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China’s Changing Stance on the Korean Peninsula
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China’s Changing Stance on the Korean Peninsula

Beijing has gone from condemning North Korean provocations to directly blaming the United States for Pyongyang’s actions.

By Shannon Tiezzi

On April 13, North Korea launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the third such launch of 2023. According to North Korean state media, it was a successful test of a new solid-fuel ICBM, another step forward in Pyongyang’s ability to threaten a nuclear attack on the U.S. mainland.

In response, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin had stern words – but for the United States, not North Korea.

“This round of tensions on the Korean Peninsula happened for a reason,” Wang told reporters during his regular press conference on April 13. “The U.S.’s recent massive military drills near the Peninsula and its deployment of strategic weapons apparently had a negative impact.”

Wang added, “The U.S. in particular needs to act as soon as possible to address the legitimate concerns of the DPRK and create conditions for the early alleviation of tensions and resumption of dialogue.” (The DPRK is an abbreviation of North Korea’s official name: the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.)

Compare that to China’s response when North Korea resumed ICBM testing in March 2022, after a hiatus of over four years. Back then, Beijing adopted a far more neutral approach: “We have noted with concern the latest developments,” Wang said, again during a regular Foreign Ministry press conference. “It is our consistent view that dialogue and consultation is the only right path to resolving the Korean Peninsula issue. Under current circumstances, any step that might lead to further deterioration or escalation of the situation is ill-advised.”

And going even farther back, China’s response to North Korea’s ICBM test-launch in July 2017 was positively scathing: “Relevant resolutions of the U.N. Security Council have explicit stipulations on launches conducted by the DPRK using ballistic missile technology,” then-Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang said.

He continued: “The Chinese side opposes launches by the DPRK in violation of relevant resolutions of the U.N. Security Council. The Chinese side urges the DPRK not to violate relevant Security Council resolutions any more and create necessary conditions for the resumption of dialogue and negotiation.”

To recap: In just under six years, China has gone from responding to North Korean ICBM launches with direct condemnation, to adopting a “both sides” stance, to outright blaming the United States for Pyongyang’s actions. Indeed, China no longer even expresses “concern” in response to North Korean missile launches – which remain as much in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions now as they were in 2017 – but did make a point of voicing its “grave concern” over South Korea-U.S. military drills in March 2023.

At the time, Wang made crystal clear that China believes the United States is to blame for any escalatory actions made on the Korean Peninsula – including North Korea’s military provocations. “The crux of how the Korean Peninsula situation gets to where it is today is clear. The main reason is that the parties concerned have refused to respond to the denuclearization measures taken by the DPRK, and continued to pressure and deter the DPRK,” he said.

North Korea and the South Korea-U.S. alliance have been locked in an escalatory spiral since May 2022, when South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol took office with a pledge to enhance the alliance. Even before Yoon’s inauguration, however, North Korea had resumed missile testing at a rapid clip, following years of relative quiet on the peninsula amid diplomatic efforts between the two Koreas and North Korea and the United States.

The situation has deteriorated over the past year, but the driving factors haven’t markedly changed. Yet China’s response has undergone a notable shift. Why?

The simplest explanation is that Beijing’s shifting North Korea positioning is a symptom of deteriorating China-U.S. ties. The relationship hit new lows in 2023, when hopes for even a limited thaw were shattered by the revelation of a Chinese surveillance balloon transiting over the continental United States.

With Washington embracing all-out competition against China in nearly every field, Beijing has threatened that even areas of potential cooperation would wither away. The shared interest in non-proliferation, especially on the Korean Peninsula, is one of those areas. In essence, Beijing wants to make life as difficult as possible for the United States – even if, in North Korea’s case, that means turning a blind eye to behavior China has criticized in the past.

China has been upfront about its reasoning. During a tour of Europe in April, Liu Xiaoming, China’s special representative on Korean Peninsula affairs, told AFP that Beijing is “concerned about the U.S. intention to use Korean Peninsula issues as a tool for containing China.” Beijing sees the United States’ beefed-up military cooperation with South Korea not as a direct response to North Korean behavior but as a nefarious plot ultimately targeting China.

“It’s part of their Indo-Pacific strategy... to gang up allies, to strengthen their alliance with [South Korea] and Japan,” Liu claimed.

According to Liu, China doesn’t think the United States is seriously trying to find a diplomatic solution to the North Korea problem at all. Instead, Washington prefers to use the deteriorating situation on the Korean Peninsula as a pretext to deploy more strategic assets to China’s doorstep. “The message sent to the DPRK is still pressure, sanctions, confrontation, so that made dialogue impossible,” Liu told AFP.

Liu’s trip itself was part of an effort to gain buy-in for China’s framing of the Korean Peninsula crisis. His mission was to encourage leaders in France and Germany – his first two stops – to “persuade Americans to address the security concerns” of North Korea, as he told AFP.

Indeed, Liu told his German counterpart that, when it comes to the Korean Peninsula, “the parties concerned” should “stop [the] confrontation and pressure campaign, and address each other’s concerns, especially the legitimate concerns of the DPRK, in a balanced manner through meaningful dialogue.”

He likely found a more receptive audience in Russia, the final leg of his trip. China and Russia have been in lockstep on nearly every global issue since Moscow launched an all-out invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 – especially when that means standing in opposition to the United States. “China and Russia share a lot with regard to the Korean Peninsula. We all work for peace and stability,” Liu told AFP.

If China’s recent statements are any indication, we can expect a renewed push from both China and Russia to begin easing U.N. sanctions on North Korea – a major piece of the “pressure campaign” against the North. China’s push for sanctions relief is starkly at odds with Pyongyang’s unprecedented spate of missile tests and military drills.

The United States would of course block any such attempt with its veto power on the U.N. Security Council, but it would still send a message to North Korea that it will face no consequences for its actions – a dangerous signal as Pyongyang reportedly stands ready to conduct a nuclear test.

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Shannon Tiezzi is Editor-in-Chief of The Diplomat.
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