Bilahari Kausikan

Over the past few years, heightened competition between the United States and China has seen a growing interest in what this means for smaller states in the Asia-Pacific. As a country that has long been regarded as punching above its weight, and one that continues to work to preserve good relations with both Beijing and Washington, Singapore’s experience offers an interesting example in this regard.

For more on this question, The Diplomat’s senior editor Prashanth Parameswaran recently spoke to Bilahari Kausikan, former permanent secretary of Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, about his views on how Singapore and small states can navigate rising U.S.-China competition. The conversation took place immediately following the Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia’s premier security summit, in Singapore from May 31 to June 2, 2019.

As a small state in terms of geographical size, Singapore has been regarded as having repeatedly punched above its weight historically. There have been various explanations for this, whether it be the vulnerability that the country had from its inception or its record of economic success built up over decades. What are the key factors to your mind that have served as the foundations for Singapore’s record? Are there particular examples that stand out to you?

We start from the premise that small city-states have no intrinsic relevance in the international system. Relevance is an artifact created by human endeavor, and having been created, must be sustained by human endeavor.

The foundation is economic success. A barren rock cannot be relevant. Economic success creates options. Small states will always face constraints. But rich small states will have more options than poor small states.

For example, economic success gave us the wherewithal to develop Changi naval base and open these facilities to major powers, not just the U.S., but in principle to any naval power that finds it useful and many have availed themselves of our facilities.

During what some have characterized as the “small state debate” in Singapore that emerged in 2017, you argued that small states should aim to transcend their physical size to defend their interests. What are some of your reflections about that episode for Singapore? Are there any notable observations that you have picked up from engaging with Singaporeans on this front through your speaking and writing on this subject since then?

I think there is now a better understanding among our public that diplomacy is not just about being nice but about standing up for your own national interests.

Of course, we do not go around poking people in the eye just to see what happens. You have to clinically evaluate what is possible in each situation. But we need to sometimes act to protect and promote our own interests, even if makes some countries unhappy and entails some risk.

There is a better public understanding that you cannot just lie low and hope for the best but must take your own fate into your hands, and that if you give the impression you can be intimidated, you increase the possibility that others will try to intimidate you. You have to draw red lines and enforce them.

Sometimes the greatest risk is trying to avoid all risks.

The period of heightened great power competition between the United States and China has once again put the focus on the effects on small states. Singapore has historically tried to cultivate good ties with both, but that has become more challenging to do in this environment. How would you characterize Singapore’s relations with the United States and China today, as well as its position in the midst of this U.S.-China competition?

Our relations with both are quite good. But having good relations does not mean you have to pander to their every whim if it goes against your own interests. Singapore does not exist to bring joy to American or Chinese hearts. We exist to promote and defend the interests of Singaporeans.

Addressing the question of what Singapore should do in the face of heightened U.S.-China competition, you recently wrote that the country should focus less on finding a sweet spot between Washington and Beijing but rather pursue its national interests consistently and stand up to either or both when necessary. How do you think that Singapore is doing on this front today? What are some considerations to keep in mind on this front in the future?

You cannot make everybody happy all the time. Sometimes our interests will coincide with Chinese interests and sometimes they will coincide with American interests and sometimes they will coincide with neither’s interests. That is the reality and I trust both the Americans and Chinese understand this.

Singapore is also in the midst of a gradual domestic political transition, and its political environment is set to become more contested in the coming years. How does that changing domestic political environment play into how Singapore manages the influence of major powers and great power competition? Are there are other key variables that are important to keep in mind that could affect how Singapore manages this challenge?

It makes foreign policy more complicated. The domestic politics of other key ASEAN members are also getting more complicated and that makes getting a consensus more difficult. The pace of change is accelerating globally; uncertainties are multiplying everywhere, in every issue domain.

But we don’t give up. It is pointless to complain that things are not as you hope. You play the hand of cards that you are dealt, not the hand you wish you were dealt. You take the world as it is and do your best.

While Singapore’s experiences as a small state are rooted in its own particular context, are there some lessons that might be generalizable for other small states looking to defend their interests as great power competition heats up?

Every country is unique. But the general point that can be drawn from Singapore’s experience is that however small, you are never entirely without agency. What Thucydides articulated [“the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”] is crude realism, and crude realism is sometimes not very realistic. Whether a country has the wit to recognize the possibilities, and the will and courage to use the possibilities, is of course another matter. But there is always agency.