East China Sea Flashpoints Heat Up

While China’s aerial intercepts and incursions near Taiwan and Japan get most of the attention, these are not the only methods Beijing is trying to bolster its control of the East China Sea. For Tokyo, Beijing’s ongoing exploration of offshore gas fields in the area represents yet another attempt to unilaterally change the status quo.

Tension over sovereignty of these disputed gas fields appears to be on the rise again, deteriorating already-strained bilateral relations. The most immediate issue in China-Japan relations is the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands – and those tensions were not allayed by a meeting between the defense chiefs of the two powerful Asian nations in Singapore on June 12, the first such in-person meeting since December 2019.

The most recent dispute erupted on May 20 when Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) announced that China has built 17 gas exploration platforms on the Chinese side of the geographical equidistance line between Japan and China in the East China Sea. Intentionally or not, the announcement came on the same day that U.S. President Joe Biden arrived in South Korea, the first stop in a five-day Asian tour that also brought him to Japan.

“The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the continental shelf in the East China Sea have not yet been delimited, and Japan takes a position that maritime delimitation should be conducted based on the geographical equidistance line between Japan and China,” MOFA said in a statement posted to its website, reiterating the nation’s long-held stance.

“In this regard, under the circumstances pending maritime boundary delimitation, it is extremely regrettable that China is advancing unilateral development, even on the China side of the geographical equidistance line.”

The following day, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio told reporters that China’s development activity in East China Sea is “unacceptable,” adding that his government has lodged a complaint against Beijing via diplomatic channels.

On June 17, MOFA said Tokyo had again lodged protests with Beijing, as it found China had built an 18th gas exploration platform near the median line.

Meanwhile, China did not respond to Japan’s recent protests openly, but it has long claimed that the exploration of oil and gas fields is normal activity, within its sovereign rights to the maritime area where China does not have any dispute with Japan. Thus, Beijing is not obligated to inform Tokyo of any impending or ongoing operation in this area of the East China Sea.

Behind this incident are the conflicting views of the two countries on where the demarcation line between their exclusive economic zones (EEZs) should be placed.

Legally, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) allows coastal countries to regulate catch and seabed resources in an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extending 200 nautical miles, or 370 km, from their shores. But in some places the 200 nm EEZs of neighboring states would overlap, necessitating a smaller zone for each. Beijing and Tokyo, both of which signed UNCLOS in 1996, have not agreed on where their EEZ border lies.

While Japan defines the EEZ boundary as the line marking an equal distance from the coasts of the two countries, China claims its EEZ extends to the edge of the continental shelf, which stretches to the Xihu trough (known as the Okinawa trough in Japan). Beijing says it has the right to exploit maritime resources up to that point.

China asserts that the gas fields in question, known as Pinghu, Chunxiao, Tianwaitian, Longjing, Canxue, Duanqiao, Baoyunting, Kongque, Wuyunting, and Yuquan, are all located inside the Chinese side of the EEZ boundary – even if the Japanese method of demarcation is adopted – because they are a few kilometers from Japan’s claimed center line. (Remember, however, that China has never accepted the legitimacy of the Japanese demarcation.) Meanwhile, Japan says it has a right to claim its share if these resources are found to straddle the intermediate line.

In 2004, then-Japanese Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Nakagawa Shoichi stressed the so-called “drinking straw effect” to his Chinese counterpart. Nakagawa said that if China were to begin oil extraction in waters near the “Sino-Japanese Median Line,” that means resources would flow from Japan’s side of the line toward China’s.

Japan has repeatedly asked China to cease unilateral development of the area and to resume negotiations on the implementation of a June 2008 agreement, in which both countries agreed to cooperate on the development of natural resources in the disputed waters.

Further complicating matters, Japan claims China has installed radar on some of its offshore gas platforms. Military experts in Tokyo suspect that by doing so, China’s real purpose is monitoring Japan Self-Defense Forces and U.S. military forces in Japan. That military purpose will prevail even after Beijing depletes sea-bed resources or even if the exploration is deemed unprofitable.