Japan Moves Into the Post-Abe Era

Japan’s July 10 upper house elections took place in the shadow of former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s assassination on July 8. Abe was gunned down during an outdoor campaign speech in Nara. Despite the publicity of the assassination, it did not necessarily translate to greater political participation in Japan. Turnout – 52.05 percent for prefectural constituencies – was higher than the last upper house elections in 2019 (48.80 percent), but still the fourth lowest on record.

The biggest story to come out of the election was the supermajority formed when the seats of the four pro-constitutional revision parties are combined: the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), LDP’s coalition partner Komeito, Nippon Ishin no Kai (Japan Innovation Party), and the Democratic Party for the People (DPFP). The LDP alone won 63 seats, over a majority of the 125 seats that were being contested in this summer’s election. Komeito won 13, Ishin 12, and the DPFP five.

In Japan, revising the constitution requires a two-thirds vote in the upper and lower houses of the Diet before it can be put to a national referendum, where a majority of the population must approve it. In the upper house, which consists of 248 seats, the magic number is 166. Combined with the seats the four parties hold that were not up for election this time, with their election victories, the pro-constitutional revision parties now hold 179 seats.

Although a necessary prerequisite has been met, this does not mean revision will be straightforward, as the four parties still need to agree on what revision will look like. The Asahi Shimbun and a team led by Taniguchi Masaki, a political science professor at the University of Tokyo, conducted a survey of all incumbents and candidates in the upper house. Valid responses were received from 94 percent of successful candidates and 67 percent of incumbents. According to their results, 78 percent of the upper house members favored adding a clause that would spell out the legal status of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and 74 percent supported adding a clause that would allow the government to limit civil rights during national emergencies. These numbers are up from 66 percent and 50 percent in the 2019 survey, respectively.

While almost all LDP, Ishin, and DPFP members support revision, only 54 percent of Komeito members support it. Furthermore, among them, only 14 percent support the addition of the SDF clause and 29 percent support the emergency clause. Unless there is rock solid unity between the LDP, Ishin, and DPFP, pacifist Komeito will likely play an outsized role in what constitutional revision will look like in practice. Revision of Article 9, in particular, seems extremely unlikely in the near future.

Before the election and Abe’s assassination, current Prime Minister Kishida Fumio’s position on constitutional revision was unclear. He has made much more proactive statements since, indicating a willingness to amend the constitution clause-by-clause as agreement is reached rather than waiting for an agreement across all clauses that could potentially be revised.

Constitutional revision is not the only major item on the agenda for Kishida. The day after the election, he declared that rising prices and national security issues today are Japan’s “greatest post-war difficulties,” along with the ongoing coronavirus pandemic, the need to revitalize the economy, the war in Ukraine, and global nuclear disarmament. Kishida also said, “I will keep alive former Prime Minister Abe’s thoughts and tackle thorny issues such as the abduction [of Japanese nationals by North Korea] and amending the Constitution.” As Kishida advocates a “new form of capitalism,” the government will have to deal with how to implement these measures – for example, increasing investment in human resources through vocational training – while simultaneously increasing defense spending, as Chinese incursions in Japan’s territorial waters continue, and social security spending, as Japan’s population continues to shrink and age.

Other interesting observations from the election include the electoral success of internet celebrities and women, and the narrow victory for the opposition parties in Okinawa, seen as a precursor to September’s gubernatorial election.

The main opposition, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP) had a particularly poor showing despite campaigning against “Kishida inflation” and for “livelihood security,” and the Osaka-based Nippon Ishin failed to become a national party. Lack of unity among opposition parties continues to plague all challengers to the LDP.

Looking ahead, Kishida is expected to reshuffle his cabinet and the leadership of the LDP as early as late August. Taking a page from Abe’s book, Kishida is likely to preserve the core of his cabinet in a bid for government stability. How members of the Abe faction, the largest – but also now leaderless – party faction, will be represented going forward is still a delicate matter. The expected instability within the Abe faction itself could also change LDP dynamics. Kishida’s own faction is only the fourth-largest faction in the LDP.

How will the assassination change domestic politics in Japan? It is too soon to say anything definitively, but tentatively, we can say that the shooting does not appear to portend a violent radicalization of Japanese politics.

The alleged shooter’s motivations appear apolitical at the current stage in the investigation. There will, of course, be political consequences, but the assassination is most likely not a harbinger of broader violent radicalization. In other words, we should not expect a return to the 1930s-style “government by assassination” in Japan. What is more concerning is the high profile way in which the murder demonstrated the viability of handmade guns; whether for political or apolitical ends, it could change violence in Japan.

Meanwhile, Kishida may have the opportunity and incentive to adopt a more pro-security agenda. Even before Abe’s assassination, Kishida’s pledges at the Shangri-La Dialogue and the NATO summit revealed a pro-security agenda. However, Abe’s death could give him the momentum and pressure to implement it. Increased defense spending in line with Abe’s own goals can help shore up Kishida’s support from the more conservative wing of the LDP. Given that Kishida’s desired economic policies are less in line with the neoliberal agenda Abe favored, this issue linkage may be particularly important.

An LDP lawmaker told Reuters on the condition of anonymity that the next defense budget could be as much as 6 trillion yen ($45 billion), an increase of 11 percent from last year. Annual percentage increases of about 10 percent would double Japan’s military spending to about 2 percent of Japan’s GDP over the course of 10 years. The same lawmaker stated that if Kishida can achieve the increased defense budget, “the conservatives within the party will flock to Kishida and he will have a long-term administration, no doubt about it. Kishida can secure his throne by realizing Abe’s goals.”

Kishida does not need to face an election again for three years, unless he calls a snap election himself. What Kishida will achieve in this “golden era” will depend in large part on what he prioritizes and how effectively he can manage the factions within the LDP.