The South China Sea Is Getting Even More Crowded

At an August 2021 United Nations Security Council meeting on maritime security, representatives from China and the United States clashed over dynamics in the South China Sea. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken claimed that “conflict in the South China Sea, or in any ocean, would have serious global consequences for security, and for commerce.” And in a clear reference to China, Blinken added, “When a state faces no consequences for ignoring these rules, it fuels greater impunity and instability everywhere.”

Separately, China’s deputy U.N. Ambassador Dai Bing accused the United States of “arbitrarily sending advanced military vessels and aircraft into the South China Sea as provocations and publicly trying to drive a wedge into regional countries.” Dai also labeled Washington as “the biggest threat to peace and stability” in the maritime area.

The latest exchange of verbal barbs between Beijing and Washington is representative of a broader trend: The intensifying presence of not only regional, but also extraregional actors, all opting to shift policies to counter Chinese claims in the South China Sea. The United States has long been a leader, making moves to uphold and maintain principles of freedom of navigation in the contested waters. In addition to ongoing freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) by U.S. maritime vessels, the Biden administration appears committed to sending a strong message of solidarity with Southeast Asian partners.

Vice President Kamala Harris’ weeklong trip to Asia in late August was a case in point. Harris, the highest-ranking Biden administration official to travel to Asia so far, choose Singapore and Vietnam as her destinations. Vietnam is a rival claimant in the South China Sea, and Singapore, while having no claims, has a highly vested interest in seeing the disputes resolved peacefully. Speaking from Singapore, Harris proclaimed that “in the South China Sea, we know that Beijing continues to coerce, to intimidate, and to make claims to the vast majority of the South China Sea… Beijing’s actions continue to undermine the rules-based order and threaten the sovereignty of nations.”

“The United States stands with our allies and partners in the face of these threats,” she added.

Harris was the latest in a series of high-profile visitors to the region, including a trip by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Austin made stops in late July in Singapore, as well as Vietnam and the Philippines – both claimants in the South China Sea that have not shied away from confronting Beijing. When in Manila, Austin heralded the restoration of the Visiting Forces Agreement between the United States and the Philippines as strengthening an alliance seen as “vital to the security, stability, and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific.” Austin also dismissed Beijing’s claim to the disputed waters, stating that it has “no basis in international law” and that it “treads on the sovereignty of states in the region.”

The United States, though it has fashioned itself as a leader in supporting a “rules-based international order,” is not alone. The French navy has conducted a series of FONOPs to affirm international maritime law. More recently, a British carrier strike group, with a new aircraft carrier, passed through the South China Sea and the Western Pacific Ocean in July, the first time in more than two decades. The deployment of the British force “signals the continued strong relationship between Britain and the United States in the context of America’s competition with China,” Alessio Patalano, Ph.D., reader in East Asian warfare at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, wrote in War on the Rocks. Patalano also argued that a new British focus on the Indo-Pacific communicates to other powers – including Australia, France, India, and Japan – that together a network of partners has the means to effectively shape the security environment in the region.

Separately, a German warship bound for the Indo-Pacific left port in early August. While the frigate will meet with Japanese and Australian vessels to bolster their military cooperation, it will also sail through common trade routes, including the South China Sea, marking a German vessel’s first passage in the region since 2002. German officials have clearly articulated their opposition to Chinese claims in the South China Sea. “We want existing law to be respected, sea routes to be freely navigable, open societies to be protected and trade to follow fair rules,” said German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer.

In August, India joined the ranks of other powers engaging in freedom of navigation activities in the South China Sea, signaling the country’s willingness to take on a greater role in countering China’s influence to the east. During the Indian task force’s voyage, which includes the country’s first indigenously built aircraft carrier, the INS Vikrant, the vessels will participate in joint war games off the coast of Guam with the other members of the Quad (the United States, Japan, and Australia).

The presence of task forces passing through disputed waters is not the only development congesting already busy maritime routes. In addition to expanding military training and cooperation, regional actors in Southeast Asia are deepening their investment in naval capabilities. For example, following an arms export deal between Japan and Indonesia in spring 2021, Japan could deliver upward of eight new frigates to the Indonesian Navy.

In June, Vietnam set up a new armed maritime militia unit consisting of nine ships and platoons – the Permanent Maritime Militia Unit – in Kien Giang, its southwesternmost province bordering Cambodia. This new squadron, the second since April, is intended “to jointly protect the sovereignty of the sea and islands,” according to the Vietnamese Defense Ministry. (China is reportedly helping to build infrastructure at Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base to expand and modernize it to host large, deep-water vessels. Cambodian officials deny the assistance comes with any strings attached.)

China has not sat by idly as the frequency and diversity of vessels in these waters has grown. On the contrary, Beijing has continued to take a multipronged approach to the South China Sea. Publicly, Beijing is steadfast in its expansive claims, justifying them as having “abundant historical and legal basis.” In February, China passed new legislation for its coast guard, authorizing the force to fire on foreign ships in Chinese-claimed waters without prior permission.

Separately, China has upped its surveillance in the maritime region. One way it has bolstered its information gathering has been through upgrades to two civilian supply ships, the Sansha 1 and Sansha 2, that were outfitted with high-tech surveillance and tracking equipment. This approach falls in line with China’s record of leveraging civilian ships to expand and assert its influence in the name of national security interests in the South China Sea. Beijing has also reportedly dispatched intelligence-gathering vessels and maritime patrol aircraft to manmade islands China administers, despite the competing claims over the features.

The presence of major Western powers in the South China Sea frequently elicits criticism and condemnation from Beijing officials. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Zhao Lijian has accused the United States of “deliberately stoking disputes,” “sowing discord,” and “sabotaging regional peace and stability” in the South China Sea. China has also simultaneously adopted pragmatism with countries in the immediate region, exhibiting a clear preference for engaging with its neighbors in the absence of the United States or other extraregional actors, while emphasizing the need for consultation and negotiation.

Ahead of the five-year anniversary of an international arbitral tribunal’s ruling against China’s claims – and in spite of the storied tension between China and Vietnam – Beijing and Hanoi agreed in June to establish a hotline between the two navies to help manage tensions and emergencies and improve information sharing. Additionally, talks between China and the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the negotiation of a long-awaited code of conduct (COC) resumed in August. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi praised the success of the talks, saying that ASEAN and China agreed to a finalized preface.

In 2018, the two sides announced a nearly 20-page Single Draft Negotiating Text, but this latest “progress” still leaves much unresolved. Aristyo Rizka Darmawan, a lecturer in International Law at the Center for Sustainable Ocean Policy, University of Indonesia, identified four legal issues that must be grappled with in the East Asia Forum. First, the COC must have a clear geographic scope; second, parties must decide whether the COC is legally binding; third, the parties must establish monitoring and compliance mechanisms; and finally they must resolve the question of whether the COC would set up a dispute settlement mechanism.

Renewed talks between ASEAN and China should be supported, argues Viet Hoang, lecturer at the Ho Chi Minh City University of Law and member of the Department of the Law of the Sea at the Vietnam Bar Federation. “But a bad COC is ultimately a greater risk for ASEAN than no COC at all,” he added.

Absent a COC, with modernizing naval fleets and the entrance of more actors upholding freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, the maritime region has gone from a regional to a global focal point, heightening the risks of miscalculation and winnowing diplomatic maneuvering room.