An Upcoming US-China Rapprochement Under President Trump?

The conventional wisdom on U.S. President Donald J. Trump’s China policy is that his preferred transactional approach, aimed at making deals with China, will not work. The reason behind this judgment is that the fundamental differences between the United States and China are structural; a status quo United States and a rising, revisionist China have divergent interests. The logic continues that since conflict is deeply embedded in the structure of the international system, any transactions between the two will have to be superficial, cosmetic, and will ultimately be unable to change the profound distrust that exists between them, allowing them to overcome the conflict of their national interests. In other words, these transactions will hit a wall sooner or later, because the national interests of either the United States or China are not negotiable.

Trump’s original hardline approach to China had raised major criticisms from the policy community, which seem to have helped shift his policy back to a more traditional track. His attempt to adapt the U.S. One China policy was seen by some as aimed at using Taiwan as a bargaining chip to seek concessions from China on other key fronts. Yet upon the realization of the infeasibility of this approach with either mainland China or Taiwan, Trump returned to a more traditional U.S. policy on Taiwan by finally affirming the One China policy in February 2017.

Similarly, Trump had made rather inflammatory comments about China on trade during his presidential campaign, to the extent that some were worried about a trade war if he indeed decided to label China a currency manipulator and even impose a 45 percent tariff on Chinese imports. Neither of these happened, which confirmed the earlier Chinese speculation that Trump is essentially a pragmatic and rational businessman; someone that China can work with.

Several key developments on the China policy front since Trump’s inauguration suggest a positive turn in bilateral relations compared to the days of the Obama administration. The Mar-a-Lago summit in early April worked rather well to build personal chemistry between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Their personalities seemed to click. In comparison, the first meeting between then-Vice-President Xi and President Obama in November 2009 did not really create a good foundation for such chemistry due to their very different personal styles.

In two one-on-one meetings between Trump and Xi that went much longer than originally planned, the two leaders are said to have had frank and honest conversations about their concerns, agendas, and demonstrated the sincerity to respect and work with each other. The earlier fear that two assertive strong men might run into embarrassing moments of disagreements and coldness did not happen. Either Xi alone or both Xi and Trump intentionally kept a low-key and cooperative posture; the summit turned out to be much more productive than people had expected.

Concrete deliverables from Mar-a-Largo were scarce, at least according to the public post-summit statements from the two governments. A joint U.S.-China communique might have never been in the cards given the nascent nature of the Trump administration, but the lack of a joint statement was nonetheless surprising. The two countries did not publish a list of deliverables, especially on issues for joint cooperation, which had been a featured standard product from the previous annual Strategic and Economic Dialogue.

What the summit did lead to is the resumption of genuine top-level leadership meetings and a channel of communications that arguably is more meaningful and important than the massive working-level dialogues and long lists of micro-deliverables. Indeed, if the annual U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue (S&ED) and its scores of working-level cooperation agendas did not prevent the deterioration of bilateral relations under the Obama administration, perhaps people could bear more hope for the top leaders to navigate the acute problems through honest conversations and with a genuinely cooperative attitude.

The most significant development between Trump and Xi after the summit is probably what appears to be a higher level of cooperation on North Korea. As the world sweated over a potential “April crisis” on the Korean Peninsula due to North Korean provocations and the expectation of another nuclear test or more missile tests, there were signs of enhanced cooperation and coordination between Washington and Beijing to check Pyongyang’s belligerence.

Most notably, China is committed to full and strict implementation of UN resolutions sanctioning North Korea, including the implementation of a coal import ban on North Korea for the rest of 2017. Equally illuminating is China’s expressed willingness to "coordinate" policies with the United States on issues related to the Peninsula, which is unprecedented. China has been relatively quiet on the U.S. deployment of aircraft carriers to the region in comparison to its pungent criticisms of Washington for driving up the tension when it deployed the USS George Washington aircraft carrier to the Yellow Sea in 2010. By committing to cooperation and coordination with the United States, China is depriving North Korea of the opportunity to hide behind Beijing’s security concerns about Washington, which involuntarily shielded Pyongyang from the consequences of its provocations.

The subtle but important change of tone and position on China’s part would not have been possible without some consensus and explicit/implicit understanding between the two leaders on the top level. China’s national security is threatened by North Korean nuclear provocations; distrust and conflict of national interests between Beijing and Washington has exacerbated this vulnerability. A sensible guess is that Xi and Trump achieved some sort of bargain on North Korea and agreed to jointly apply pressure on the belligerent regime by aligning their positions and pressing for dialogue.

It still remains to be seen whether U.S.-China coordination on North Korea will bear fruit due to uncertainties regarding North Korea’s reaction and China's tolerance for potential instability.  However, the approach to solicit and induce Chinese cooperation on an issue previously regarded as impossible for bilateral cooperation raises an honest question as to whether the United States and China could indeed achieve strategic coexistence, mutual respect for each other’s core national interests, and cooperation on key global challenges, even if their geostrategic instincts suggest otherwise. If it comes to fruition, the world will be closer to the idea of a G-2 than any time in the history.

In a repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, the two sides are stuck in an endless cycle of defection because without knowing the other side’s intention, defection to avoid a worse outcome is the most rational policy to pursue. The only way to break the cycle of negative interaction is by creating the incentive for one side to take the risk and cooperate, and for the other side to reciprocate, hence steering the pattern of interaction to a positive direction. The most difficult part is figuring out how to induce the start of a cooperative cycle while one side inevitably runs the risk of being cheated. In the case of the United States and China, if the two countries could jointly share the risk and uncertainty, new opportunities might arise.

Such hope is certainly idealistic. A positive relationship between two great powers is hard to come by without the presence of a major common enemy. The United States and China are faced with many differences and disagreements from domestic politics to their foreign policy agendas. To overcome the differences and disagreements despite their geopolitical and strategic instinct requires political leadership and courage. Furthermore, although Trump has so far, as president, stayed quiet on China’s core national interest issues such as Taiwan, Xinjiang, Tibet, China’s political system, as well as the South China Sea, he may not be able to do so indefinitely given domestic political requirements.

On the other hand, while China might be willing to accommodate Trump’s trade agenda and make concessions, there will be selfish incentives and domestic opposition that undermine a genuinely cooperative approach. Last but not least, even if Trump’s policy becomes more consistent, which it most likely will not, as U.S. policies are subject to the four-year election cycle, whatever trust and improvement with China Trump might be able to produce is not sustainable when there is a potential change of administration in the future, and with it, a possible change of heart and policy.

Nevertheless, after years of mutually reinforced strategic distrust and cycles of escalating tension, an experiment on an alternative approach to test the possibilities is healthy and encouraging. We may in the end still be unable to escape the trap of realism and power politics, but it will be at least intriguing and beneficial to know what we will have missed.