Bangladesh’s Evolving Relations with India and Pakistan

The emergence of Bangladesh as an independent nation was a watershed event in the early 1970s. The founding Father of the Nation, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, declared the independence of Bangladesh on March 26, 1971. Eventually, Bangladesh emerged as a free nation from under the brutality of the Pakistan regime. The birth of Bangladesh on December 16, 1971 was influenced by the dynamics of the Cold War era. Bipolarity, alliance building, the non-aligned movement, and liberation struggles in the Third World were important factors that shaped the directions and outcomes of Bangladesh’s Liberation War. The country’s diplomatic journey through the heyday of the Cold War dawned in the maze of subcontinental politics, deeply influenced by the dynamics of the 1947 Partition. The events related to Bangladesh’s Liberation War provide a strong historical and philosophical basis for contemporary Bangladesh’s relations with India and Pakistan.

Bangladesh received critical support from different nations for the cause of liberation. Such support was instrumental to overcoming the forces and propaganda against the creation of the Bangladeshi state. India was a leading external power in supporting the emergence of a free and independent Bangladesh.

For Bangladesh, the conduct of foreign policy during the days of the Cold War and into the post-Cold War era has been deeply challenging. Over the past 50 years, India and Pakistan have prominently featured in the foreign policy of Bangladesh, demonstrating a complex cyclical patterns of inter-state relations.

Bilateral Relations With India: The Beginning

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, often referred to as Mujib, laid the foundation of Bangladesh-India bilateral relations while he was returning to Dhaka from a Pakistani jail on January 10, 1972. With its recognition of Bangladesh on December 6, 1971, India laid down the path for a bright future in Bangladesh-India relations. A high watermark of Mujib’s statesmanship was reflected during his visit to Kolkata on February 6-8, 1972. During the visit, a joint declaration between the two countries announced the withdrawal of Indian troops from Bangladesh by March 25 of that year.

Undoubtedly, India’s active support of the freedom struggle in Bangladesh contributed to a warm start for Bangladesh-India relations. One can go back to Mujib’s remarks in Kolkata on February 6, 1972:

I have no doubt in my mind that India, our next door neighbor, will proudly march on as the largest democracy of the world under the dynamic leadership of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. We, on our part, are striving to advance ideals of nationalism, democracy, secularism and socialism at home and nonalignment in international relations.

In a high note of friendship, Mujib concluded the address by saying “Bangladesh-India Bhai-Bhai” – brother-brother. Both prime ministers expressed their determination for cooperation between the governments and people of the two countries, inspired by a vision of lasting peace, amity, and good neighborliness. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi said in the Indian Parliament that the relationship between the countries was “cemented through blood and sacrifice.”

Apart from the recognition of mutual friendship and interests, both India and Bangladesh focused on certain principles to shape their bilateral relations. Domestically, the principles of socialism, democracy, nationalism, and secularism and externally, the principles of anti-imperialism, non-alignment, and peaceful coexistence guided the parameters of Bangladesh-India relations at the very beginning.

Lost Decades?

The assassination of Mujib on August 15, 1975 plunged bilateral relations with India into a period of darkness and hostility. The assumption of power by General Zia, after a bloody coup, disrupted the healthy evolution of Bangladesh-India ties.

The honeymoon phase in Bangladesh-India relations had already started to suffer by the first quarter of 1973, and took a further negative drift from the second half of 1974. Several factors initially contributed to worsening relations, including strong nationalism in the newly emerged Bangladesh, smuggling, and a currency crisis. Eventually, the post-‘75 political regimes moved away from a strategic partnership with India and were rather engaged in a strategic rivalry. The preponderance of linguistic nationalism was questioned and attacked by new political forces in Bangladesh that emphasized Islam as the most important symbol and ethos influencing national identity. The debate between Bengali vs. Bangladeshi nationalism took center stage in the national politics of Bangladesh.

As a result, both nations were entrapped in a long spell of inter-state tensions and conflict as demonstrated in a range of bilateral issues from water to borders to migration. Issues such as the dispute over the maritime boundary, the land border conflict, the sharing of the Ganges River, and disputes over the Muhurir Char (an islet on the Muhuri River, the boundary between Bangladesh and the Indian state of Tripura), the Tin Bigha Corridor, and Purbasha Island in the Bay of Bengal, as well as allegations of domestic interference, seriously undermined friendly relations between India and Bangladesh. Non-cooperation and rivalry have characterized much of the bilateral relationship since, creating mistrust and suspicion. Political regimes in both Bangladesh and India have made every effort to politicize the relationship and use it for their domestic electoral ambitions. Relations suffered for more than two decades, particularly from 1975 to 1996.

The electoral victory of the Awami League, led by Sheikh Hasina, reversed the trend and to an extent rebuilt Bangladesh-India relations during the 1996-2001 period, only to witness a new phase of deterioration from 2001 to 2006.

A New Paradigm of Relations, But Challenges Remain

The Awami League’s landslide victory in the December 2008 general elections provided another historic opportunity to forge closer cooperation between Bangladesh and India. Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s determined and bold initiative to allay India’s long-standing security concerns regarding its northeastern region benefited the country immensely. For example, the Bangladesh government supported India’s capturing of top separatist leaders, including Anup Chetia. Then came a bevvy of agreements addressing long-standing concerns and opportunities for future cooperation: the resolution of the maritime boundary dispute in 2014, the ratification of the 1974 land boundary agreement (LBA) in 2015, a coastal shipping agreement for the use of Chittagong and Mongla ports in 2015, the signing of a bilateral extradition treaty in 2016, a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation in 2018, increased energy cooperation, a memorandum on sharing of the Feni River water, and cross-border LNG pipeline cooperation. Enhancing transit and connectivity, with the important inclusions of Nepal and Bhutan, was also a new milestone. Trade cooperation between the two nations expanded dramatically from about $3 billion in 2009 to $9.5 billion in 2019. Although they have largely remained unimplemented, India extended lines of credit (LOCs) worth $8 billion.

The past decade marked a new phase in Bangladesh-India relations. With the changing geopolitical environment in South Asia and the Bay of Bengal, the contours of Bangladesh-India relations are quickly shifting. Sino-Indian competition in Bangladesh has been significant in recent years. Remaining unresolved bilateral irritants – such as the Teesta River water sharing dispute; the killings of Bangladeshis on the border; Bangladesh’s trade deficit, largely due to the imposition of non-tariff barriers by India; slow progress in the implementation of LOCs; and difficulty in transit negotiations – have stoked concerns for Bangladesh. These challenges also influence public opinion in Bangladesh about India. In addition, Bangladesh’s procurement of submarines from China, support of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and growing Chinese economic engagement have further driven a wedge between Bangladesh and India.

India’s stance on the Rohingya crisis is also a source of public discontent in Bangladesh. This has been accentuated by the cross-border repercussions of communal politics and the so-called illegal migration issue in India. The implementation of the National Register of Citizens (NRC) in 2013 and the passing of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) – both seen by critics as targeting Muslims – in 2019 are further eroding trust and goodwill.

Still, there are compelling economic and geostrategic strategic reasons for Bangladesh and India to cooperate in the larger interests of development and prosperity in the region, despite the existing challenges. The evolving geopolitical calculus, changing regional dynamics, and growing public discontent demand more prudent diplomatic efforts from both India and Bangladesh.

What About Pakistan?

Bangladesh faced significant diplomatic opposition from Pakistan following its independence. Dealing with a hostile Pakistani state was foremost on the agenda for the Mujib government, which rightly pursued recognition as the central goal of his foreign policy. Unsurprisingly, Mujib was tough on Pakistan and even refused to talk to Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (later prime minister) until Islamabad recognized Bangladesh.

In the early years, Pakistan clung to its global campaign of propaganda and misinformation, denying the reality of Bangladesh’s independence. In Pakistan’s view, it could not recognize Bangladesh until all the problems stemming from of the 1971 war were resolved. Mujib wanted to try 195 prisoners of war (POWs) for committing genocide; Pakistan, obviously, did not. The two sides refused to compromise on the issue, with Mujib mentioning in an interview that Pakistani POWs held in India couldn’t be released without the recognition of Bangladesh.

From Negation to Recognition

A sudden change in Pakistan’s attitude on the question of recognizing Bangladesh came shortly before the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) Summit in Lahore in February 1974. Bhutto, then prime minister, extended an informal invitation to Mujib to attend the summit. At first, Mujib refused, but he later accepted the invitation. Following the summit, a tripartite agreement between India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh was signed on April 9, 1974 settling the problems left over by the war of 1971. Pakistan agreed to accept all four categories of non-Bengalis as specified in the Indo-Pakistan agreement of August 28, 1973. A statement by Pakistan’s minister of state for defense and foreign affairs condemned and regretted any crimes that may have been committed by Pakistani soldiers in Bangladesh.

In June 1974, Bhutto paid a visit to Dhaka. During talks between the two leaders, Bangladesh raised the question of the division of assets and the repatriation of the remaining Pakistanis. Progress was made.

What led to Pakistan’s change of attitude? Several situational factors played prominent roles. First, the concurrent events of the first nuclear test by India and the Sino-Russian border tensions influenced Pakistan to some extent. As a result, Pakistan might have changed its position and showed interest in improving relations with Bangladesh in May 1974. Due to the Sino-Soviet border conflict, Pakistan feared that the Soviet Union, India, and Bangladesh might further consolidate their relations while China, a close friend to Pakistan, was busy dealing with the border conflict. Beijing had softened its tone toward Bangladesh at the time. Finally, Bangladesh-Middle East relations were improving and Pakistan had no excuse left to show reluctance to Bangladesh.

From Recognition to Bonhomie: Pakistan Support for the Post-Coup Leaders

Mujib’s assassination in August 1975 provided an opportunity for Pakistan to align with the new ruling clique in Bangladesh. The right-wing and reactionary political forces and coup leaders in Bangladesh found in Pakistan a new ally for their ambitions to transform Bangladesh into an Islamic state. Pakistan did not waste a moment to seize the opportunity. On August 16, 1975, the day after Mujib’s killing, Bhutto announced support for the new government in Bangladesh. He declared that Pakistan would dispatch 50,000 tons of rice, 10 million yards of long cloth, and 5 million yards of bleached mull as a gesture. On October 5, 1975, Pakistan and Bangladesh agreed to establish diplomatic relations.

Two years later, in December 1977, Zia visited Pakistan. It was the first official visit by a Bangladeshi leader to Pakistan. Relations between Bangladesh and Pakistan grew rapidly during the Zia period while Bangladesh-India relations were in a state of flux.

Zia was assassinated on May 31, 1981 and for a while, the country was ruled by a civilian government. But on March 24, 1982, General Ershad came into power. He proclaimed a second period of martial law in the country, which lasted until November 1986.

Under the leadership of Ershad, relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh were further strengthened. On July 26, 1986, Ershad paid an official visit to Pakistan in connection with his tour of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries. Within a decade, the volume of trade between Pakistan and Bangladesh had tripled.

Bangladesh-Pakistan relations enjoyed friendship and partnership during the military rules of both Zia and Ershad. Later on, during the Khaleda Zia regime in Bangladesh (1991-1996) the two countries continued to expanded ties. Economic cooperation reached such a level that the two agreed to sign a free trade agreement. While a draft deal was finalized in 2004, it has yet to be settled.

From Bonhomie Back to Antagonism

Bilateral relations between Bangladesh and Pakistan have been frozen in recent years. Pakistan’s opposition to the trial of war criminals in Bangladesh through the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) substantially harmed bilateral relations. Pakistan’s National Assembly issued a resolution condemning the trial. Islamabad’s continued support for those accused of collaborating in Pakistani war crimes in Bangladesh in 1971 angered people in Bangladesh, where the trial of war criminals is a sensitive domestic issue.

Both countries were involved in diplomatic rows in the 2015-2016 period as well. Pakistan had to withdraw their High Commission official based in Dhaka after Pakistani diplomatic officials in the Bangladeshi capital were alleged to have been running an illegal currency business, and accused of being involved in terror financing and maintaining links with militants.

There was a debate in Bangladesh about scrapping diplomatic relations with Pakistan altogether. Notably, the war crimes trial enjoys widespread public support across the spectrum of political forces in Bangladesh. The government of Bangladesh resisted calls for breaking off diplomatic ties with Pakistan. However, the level of engagement between the two states was downgraded. All aspects of bilateral relations, particularly economic cooperation, have suffered enormously under this chill. Bilateral mechanisms like the foreign secretaries’ dialogue have not been held for nearly 13 years. No meeting of the joint economic commission between Bangladesh and Pakistan has been held since 2005. Bangladesh also opted out of joining the 19th SAARC Summit, which was scheduled to be held in Islamabad in 2016.

Re-normalizing Relations?

Media reports suggest that current Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan has made credible overtures to repair bilateral relations with Bangladesh. Since he came to power in 2018, Khan has signaled a change in the atmosphere of animosity and mistrust. First, he acknowledged and praised the economic development and social progress of Bangladesh. He even said Pakistan can learn from Bangladesh’s development. Bilateral relations seemed to take a fortuitous turn in mid-2020, largely due to Islamabad’s proactive efforts to defrost the chilly Bangladesh-Pakistan relationship.

In a stunning move, Pakistan lifted all restrictions on visas for Bangladeshi applicants in January 2021. Another significant development was a phone call between Khan and Sheikh Hasina earlier this year in which Khan congratulated Bangladesh for its 50th independence anniversary. Khan invited Hasina to Pakistan for a visit during the call. In a letter to her Pakistani counterpart on the occasion of Pakistan Day, Hasina stated the commitment of Dhaka toward peaceful and cooperative relations with Islamabad and other neighbors.

Apart from bilateral approaches, China, Malaysia, and Turkey are reportedly behind an effort to re-normalize Bangladesh-Pakistan relations. The OIC and the D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation (the Developing-8 or D-8 club) are some of the multilateral platforms that emerged as diplomatic spaces that can contribute to the re-normalizing of Bangladesh-Pakistan relations.

Conclusion

Bangladesh’s relations with India and Pakistan have evolved paradoxically over the last 50 years. The pattern of Bangladesh’s relations with India shifted from honeymoon highs to outright hostility and then onward to a strategic partnership now under strain. On the other hand, the pattern of relations with Pakistan has taken on a cycle of hostility, friendship, renewed hostility, and the possibility of friendship again. Bangladesh’s relations with India and Pakistan have inverse cycles of friendship and hostility. When Bangladesh is friendly with India, it is just the opposite with Pakistan and vice versa.

A critical issue is that the current stage of strategic partnership between Bangladesh and India is under stress largely due to the emergence of new irritants in their bilateral relations. International politics is dynamic and so too are the patterns of inter-state relations. The Sino-Indian rivalry in the region has a profound impact on different combinations of bilateral relations in South Asia and beyond. There is no denying the fact that there is a divergence of perception among South Asian countries regarding China’s growing engagement in the region. Bangladesh and India have different views about China, the Rohingya crisis, and the Teesta water-sharing issue. Bangladesh’s prime minister has stressed that geopolitical rivalries in the region must be overcome through regional cooperation and focus on connectivity and poverty alleviation.

Bangladesh-Pakistan tensions and hostility have been tempered by a few proactive moves from both states in recent years. Particularly, Pakistan seems eager to repair a relationship that enjoyed friendship and cooperation for more than three decades under military and right-wing political forces. The continuing economic cooperation and attempts at reviving old bilateral mechanisms may improve relations, but Pakistan has to ways to go to normalize its relations with Bangladesh.

March 25 is observed in Bangladesh as a National Day of Genocide, remembering the crackdown in the name of the so-called “Operation Search Light” by the Pakistan military regime in 1971. For better ties, the Khan government in Pakistan will have to offer a genuine apology on the issue of genocide and the 1971 war. The government also needs to demonstrate sincerity about resolving the issues of the stranded Pakistanis in Bangladesh and asset sharing.

New elements layered over existing patterns of conflict, cooperation, and divergence in South Asia continue to affect Bangladesh’s geopolitical relations, including: China’s BRI; the Quad, bringing the United States, India, Japan, and Australia together; the advent of Indo-Pacific strategies by several states; the AUKUS nuclear submarine deal between the U.S., the U.K. and Australia; the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan; the ongoing Rohingya crisis; and the military coup in Myanmar. Nuclear proliferation, the Kashmir crisis, and terrorism have long been major challenges for South Asia, and they are further complicated by the range of newer developments.

In the changed strategic scenarios and economic power matrix, Bangladesh seems to enjoy wider autonomy to conduct its foreign policy. Bangladesh’s Sheikh Hasina, riding on a fast-growing and resilient economy, can assert a new role for Bangladesh amid the puzzling patterns of inter-state relations.