Interview: Jenny Town and Joel Wit
“North Korea is not sending signals it is open to diplomacy, but waiting for it to do so is a serious mistake.”
It’s been a busy 2022 for North Korea. After a record-setting spate of missile launches in the first month of the year, things quieted down during the Beijing Winter Olympics. Then North Korea tested an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the first such test in five years. Satellite imagery has analysts concerned that a nuclear test is on the way as well, which would bring the Korean Peninsula back to the bad old days of “fire and fury” seen in 2017.
For more insight into North Korea’s recent military actions – and its goals – The Diplomat interviewed Jenny Town and Joel Wit of 38 North, a website dedicated to analysis of North Korea hosted by the Stimson Center. Town is a senior fellow at the Stimson Center and the director of Stimson’s 38 North Program. Wit is a distinguished fellow in Asian and Security Studies and the founder of 38 North.
April 15, the Day of the Sun, is an important public holiday in North Korea. Can you give us a quick overview of the significance of April 15 for North Korea, and how the latest celebration fits into that context?
Jenny Town: April 15 is one of North Korea’s most important holidays, commemorating the birthday of the country’s founder, Kim Il Sung. It is usually marked by large-scale parades, sometimes military parades, that roll through Kim Il Sung Square and are overseen by the leader. This is a time for the regime to reinforce political ideology, call for national unity and project an image of strength. This year marks the 110th birthday of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Un’s 10th year as leader, and celebrations were expected to be big, given signs of parade preparations observed in satellite imagery over the last few weeks, the build-up of WMD achievements over the past few months, and the recent issuance of a commemorative stamp for Kim Jong Un’s 10 year anniversary.
Kim Jong Un, through the combination of festivities around both April 15 and April 25, appears to have wanted to impress upon the North Korean people the that country is still strong despite both the worsening international security situation and the hardships of the pandemic. Whether the people will view it that way when the cameras go dark, the food situation is still dire, and economic opportunities are still limited due to pandemic restrictions is unclear. At the very least, the showcasing of the recent new missiles tested in recent months and yet another new missile help Kim demonstrate his ability to achieve national goals and also project this notion of maintaining peace through strength.
Furthermore, the increasing emphasis on an evolving nuclear doctrine is partially in response to some of the harsher rhetoric coming out of Seoul these days, from the incoming Yoon administration. It also serves as a sort of reassurance that, because of its nuclear weapons, North Korea will not suffer the kind of invasion Ukraine is experiencing now or the fate of other non-nuclear armed states against nuclear armed adversaries in the past.
Should we read North Korea’s repeated missile and satellite tests as a signal to the United States and/or South Korea’s new president-elect? Or are these efforts meant more for a domestic audience, to demonstrate the country’s military strength?
Jenny Town: For North Korea to have this many new missiles and weapons system ready to test, the development efforts have obviously been moving at a quick pace for quite some time. A testing plan/schedule has probably been in the works for several months to be able to execute these all back to back. That means planning way in advance of the South Korean elections or even the conflict in Ukraine. If you recall, the intensive testing schedule started way before the election as well (in January), without regard for whom would be elected.
These tests serve to fulfill North Korea’s military development and larger political goals. There are clearly WMD goals that Kim Jong Un wants to meet – certain technologies that counter U.S./ROK missile defenses, follow regional trends (such as hypersonics), and advance the program in ways that demonstrate progress and expansion into more lethal and credible deterrent capabilities. They also help Kim Jong Un accomplish goals that were set forth as part of his five year plan at a time when there’s been less success on the economic side of the equation. Moreover, there are fewer political consequences at the moment for testing given deteriorating relations between the U.S. and both China and Russia, the push toward re-forming ideological blocs, and with the U.N. Security Council effectively paralyzed with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
What impact do you think the COVID-19 pandemic, and the associated economic toll, is having on North Korea’s military activities?
Jenny Town: It is difficult to tell the full impact of the pandemic on North Korea, given the lack of access and the dependence now on North Korean state reporting. But certainly, the prolonged border closure has to have created economic hardships on all levels of society, including food shortages, job losses as factories and other trade industries atrophy due to lack of demand, and a general lack of imported goods to sell in the markets, resulting in less market activity overall and fewer sources of income for average North Koreans. This is essentially making the people more dependent on the state and the state more dependent in general on China for aid, trade and market activity.
While this may impact the quality of life for soldiers on the ground, especially those in construction units, for instance, North Korea is adept at generating income in illicit ways (such as cyber crimes and sanctions evasion) that provide the regime funding to funnel into priority areas, which at the moment, includes intensive weapons development and demonstrations.
There has been increased speculation about a possible nuclear test on the horizon. How likely do you think that is? Given the tensions elsewhere in the world (particularly over the Ukraine war), would you expect a strong international response?
Jenny Town: There are goals that were set as part of the five year plan that will eventually require further nuclear weapons testing to achieve. We have observed in commercial satellite imagery efforts to restore access to Tunnel #3 of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site for potential use in the future. However, how far in the future is really unknown (especially based on open sources).
While some excavation activity has been observed around the tunnel complex in the southern part of Punggye-ri, there does not appear to be enough spoil accumulated yet to suggest that a new entrance has yet been successfully created. There is also no way to know what the condition of the tunnel complex actually is once they reach it and how much work will be needed to make it ready for use, assuming it is still usable. All we can really say at this time is that North Korea appears to be creating the option to test again in the future.
The international response, given the current geopolitical environment, is unlikely to be as strong or unified as it was in the past. There will be a push from the U.S. and like minded states to try to impose harsh punishments on the North, but those efforts will likely be limited to unilateral sanctions from individual countries and resumption and expansion of such things as U.S.-ROK joint military exercises. However, if a nuclear test is conducted in the coming weeks, it is also likely to solidify a more hardline approach to North Korea as President-elect Yoon takes office, and renew calls in South Korea for such measures as the redeployments of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula.
Based on the signals coming out of Pyongyang, is North Korea open to diplomacy right now? If so, what steps from the United States and South Korea might be most successful?
Joel Wit: North Korea is not sending signals it is open to diplomacy, but waiting for it to do so is a serious mistake. While Washington is rightly focused on Russian aggression in Ukraine, the arms race in Northeast Asia – not just on the Korean Peninsula – is accelerating, posing new dangers for the region. Pyongyang’s recent highlighting of its efforts to develop tactical nuclear weapons is one factor. Another is growing talk in South Korea and Japan about doctrines of pre-emption and deploying American tactical nuclear weapons in the region.
Unfortunately, the Biden administration is stuck in a policy “no man’s land,” which offers no prospect of making progress with a North Korea. There is no practical avenue of ramping up significant sanctions on Pyongyang at the United Nations – given Chinese and Russian opposition – or unilaterally. Moreover, professing a willingness to meet “anywhere, anytime,” is only likely to meet with a yawn in Pyongyang.
The Biden needs to start once again from square one. First, that will mean taking a close look at the developing regional security situation, which is contrary to American national interests. Second, it will require taking serious steps to reassure allies that go beyond just dialoguing to bolster extended deterrence. Third, Washington needs to devise a proactive diplomatic strategy to deal with Pyongyang, to take advantage – if possible – of what may be North Korea’s discomfort with its growing dependence on China.
But that means taking steps that fly in the face of conventional wisdom. For example, it may mean attempting to engage the North Koreans at high levels. It may mean taking unilateral steps beyond providing the humanitarian assistance some pundits have recommended – assistance Pyongyang isn’t interested in – such as lifting a few token sanctions to demonstrate seriousness.
In short, the choice may be sticking to old bromides, which means acquiescing in the slow-motion “nuclearization” of Northeast Asia and accepting the growing risks to our alliances as well as regional peace and stability, or starting now to find ways to avoid the worse possible outcomes.