The Present in the Past: 100 Years of the Chinese Communist Party

When 13 young Chinese men, a Dutchman, and a Russian met in the French concession of Shanghai on a hot July day in 1921, they could not have imagined that the organization they were launching, the Chinese Communist Party, would drive of one of the greatest revolutionary upheavals of all time. Nor could they have foreseen that less than 30 years later, the CCP would seize power, and 100 years later it would lead an economic superpower that many in Washington now view as the United States’ greatest rival on the global stage. What would those early founders have thought if they gazed upon China today under the leadership of General Secretary Xi Jinping?

From its origins, the party sought to transform the nation’s society, economy, and politics to bring about “wealth and power.” To that extent, they would be proud of today’s CCP but baffled by the current embrace of capitalism and its role within the world order. This raises the question of whether the communist revolution was one of nationalism or communism. From its founding, the answer is both. The young intellectuals saw Leninism as a vehicle to drive China toward its rightful place in the world. In October 2019, Xi Jinping linked his “China Dream of national rejuvenation” to the original mission of the CCP, which was to bring happiness to the Chinese people and rescue the nation from its national humiliation at the hands of the foreigners. He noted that if one never forgot why one started, then “you can accomplish your mission.”

The Role of Tradition

Yet, from day one, the party also portrayed itself as providing a radical break with the past. During the first decades of the 20th century, critical intellectuals attacked the Chinese tradition and its inheritance. A common slogan was “down with the old Confucian shop.” Traditional practices of authority and behavior, including sexual mores and gender roles, were heavily criticized as the young tried out different lifestyles, embraced feminism, and demanded liberation from the repressive institutions of the household, clan, and religion. The only way to interpret the world was through the lens of class and class warfare. The CCP was part of a global revolution destined to overthrow the colonial world order and usher in a new world led by the representatives of the proletariat. There would be no place for capitalists, landlords, or foreign exploiters. Despite temporary, tactical alliances, class warfare was the name of the game. Before and after 1949, landlords were extinguished; in the 1950s, the foreigners were expunged, the private business community squeezed and eliminated. In the 1960s, Mao Zedong turned his ire on those within the CCP whom he saw as taking the revolution back down the road toward capitalism.

Xi Jinping no longer portrays the party as representing such a radical break with the past. Following Mao’s death in 1976, the CCP began to shun his approach to politics, with the leadership turning to economic revival. Class reconciliation replaced class conflict and the CCP began to rely on private enterprise to deliver the much-needed economic goods. By the end of the 1990s, Jiang Zemin encouraged private entrepreneurs to join the party now described as representing the “advanced elements” of society. As a result, the party today primarily represents the interests of the new elites in Chinese society rather than the proletariat and the peasantry.

While Xi peppers his speeches with references to Marxism and struggle, he has sought continuity with the longer Chinese tradition. The CCP’s legitimacy to rule derived not only from its own revolutionary history but also from the longer history of dynastic rule. In 2014, he declared the CCP and socialist culture to be the “successor to and promoter of fine traditional Chinese culture, which was born of the Chinese civilization and nurtured over more than 5,000 years.” Xi also traces a direct line of descent through CCP history. In so doing, he rejects the division of the history of the PRC into two periods, one under Mao Zedong and one during the era of reform. His leadership builds on an unbroken legacy of the CCP’s past. The Cultural Revolution is no longer described as “responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses” for the party and society but rather as a misguided experiment to curb abuse and corruption that provided “extremely painful lessons.”

Further, drawing a deeper thread of continuity with the past, Confucius no longer comes in for the attacks he weathered from the early founders. Instead, for Xi, Confucianism was “taking shape and growing within China” together with other philosophies and cultures. Building on the legacy of previous leader Hu Jintao, with his idea of building an “harmonious society,” Xi views such philosophies as “spiritual experiences, rational thinking, and cultural achievements of the nation while it strived to build its identity.”

From Debate to Orthodoxy

Without party leadership, “national rejuvenation” would be no more than wishful thinking. The founders and Xi Jinping share the view that the party is the only vehicle to lead China along the correct path toward the future. From its origins, the CCP purported to operate a traditional Leninist structure, and, apart from a brief period at the height of the Cultural Revolution (1966-69), this has remained the dominant organizational form. Although the interpretation of Marxism has been very flexible, from the late 1920s democratic centralism has been the party’s organizing principle. This enshrines a hierarchical structure of rule that resembles a pyramid, with the individual subordinate to the organization and the minority to the majority. Despite references to collective leadership, this has rarely worked and the tendency has been toward the dominance of one individual. Currently, Xi Jinping is defined as the “core” of the leadership. For Xi, a unified disciplined party is essential to push through his policy preferences and he will not tolerate any public dissent about the objectives of his mission or the means to achieve it.

The CCP was founded in an era of uncertainty, with many worried about the nation’s future. Initially, Marxism was a marginal stream in leftist circles; anarchism held more sway and interest in social democracy and liberalism swirled in the atmosphere. The First Party Congress in 1921 was a raucous affair as participants debated seriously different views about the nature of the revolution and the role of the party. The fluidity of the time is shown by the fact that only two of the 13 attendees stayed with the CCP until 1949. Importantly, one was Mao Zedong, who after consolidating power shaped the party in many ways into what it is today. In the 1940s, Mao exterminated the remnants of the more cosmopolitan atmosphere that had prevailed among the left in China and imposed a narrative on party members for all to follow. Alternative views were driven out and an official orthodoxy established.

Xi Jinping has taken this approach to heart, expecting obedience not only from party members but also from society at large. Following Mao Zedong’s lead, Xi sees no need for independent intellectual inquiry about the revolution’s trajectory. Journalists are not to investigate the “dark side” but are to propagate the party’s views. All media organizations were instructed to train journalists in the Marxist concepts that dictated their role. Universities are not only to train students in the technical skills that the economy needs but also are to become incubators of faithful Marxists, in thought if not in deed. In December 2019, the prestigious Shanghai-based Fudan University changed its charter, dropping the phrase “freedom of thought” while adding the pledge to follow CCP leadership. Not even social media “netizens” are exempt, with the party putting in place careful monitoring, censorship, and an online army paid to place pro-regime commentary.

Defining the Enemy

The centrality of the party and its unique ability to define the policies necessary to drive China forward means that it goes to great lengths to present itself as infallible, a problem given the mistakes made in the past such as the economically disastrous Great Leap Forward (1958-60), when perhaps as many as 30 million died, or the politically disastrous Cultural Revolution, when millions were persecuted for being supposed class enemies. Thus, blame has to be found elsewhere, either with party members who have infiltrated with the evil intent of leading the party astray or with foreigners seeking to undermine CCP rule. Thus, the demonstrations in Hong Kong did not elicit a review of CCP policy but rather were blamed on a handful of people inciting trouble and the action of foreigners stirring it up.

Dealing with foreigners has involved a complex set of relationships in the past and in the present. The First Party Congress announced the intention to eradicate the foreign colonial presence in China. The proletarian ally of Soviet Russia was a different matter, and the party would not have survived and thrived without its early support. Gradually, the narrative was developed of the 100 years of humiliation at the hands of foreign forces dating back to the first Opium War (1839-42). Mao Zedong strengthened CCP legitimacy not only by heralding the defeat of the Japanese invaders (1937-45) but also by liberating the nation from this century of humiliation. Thus, the CCP came to power claiming that it would set right the injustices of the compromise of China’s sovereignty. While the CCP under Mao Zedong saved the country from dismemberment and ruin, Xi Jinping intends to complete the unfinished project through the “China Dream of the Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation,” which will allow China to deal with foreigners on its own terms and from a position of strength.

There is an ambivalence with respect to private commerce. While the First Party Congress expressed the clear goal of overthrowing the capitalist structures, introducing the dictatorship of the proletariat and nationalizing industry, the period since 1978 has presented a more complex challenge. Although the post-1978 period witnessed a massive engagement with the first foreign investments in the Chinese economy and the importance of export-led growth, followed by China’s increasing presence on the world stage, the CCP’s attitude toward foreign intent remains one of caution and suspicion. Having wiped out private business after 1949, slowly and initially grudgingly through the 1980s, the CCP acknowledged a role for private enterprise. Yet, where possible, Xi Jinping’s policies have provided preferential treatment for the state-owned sector to pursue the domestic and international agenda. By contrast, the private sector has been disfavored in terms of access to capital and investment and has been reined in once it becomes too influential or when business seems to be evading party oversight. This was clearly the case when Jack Ma and his Alibaba and Ant Financial empire found their wings clipped. Private business does, however, provide a safety valve that the party opens when development runs into difficulty.

The CCP’s World View: Then and Now

Finally, what about the CCP’s world view? From its origins until the present, a crucial part of the CCP’s mission has been to build a new, more favorable global order. Thus, it should come as no surprise that Xi Jinping sees the mission of the CCP as restructuring the global order to better reflect China’s priorities. The nature of that order and how change should be pursued has changed over time. Initially, the CCP saw itself as a key member of the international proletarian alliance that would rid the world of colonialism and the domestic oppression of rapacious landlords and industrialists. In the 1950s, with the initial enthusiasm of the Bandung Conference (1955), the CCP saw its role as a possible leader of “Third World” nations, again destined to construct a new global order that was fairer to developing nations. With the radicalism of the Cultural Revolution, the CCP saw the possibility of exporting its class-based struggle globally through support for radical movements across the world.

Xi’s approach contains elements both of the inherited Marxist tradition as well as influences from the traditional Chinese view of the global order. China is essentially an empire anchored to a Westphalian concept of the nation-state trying to operate in an increasingly multilateral world. Xi evokes “historical materialism” to explain the inevitable decline of the West and the rise of a socialist China. At the same time, he envisages contemporary China occupying the space under the traditional notion of “Tianxia,” with the nation at the center of a Chinese cultural sphere that radiates out to draw others into its sphere of influence. While the field of radiation is far wider than in the days of the empire, the CCP is not forcing others to adopt its system wholesale or pushing for other nations to become subordinated states. That said, the CCP clearly sees its economic and political model as one that enjoys legitimacy, deserves respect, and that others could follow should they so wish.

The CCP is willing to exert global leadership in those domains that it feels the United States has withdrawn from, while redressing its relationship with the United States and with the Asian region. At a December 2014 Politburo session, Xi noted that China was embarking on a “new round of opening to the world,” emphasizing that China would no longer take a passive role in global economic governance: “We cannot be a bystander but must be a participant, a leader.”

Consequently, China has been more explicit about its aims, causing disquiet among a number of countries in the region and in the West. In October 2017, Xi announced his aspiration that by 2050 China would be a “global leader in terms of composite strength and international influence.” To allay concerns, he sought to portray China as a “defender of the international order,” rather than a threat and destabilizer.

Of course, Xi Jinping has tools, power, and influence at his disposal that the founders of the party and even Mao Zedong could never have imagined. These comprise carrots and sticks. The carrot is the range of investments that China is developing in the region and beyond, including the Belt and Road Initiative and the establishment of financial institutions. These provide the opportunity to tie nations throughout the region into China’s sphere of influence. The stick is largely reserved for questions of sovereignty, with China’s more aggressive moves in the South China and East China Seas creating concern among countries such as Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

None of this means that the CCP still wants to overturn the global order entirely. It seeks rather to shape existing systems to reflect better its own interests. Unlike the internationalists at the First Party Congress, the CCP is now one of the most fervent defenders of the nation state. The approach to the global order varies dependent on issue and institution. While China has been a strong defender of the U.N. Charter, it has rejected international scrutiny on rulings over the South China Seas. Similarly, it has sought to emasculate the impact of the international human rights regime, an endeavor for which it has found willing support from other authoritarian regimes. The earlier appeals to internationalism and universalism have been replaced by a more targeted focus on the pursuit of the national interest as defined by the CCP and Xi Jinping.