Darshana M. Baruah

The in-vogue term “Indo-Pacific” positions the Indian Ocean region as part of singular geographic – and geopolitical – region along with the Pacific Ocean. Yet understandings of and approaches to the Indian Ocean region are very much in the eye of the beholder.

The Diplomat talks with Darshana M. Baruah, an associate fellow with the South Asia Program and leader of the Indian Ocean Initiative at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, about the current geopolitical situation in the Indian Ocean. India may be the only country that sees the region truly holistically, from the African coast to the eastern edge. But interest from other powers like China, the United States, and France, is growing. Meanwhile, the Indian Ocean island states have their own stakes and say in the region’s development.

How does Indian Ocean security figure into the Quad group’s activities, collectively or bi/trilaterally?

The conversation around the Indian Ocean at a quadrilateral level is very fundamental. Of the four Quad members, India is the only country which defines the entire Indian Ocean as its area of priority. Canberra’s interests lie more in the northern Indian Ocean, specifically in the Bay of Bengal area, and in the eastern Indian Ocean, which is limited to Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Moreover, the Indian Ocean is a secondary area of priority for Australia, with the South Pacific and Western Pacific ranking higher in terms of geopolitical priorities. Japan has a similar approach to the Indian Ocean. While the U.S. has a naval base in Diego Garcia and frequently transits the region, its engagements with the littorals and in the region itself are fairly limited. Perhaps India’s most active partnership in the Indian Ocean is with France.

There are more initiatives and conversations at a bilateral level amongst the Quad countries on the Indian Ocean than collectively as a group. Moreover, there are many initiatives, such as the Indo-Pacific Oceans initiative and Coalition for Disaster Resilience Infrastructure, where India finds support from its Quad partners. But these initiatives are framed under the wider maritime or Indo-Pacific framework rather than the Indian Ocean. A key difference is also the scope of the Indian Ocean, with most governments dividing the Indian Ocean into the eastern and western Indian Ocean. The focus and engagements in the western Indian Ocean, even from India, are limited in comparison to the eastern Indian Ocean.

As Sino-Indian frictions heat up, New Delhi has paid more attention to the strategic importance of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Can you run through the current plans for the ANI, and the chain’s importance in New Delhi’s importance security strategy?

India has announced a number of initiatives and projects around development of the islands beginning in 2015. The current government also set up the Island Development Agency (IDA) to review and implement sustainable ways of developing both the Andaman and Nicobar as well as Lakshadweep islands. A key challenge in developing these islands has been environmental concerns and the protection of indigenous tribes. These initiatives are focused on increasing basic infrastructure, including digital connectivity and eco-tourism.

However, to be able to leverage the islands in a manner consistent with its geography and environmental concerns, India will have to first chart out the purposes of the islands within its maritime strategy and goals. Many of Delhi’s strategic collaborations including the islands are currently ad hoc. The refueling of an American P-8 on the islands in 2020 was perhaps the first strategic signaling toward any willingness within the government regarding the island’s role in its Indo-Pacific engagements. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands are optimally suited and located for maritime domain awareness (MDA), surveillance and reconnaissance missions, and anti-submarine warfare (ASW).

What role are the Indian Ocean island states, like the Maldives and Sri Lanka, playing in the strategic jostling for space among China, India, and the United States?

Islands like Sri Lanka and the Maldives are playing crucial roles in shaping the new security dynamics of the Indian Ocean region. The island states of the Indian Ocean are not only located close to key lines of communications and chokepoints in the region, but their foreign policy choices and economic partnerships today greatly affect the region’s power dynamics.

While it is true China’s engagement with the islands are driving a significant amount of geopolitical competition in the region, it is also the islands’ desire and vision to find their own place and role in a new security architecture shaping the current geopolitics. The view that Beijing is imposing and enticing the small islands of the region with unmanageable capital loans is somewhat misplaced and lost amidst the “great power competition.” To better understand the unraveling Indian Ocean geopolitics, it is important to study and understand the new maritime identities of the Indian Ocean islands, their concerns, ambitions, and strategic goals. For a sustainable policy engagement, countries will have to engage and interact with the islands directly instead of through a dominating China lens.

What about the African island states, like Mauritius and the Seychelles? Are they being engaged as part of the Indo-Pacific region, or more through the lens of different countries’ Africa policies?

The African islands of Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar, and Comoros too are driving similar a competition as Sri Lanka and the Maldives, with their own sets of priorities. However, due to the division of the Indian Ocean and many governments’ policy of engaging with the region in silos, many of the developments – which point toward new trends – are either lost or misinterpreted. While these islands are African nations, they consistently highlight their Indian Ocean identities. Most nations engage with these islands through their Africa policies, which carry predominantly continental concerns. This also applies to the coastal states along the eastern coast of Africa.

India actively engages with Mauritius and the Seychelles and these islands are part of Delhi’s Indian Ocean outreach. France is the biggest partner for Madagascar and Comoros. China is the only nation with an embassy in each of the six islands of the Indian Ocean. Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey too are emerging and re-emerging in Indian Ocean dynamics. However, to map the developments of the region and to understand the new power dynamics, the Indian Ocean needs to be studied as one continuous theater from the straits of Malacca to the eastern coast of Africa.

To what extent is India comfortable sharing leadership in the IOR with external powers, even friendly ones like the United States?

India takes a lead in Indian Ocean engagements amidst the Quad nations. To a great extent, the U.S., Japan, and Australia prefer Delhi taking a lead in the region due to their own commitments and resource constraints elsewhere. Similarly, France plays a leading role in the western Indian Ocean. The U.K. too is engaged in a number of initiatives in the Indian Ocean.

However, given the rapidly changing dynamics of the Indian Ocean and the expanding number of players in the region, it is no longer feasible for India to alone carry the burden of stabilizing and securing the Indian Ocean. India also has serious capital and capacity constraints to be able to do so. While Delhi in the past has been hesitant in welcoming external powers in the region, the relationship between India and many of these partners – the U.S., Australia, Japan – have changed significantly since the ‘70s. While India does not want to be undermined in the Indian Ocean – a concern that emerges from its limited capacity and capital constraints – Delhi will increasingly find itself in a position where collaborations and partnerships will pave the way in managing Indian Ocean geopolitics.

Today, India is willing to work with its key maritime partners, through coordination and joint initiatives, across the Indian Ocean. Given the sheer geographic size of the region, partnerships are increasingly becoming a necessity in addressing emerging threats and challenges in the Indian Ocean.