Li Shuo

In 2014, a year ahead of the U.N. climate change conference that would result in the Paris Agreement, the United States and China unveiled a bilateral climate change announcement. The declaration from Chinese President Xi Jinping and then-U.S. President Barack Obama set the stage for the current high-water mark in global climate cooperation.

Fast forward seven years, however, and a repeat of that cooperation looks tenuous amid severely strained China-U.S. relationship. Foreign Minister Wang Yi memorably dismissed the idea that climate change cooperation could be an “oasis” for bilateral relation, remarking that “if the oasis is all surrounded by deserts, then sooner or later, the ‘oasis’ will be desertified.”

Where does China-U.S. climate cooperation stand today, and what are the implications for the health of the planet?

In this interview, Li Shuo, senior climate and energy policy officer at Greenpeace East Asia, discusses China’s unilateral climate moves as well as its climate diplomacy, including with the United States. Despite lingering tensions, Li sees climate change as a bright spot for China’s relationship with the world: “Is there a second area where China made several major political moves within a decade toward the better of global governance? Probably not.”

The U.S. special envoy for climate, John Kerry, has visited China twice in less than a year, with a trip to Shanghai in April and a follow-up visit to Tianjin in September. How did you evaluate his trips, and what does that tell us about the broader prospects for China-U.S. climate change cooperation?

The U.S.-China exchanges so far this year made one point clear to me – when it comes to climate change, engagement matters. The G-2 will certainly not go back to the cooperation seen during the Xi-Obama period. But that doesn't mean there is no need for them to engage. In fact, climate change, unlike many other bilateral issues, can truly not afford decoupling. The climate crisis won’t just go away if Beijing or Washington shut communication channels.

Kerry's China trips have demonstrated the value of engagement. The joint statement issued in Shanghai had a few notable U.S. diplomatic wins. Among them, it’s the first time that the founding principle of global climate politics – common but differentiated responsibilities – was not cited in a U.S.-China bilateral statement. This represents the growing readiness of China to shoulder more climate responsibilities, something that the U.S. has always wanted.

The Tianjin visit did not yield any immediate outcome. But weeks after Kerry’s trip, President Xi announced an overseas coal [power project] moratorium at the UNGA [United Nations General Assembly]. Without international engagement, China will be under no rush to cut a profitable area of its overseas business.

One of the prevailing narratives in Washington is, “the Chinese are tricking us into a climate conversation to extract concessions elsewhere.” That narrative can’t be further from fact. What exactly did China get from the U.S. by announcing an overseas coal moratorium, the ratification of the Kigali Amendment (which the U.S. has not done so far), and carbon neutrality?

China is making these incremental moves when the U.S. has barely done anything concrete on the climate front. The global community has learnt not to take what Washington declares at face value. This applies to Biden's 2030 emission reduction target and his latest climate finance commitment – all solid on paper, but with a slim chance to be actually fulfilled. The willingness of China to progress on the climate agenda in light of Washington's chronic “overpromise and underdeliver” syndrome is worth noting. In 20 years time, this dynamic will shape which one of the G-2 ventures further on climate action.

The U.S. is not the only potential partner for China on environmental issues. The EU sees climate change as a priority, as do many developing states. How is China pursuing climate diplomacy with other partners?

While recognizing the important role of the U.S. and China in each other’s domestic climate discourse, the G-2 dynamic is not the only game in town. This will only become more true as the world evolves into a multipolar place while U.S. climate action is paralyzed by domestic politics.

The EU, and to some extent the U.K., holding the COP26 presidency, has become an important interlocutor for China. Brussels shares many of Washington’s concerns when it comes to China’s pollution problems, but it carries more credibility when talking to China because of its better climate track record. That said, EU-China climate talks are far from hunky dory. It will be challenged by the shifting bilateral relationship. The European carbon border tax will also test both sides in solving their differences.

China’s climate relationship with other developing countries is an interesting one. Beijing has graduated from the historic G-77+China camp, but on the other hand, it is not a developed country. Being sandwiched could be a hard position as China has to take the heat from the West while at the same time dealing with the moral arguments from climate vulnerable countries.

But a more forward-leaning approach is possible. Serving as a bridge between developed and developing countries could be China's unique ability. Doing so could help Beijing fulfill its national interest while projecting a solution-oriented leadership role in global governance. But this role demands skillful diplomacy and delicate strategies, qualities that Chinese diplomats have yet to acquire.

China has also shown a willingness to act independently on climate change, exemplified in President Xi Jinping’s announcement of a 2060 goal for reaching net-zero emissions. What steps have been taken to make this goal a reality? Are you optimistic about that target – and the 2030 date for peak emissions – being achieved?

It has become a trendy thing for countries to commit to ambitious goals that are decades away from now. But when it comes to solving the climate crisis for real, what matters is today and tomorrow. My worry is China will continue with business as usual in the near term. To some extent, the carbon neutrality announcement challenges this near-term sleep walking. It forces Chinese provinces and industries to think hard on decarbonization. But one should never underestimate the desire of these actors to pursue growth at the expense of the environment. So two competing narratives are emerging. On one hand, carbon neutrality. On the other, economic and energy security. It is too early to tell which one will prevail, but the next few years are critical to determine China's speed of decarbonization.

China has traditionally framed itself as the leader of the developing world at U.N. climate discussions, but it is also the world’s largest emitter. Can China combine both roles by proactively reducing its emissions, while also helping its partners in the developing world find an alternative to the traditional, carbon-heavy model of development?

With the latest overseas coal moratorium declared by Xi at this year’s U.N. General Assembly, a new opening is ahead of us. China has been the last man standing in supporting coal plants across the world. Xi’s decision could significantly reshape the global energy landscape. Those of us who have worked hard to achieve this decision should realize that the conversation doesn’t end here, but only just begins. The energy security challenges of much of the developing world won’t go away because of China turning off the tap on coal. In fact, the quest to secure low carbon energy solutions only becomes a more urgent issue.

China was part of the problem, but it can and should be part of the solution now. It has much renewable muscle to flex. The rest of the world should not pretend it is just China’s responsibility to switch the world from coal to wind and solar. There can’t be better news than a China coal moratorium for the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative, launched by the G-7 and intended to support high-quality infrastructure in the Global South. When can we hear anything concrete from them?

What can we expect from China at COP26 in Glasgow in November? Are you anticipating new commitments or announcements?

Predicting China's climate decisions has become a dangerous business in recent years. A few high-level decisions, such as the ones made in this year and last year’s U.N. General Assembly, caught many by surprise and have made what used to be impossible a reality now. To be clear, we are still far from keeping 1.5C in sight even with these Chinese announcements. But the global community should take note of the intensity of top level decision making in climate change. Is there a second area where China made several major political moves within a decade toward the better of global governance? Probably not.

That said, the world needs China to do more. Bringing its emissions peak to “before 2025” would represent a major contribution to COP26.