Making Democracy Work in Malaysia

Malaysia’s political landscape took on a new hue after the 14th General Election (GE14) on May 9, 2018. The Alliance of Hope or Pakatan Harapan (PH) won the 2018 election, the first victory by a opposition coalition after 61 years of rule by the long-dominant National Front or Barisan Nasional (BN) led by the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). The power shift not only ended one of the world’s longest runs of one-party rule, it also offered a stark contrast to the global trend of democracies being tested by populist politics.

For decades, democracy in Malaysia has been contested, marked by authoritarianism and rigged elections. Political competition is extensively manipulated with, among other issues, rampant gerrymandering and lack of press freedom during the pre-election phase, which helped provide the incumbent government substantial advantages in elections.

In the decades of struggle against the BN’s hegemony, the relationship between civil society organizations (CSOs) and the opposition was often complementary, as both shared similar causes. Many CSOs were labeled and perceived as pro-opposition entities, and it is not surprising that some of the civil society leaders joined opposition parties and some ran for office. The trend has been apparent especially since the 2008 election, popularly known as a “political tsunami,” where the opposition coalition at that time denied the BN its two-thirds majority. The 2008 and 2013 elections, characterized by a rising up of the people, were two important events in the history of Malaysia’s elections prior to the historic win by the PH in the 2018 election.

It is worth noting that the changes evident in the election results did not happen in a vacuum. GE14 reflected an accumulation of grievances and opportunities built up over decades, starting from the Reformasi movement in 1998, followed by the emergence of the electoral reform movement, Bersih, that has organized five street protests since 2007. The “gentle” administration approach adopted by former Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi was arguably an important turning point that enabled the activation of democratic space for the growth of CSOs. However, as time went by, reforms began to slow and promises were not met. The weak political environment resulting from public dissatisfaction with a wide range of issues, especially in 2007, gave an advantage to the opposition parties and CSOs as they sought to advance their demands. 

One of the promises in the PH’s election manifesto related to empowering societal institutions, civil society, and social entrepreneurship. In the manifesto, social organizations and civil society are recognized as important and as playing a complementary role to the government. The right to form associations, especially on human rights advocacy, is restricted by various laws and the actions of the previous government. In the past, organizations that attempted to register with the Registrar of Societies (RoS) were often either denied or experienced an excessive waiting period. The PH’s manifesto pledges that the process of establishing welfare bodies, foundations, and legitimate nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) will be reviewed so that a better and simpler structure can be created to enable the smooth functioning of these outfits. For this purpose, the manifesto also proposed that a Commission on Charities and Non-Profit Organizations would take over the responsibilities of the RoS and Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM). In addition, the manifesto promised to appoint representatives from civil society to be commissioners in the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) and the Election Commission (EC).

Now that the government is administered by the PH, deemed as friendlier to CSOs compared to the previous BN government, a question arises: How will these CSOs, who have been fighting for reforms, adjust to the political change after six decades of being hostile to the government? With some joining the government, the question also arises as to whether CSOs are still relevant in the present political context. How will they adjust their focus and continue to be vocal in pushing a reform agenda while facing the twin dilemmas of resistance and co-optation?

There are two perspectives on the current situation. While the change of government marked a triumph for CSOs, on one hand, civil society also lost activists to the new government. After the peaceful power transition in Malaysia, these CSOs got a chance to use their experience and advocate from within, as some activists were absorbed into the central and state governments. The outflow of talent to the new government is unavoidable. It is not a new trend either; a similar outflow occured after the 2008 election. This nevertheless stirred up a debate on co-optation and caused some uneasiness among CSOs previously all fighting for same goals. 

For example, former Bersih 2.0 chair Maria Chin Abdullah resigned from Bersih 2.0 to run in the 2018 election. Her announcement at the time sparked debate on the participation of activists in politics and on the relationship between political activists and political parties. Of course, it is debatable as to which platform – either civil society or partisan political ground – offers a better opportunity to advance change. Following GE14, Shahrul Aman Mohd Saari quit his post as acting Bersih 2.0 chair to be the minister of education’s press secretary. The challenge now is for newly elected politicians with an activist background to continue keeping their fellow politicians in check. On a positive note, this process can be seen as an opportunity to promote the renewal of CSOs by recruiting new faces.

On the other hand, interaction between the government and CSOs, once considered hostile, has increased. This is particularly true with regard to human rights and governance issues, where CSO participation in the past was discouraged. This suggests that civil society responsibility is becoming even more important than before as Malaysia experiences a democratic transition. It is a crucial time for CSOs to position themselves as credible and constructive critics to keep the PH government in check. What we saw after the 2008 and 2013 elections and are now seeing after GE14 is not only the shifting role of civil society, but the changing form of civil society itself.

Prior to the change of government, CSOs generally advocated for reform by using social media, as they had limited access to traditional media, which are controlled by political parties and the government. With a more open media environment, they are now able to undertake public advocacy on issues such as democracy and human rights in ways not possible before.

These changes come after decades of having to deal with a largely unresponsive government, which has over time impacted how Malaysians perceive the role of CSOs in society. As Malaysians have high expectations for the new government, civil society’s role as a bridge between the government and the people will be put to the test. How effective can CSOs be in holding the PH government to their promises and bringing forward reforms for the betterment of the country?

What is currently taking place in Malaysia suggests that the relationship between civil society and democratization is not a one-way process but rather one of mutual interaction. While no one can dismiss the Mahathir factor in helping decide the 2018 election, it is only fair to also recognize the role of CSOs as an important node of social power under nondemocratic conditions. It is worth noting that GE14 was the culmination of a decades-long relationship between the civil and political societies.

The current government under the administration of Mahathir Mohamad – who was once labeled as a “dictator” after ruling the government for more than two decades – is now pressing for reforms ranging from political to legislative to institutional. CSOs are split in view of the reforms undertaken by Mahathir in the current administration, which some have dubbed “Mahathir 2.0.” While CSOs are now playing more active advocacy roles in the PH government, the post-GE14 context presents numerous challenges that can potentially impact the sustainability of CSOs when their engagements are institutionalized. Both cooperative and confrontational approaches between CSOs and the government are crucial, so as to avoid political co-optation that can weaken the functioning of independent civil society. To that end, a CSO Platform for Reforms comprised of around 60 NGOs was launched following GE14 to play the role of a “watchdog” to follow up on the ministries’ reform agendas.

While space for civil society has arguably opened, the old discourse of mistrust in the relationship between CSOs and the government in Malaysia has not entirely dissipated. CSOs are arguably gaining more access to opportunities, building on what they have achieved so far, but there are also criticisms as to the level of cooperation from the PH leaders, as high expectations were not met. CSOs have expressed frustration about inefficiencies in the ministries and vice versa. On the other side, CSOs have also suffered from structural weaknesses. For instance, some may not be able to manage sensitive issues with a standard operating style in a unified spirit.

Civil society is an important space to maintain, yet after the PH’s win it is challenging to find ways to sustain the ongoing mobilization of citizens and CSOs that so profoundly marked the turning point of Malaysian politics. At the same time, the change of government serves as a window of opportunity that must not be missed to shift the old narrative where CSOs were generally seen as weak and insignificant in influencing policy changes. The current atmosphere of government-CSO relations suggests it will be a continued struggle for both to devise a working method that can crystallize the aspiration of putting the people first.