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What Does the US Return to Philippine Bases Mean for Subic Bay?
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What Does the US Return to Philippine Bases Mean for Subic Bay?

The U.S. military has no concrete plans to return to the naval base it vacated in 1992, but Subic Bay’s defense industry anticipates an economic boom.

By Nick Aspinwall

Three decades after the United States left its last military base in the Philippines, it has secured a deal to gain expanded access to the Southeast Asian country’s military bases as it seeks to establish a strategic arc around China.

The new deal, announced in early February, gives the U.S. access to a total of nine bases under the existing Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), allowing it to rotate troops in close proximity to the South China Sea and Taiwan.

U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin visited Manila to announce the agreement and meet Philippine President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr, who has aligned his country firmly with Washington after predecessor Rodrigo Duterte attempted to forge closer ties with Beijing.

“These efforts are especially important as the People’s Republic of China continues to advance its illegitimate claims in the West Philippine Sea,” Austin said, using the Philippine term for its waters in the South China Sea.

The new deal thrust an immediate spotlight upon Subic Bay, the base north of Manila that was used by the U.S. Navy for decades until it left in 1992 after failing to agree with the Philippine government over leasing costs.

So far, U.S. and Philippine officials have been coy on the names and locations of the four new sites included in the new agreement. However, Marcos told Kyodo News last month that the Subic naval base and former Clark air base are “not included in the proposed bases” to be accessed in the deal.

And it remains unlikely that the U.S. Navy would restore its substantial former presence at Subic, where it had extensive ship repair facilities. But obtaining access to the base, which is now used by the Philippine Navy, would provide a natural staging ground for a conflict with China over Taiwan.

Rolen Paulino, who heads the free-port zone created at Subic Bay following the U.S. departure, told Nikkei Asia that the U.S. military could covet Subic’s deep harbor and South China Sea access. “It’s very strategic,” he said. “It’s only an hour away from Taiwan. It is about 30 minutes away by F-14.”

Officials at the free-port zone, called the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, told Nikkei Asia there are plans to restart ship repair and shipbuilding operations for both U.S. Navy and Philippine ships, along with commercial vessels. Paulino predicted that Cerberus Capital Management, the U.S. private equity group managing the shipyard, would be “very, very aggressive this year.”

The United States could also pursue access to another facility in Luzon, including an area in northern Cagayan province, Gregory Poling, director of the Southeast Asian Program and Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told Navy Times last month. Such a facility would allow for U.S. surveillance and prepositioning of equipment for a Taiwan conflict, he said.

“Any facility up on the coast of Cagayan province, 200 miles from Taiwan and 1,000 miles from the Spratlys, it’s pretty obvious that site will be for other operations outside the South China Sea,” Poling said.

A U.S. return to Subic Bay could bring mixed reactions among Filipinos. Many would welcome the return of the U.S. military. Others, however, remain angered by the pardon of Joseph Scott Pemberton, a U.S. Marine who killed transgender woman Jennifer Laude in 2014 while in Subic Bay for joint military exercises. Pemberton was convicted of homicide and sentenced to up to 10 years in prison before being pardoned by Duterte in 2020.

The new military deal will reanimate a Philippines-U.S. military alliance that suffered under Duterte. Most notably, in 2020 the former president started the process to withdraw from the Visiting Forces Agreement, which governs much of the U.S. military presence in the Philippines. However, Duterte reversed his decision months later, and since taking office last year Marcos has relied upon the Philippines’ traditional ally to take a more aggressive stance toward Beijing.

Last month, the Philippine military accused a Chinese coast guard ship of shining a “military-grade laser light” at one of its vessels within its South China Sea waters. The government lodged formal protests, including the summoning of the Chinese ambassador.

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The Authors

Nick Aspinwall is a journalist and senior editor at The Week.

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