over 60 student activists who had protested against the 2015 National Education Law and been in prison awaiting trial for over a year were quickly released. Following that, the NLD-dominated parliament repealed two state security laws that successive military governments had used to imprison dissenters. The parliament also revised parts of the 2011 Peaceful Assembly Law. Many peaceful protesters had been sent to prison for breaking overly restrictive provisions in the law. The legislators softened some, but not all, of these provisions. The NLD majority also over-ruled military lawmakers, who hold 25 percent of the seats in parliament, to rescind a stipulation in the local administration law that requires all residents to report anyone spending the night – even family members – to the local authorities. In force since the colonial period, this had been used to harass political activists and extort money from poorer citizens.

In addition, the NLD government took a firm stand against the Buddhist nationalist Committee for the Protection of Nationality and Religion (known by its Burmese acronym Ma Ba Tha), which had stirred up anti-Muslim sentiment under the previous government. The organization had already lost much of its popular support due to some of its leaders’ anti-NLD remarks and close associations with the military-backed USDP party during the 2015 election campaign. Once in power, senior government officials stated that there was no need for such an organization, and it could face legal prosecution if it continued to propagate hate speech. This was welcomed by the human rights community. Nevertheless, tolerance for criticism of state authorities has been more curtailed under the NLD government than many expected.

A broadly-worded defamation clause in the 2013 Telecommunications Law has remained a potent weapon, used frequently by the armed forces. With over 10 million users in Myanmar, Facebook is a platform for both news distribution and public discussion, and journalists and bloggers alike have been arrested for insulting or criticizing state leaders on the social media site. The NLD government has not stood up for those who have been accused, including one of their own, and has filed charges itself under the provision. This included suing the editor and the CEO of a well-known media publication after it published an article implying a leading NLD official had inappropriately accepted an expensive gift. Those charged for libel are held without bail and, if convicted, can be sentenced to up to three years in prison and fined. Journalists and activists have protested against the clause and how it has been used, putting pressure on parliament to review it in the coming year.

The NLD leadership has been wary of the media and has closely monitored the communications of elected party members. Most NLD parliamentarians are unwilling to give journalists interviews for fear that they will say something the leadership does not approve of. Neither Aung San Suu Kyi nor President Htin Kyaw interact much with the private domestic media. State-owned newspapers, which served as key propaganda organs for past governments, continue to be published daily in Burmese and English. Inexpensive and widely-distributed, the state-owned publications have by far the highest circulation, although increasingly, Burmese obtain news from a variety of sources online.

Rule of Law and the Economy

One of the NLD’s most powerful campaign promises was that it would institute the rule of law. Bribery and corruption are endemic in the bureaucracy and the judiciary, with the greatest impacts being felt by the poor. Meanwhile, well-connected businesspeople have often been able to operate outside the law with impunity. The NLD government sought to tackle the issue by banning civil servants from accepting gifts worth more than $23, promising to investigate evidence presented by citizens regarding civil servants’ wrongdoing, and clamping down on businesses breaking the law.

The government announced that expiring jade and gem mining licenses would not be renewed until stricter regulations to stop environmental damage and human deaths could be drawn up. Hundreds of itinerant workers have died in landslides at jade mines in recent years, and rivers have been polluted due to companies’ improper dumping practices. At the same time, the government wants to ensure that in the future, a far greater percentage of the precious stones are taxed and sold through legal channels. In 2014, Global Witness estimated the value of illegal jade sales at $31 billion, almost half the country’s GDP.

Similarly, in the logging industry, companies have flouted regulations on how much timber can be cut and which species, and they have illegally exported hundreds of thousands of metric tons of timber annually, primarily to China. Myanmar has the third highest rate of deforestation in the world. The government suspended all logging for a year and intends to exert more control over the industry in the future.

Also to signal a commitment to clean government and rule of law, the Yangon region government suspended over 200 high-rise building projects approved under the previous government. The purpose was to ensure developers were adhering to zoning and safety regulations, which not all were. But there was anger that in some cases new standards were being imposed retroactively. Moreover, the building freeze put thousands out of work for months and had ripple effects throughout the construction sector. Ultimately, the government allowed half-built buildings to be completed and focused its regulatory actions on projects that were still in the initial stages.

The NLD government’s efforts to stop malfeasance were rewarded with a six point improvement in ratings on Transparency International’s corruption index. Still, that left Myanmar tied with Nigeria. Rooting out such deeply entrenched practices, particularly if civil servants’ salaries remain low and their enforcement capabilities weak, will require years of effort.

Meanwhile, the government’s record in strengthening the legal economy has been mixed. In July 2016, the government announced a 12-point economic policy, which was welcomed for its commitment to a market system, increased transparency, the privatization of poorly performing state enterprises, and inclusive economic growth. But the policy document was only three pages long and contained no details. By February 2017, the government had still not released a more fully developed plan. The parliament passed a new investment law in October 2016, merging the previously separate foreign and domestic investment laws and streamlining approval mechanisms for foreign investment in non-strategic sectors. However, the government announced that the law would not go into effect until April 2017 when the by-laws would come out.

Aung San Suu Kyi has put significant effort into courting foreign investment and development assistance, particularly through her trips to the United States and key countries in the region. With her acquiescence, the Obama administration revoked almost all economic sanctions on Myanmar and lifted restrictions on U.S. companies engaging with enterprises led by military and ex-military men and former cronies. Given their economic dominance, avoiding working with them had been difficult. Japan’s agreement to provide almost $8 billion  in aid, loans, and investment over the next five years for both economic development and peacebuilding should have a substantial positive effect, particularly in infrastructure development.

The garment sector has boomed, but agriculturalists, who make up the vast majority of the population, have struggled. For more broad-based growth, the government needs to be more proactive and address existing obstacles. For starters, much more needs to be done to facilitate the supply of inexpensive credit to smallholder farmers and small and medium sized enterprises and to resolve land disputes due to widespread confiscation under previous governments. The government has also struggled to manage a depreciating currency, which has made imports of fertilizers, building materials, and medical supplies more costly and fueled inflation.

Overall, the cabinet’s weakness in economic policymaking and implementation has meant that Myanmar has not been as successful as it could have been in attracting new foreign investment and raising the standard of living of ordinary people. The rate of economic growth for 2016-17 is still expected to be an impressive 6.5 percent, but this represents a decline from the previous two years.

The Peace Process

Decades of civil war in Myanmar have had profound effects including widespread displacement and loss of life, militarization, and deepened feelings of mistrust. Ongoing conflict and unstable ceasefires have impeded economic development and political reform. The NLD government, like the USDP government before it, has considered achieving peace a top priority. However, progress so far has been limited. Under the previous government, bilateral ceasefire agreements had been signed or renewed with many of the more than two dozen ethnic armed organizations and breakaway factions. A nationwide ceasefire agreement was drafted, and it commits the signatories to establishing a union based on the principles of democracy and federalism. Both the president and the commander-in-chief signed it just a few weeks before the November 2015 elections, as did eight armed groups, but several other armed groups did not. The non-signatories were vexed by the armed forces’ ongoing offensives in northern Myanmar and the commander-in-chief’s unwillingness to allow certain armed groups to participate in the nationwide ceasefire process.

In the 2015 elections, the NLD carried much of the vote in the ethnic states because voters felt Aung San Suu Kyi could be trusted more than others to work for a genuine federal system. She sought to revitalize the peace process by initiating what she termed the 21st Century Panglong Conference. This referenced the historic meeting in the town of Panglong in 1947 where her father and ethnic leaders signed an agreement recognizing ethnic equality and self-determination in ethnic states’ internal affairs. While the initial August 2016 conference included representatives of groups that had not signed the nationwide ceasefire agreement, and speeches were broadcast live on television, no substantive discussions took place. Since then, the government has found it difficult to move the process forward due to the escalation of conflict in northern Myanmar and the government’s limited responsiveness to ethnic armed groups’ and ethnic civilians’ concerns.

In the past year, the armed forces have continued to advance into areas where ethnic armed groups hold sway, compelling civilians to flee, and frequently blocking the provision of humanitarian assistance to the more than 100,000 (mostly Kachin) people internally displaced in the north. The 2008 Constitution grants the military full authority over its affairs, leaving the NLD government unable to intervene. Suu Kyi has said almost nothing about the military’s actions or the impacts on affected populations. She has stuck to urging the non-signatories to sign the nationwide ceasefire accord and work out their problems within the formal structure of the peace process. She has also asked ethnic armed group leaders to not be selfish but think about what they can give to the country. While this plays well with many Burmese in the heartland, those living in the conflict areas have felt that their grievances and aspirations are being dismissed.

In November, the Kachin Independence Army, together with three ethnic armed groups shut out of the peace process, launched coordinated attacks on police stations in northern border towns and temporarily blocked the main trade route to China. Although this led to further military action by the armed forces, the groups said their aim was to convince the government and armed forces that all armed groups must be included in the peace process on equal terms.

In recent months, the government has authorized the holding of peace discussions in various ethnic states and regions, opening up structured opportunities for civilians to share their thoughts. Aung San Suu Kyi also held a televised discussion with ethnic youth representatives, and peacebuilding working groups including representatives of the government, armed forces, ethnic armed groups, and ethnic political parties have been established. However, the second meeting of the Panglong Conference was supposed to take place in February but has been postponed until March. This is partly because the government has tended to dictate the terms of engagement rather than work in partnership with ethnic stakeholders. Several armed groups were unhappy that the original date and format had been set without consulting them. A resolution to the conflicts still feels far off. The large number of armed groups, the armed forces’ independence from the civilian side of government, and the high stakes involved make achieving a comprehensive political settlement challenging indeed.

Political Violence in Rakhine State

The Muslim Rohingya population in Rakhine State has long endured oppressive treatment by the armed forces and state authorities. Buddhist nationalists in Rakhine State and beyond do not recognize the Rohingya name and assert that this population consists of immigrants from Bangladesh and therefore should be called Bengalis. The 1982 citizenship law only grants full citizenship to those who belong to indigenous “races” present in Burma before 1823. The Rohingya are not recognized as one of those races, or ethnic groupings. However many who identify as Rohingya trace their families’ residency in Rakhine State back for generations.

When the NLD came to power, over 100,000 Muslims primarily in central Rakhine State were still living in internal displacement camps due to communal violence that broke out in 2012. Hundreds of thousands more Rohingya continued to reside in communities in northern Rakhine State with restrictions on their mobility, opportunities to get married, and rights to have children. Their temporary identification cards and voting rights (which they had been able to exercise from 1950-1960, as well as in 1990 and 2010) had been taken away under the previous administration.

The NLD government took tentative steps toward addressing the situation, including initiating a process to ascertain citizenship rights and establishing an advisory commission headed by Kofi Annan. The group, which includes international dignitaries and Myanmar nationals, was tasked with proposing possible solutions related to humanitarian needs, citizenship, and development in the state, which is one of the poorest. Rakhine Buddhist nationalists and some other segments of the population remained wary, and the government refrained from revising the citizenship law or instituting a plan for Muslims to leave the camps.

In October 2016, a new Rohingya armed group called Harakah al-Yaqin (Faith Movement, HaY), launched surprise attacks on border guard police stations in northern Rakhine State, killing nine policemen. In November, they killed a senior army officer in a skirmish with the armed forces. According to the International Crisis Group, the group is financed by Rohingya living in Saudi Arabia, its leaders have training in guerrilla war tactics, and they were able to recruit several hundred local men who had lost hope that they would ever be able to live normal lives.

The armed forces responded by carrying out a massive “clearance operation” that lasted over four months. Although the stated goal was to apprehend the perpetrators, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and other international rights organizations have documented horrific abuses against the civilian population including the torching of homes with families inside, the gang rape of women, and indiscriminate killings, including of small children. The UN believes the operations likely amounted to crimes against humanity, with perhaps 1,000 or more people killed. Almost 70,000 Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh. Throughout the period of clearance operations, the NLD government repeatedly insisted that the security forces were not committing any human rights abuses, but they have now said they will investigate any hard evidence to the contrary.

A High-Level Assassination in Yangon

In late January, Ko Ni, a Muslim lawyer with expertise in constitutional law and a senior advisor to the NLD, was shot in broad daylight outside Yangon International Airport while waiting to be picked up. The assailant was apprehended by taxi drivers on the scene, but only after one driver was shot and killed. In the weeks that followed, the President’s Office announced that Aung Win Khaing, an ex-lieutenant colonel, who retired in 2014, had begun planning the killing in July 2016. He had recruited his older brother, also a former army officer, who then hired an antiquities thief with a prison record to carry out the murder. Both the assailant and Aung Win Khaing’s brother are in police custody, and CCTV footage from the airport shows Aung Win Khaing at the airport just before the assassination. However he remains at large, and it is not yet known if others were involved in masterminding the killing.

Ko Ni had been advising the NLD on ways to amend or even rewrite the constitution to reduce the military’s influence. He had also been instrumental in creating Aung San Suu Kyi’s state counselor role. One interpretation is that the assassination was meant to stop all attempts to challenge the armed forces’ political power. The president’s office issued a statement saying that the assassination was likely meant to destabilize the country. Ko Ni’s funeral drew thousands from the Muslim community, civil society groups, and the NLD. Although the population has remained calm, overall, the country feels unsettled and still very much in a transition whose outcome remains uncertain.

Taking a glass half empty perspective, violence, much of it coming from the armed forces, continues to cast a dark shadow over the country. Suu Kyi and her party cannot control the military, but their silence on the armed forces’ actions has harmed their credibility. Meanwhile, the civilian government’s inexperience and the fact that most decisions need to be authorized by Suu Kyi have made policymaking slow and sometimes ineffectual.

From a glass half full perspective, much of the population still feels tremendous goodwill toward Suu Kyi and the NLD and desperately wants them to succeed. From this point of view, the party comes across as eager to do the right things but still trying to figure out how to do so.

The party has four more years in power. If it can make progress toward implementing appropriate economic policies, engaging more effectively with the range of stakeholders in the peace process and in Rakhine State, and finding constructive ways to work with the military, then this difficult year will be largely written off as growing pains.