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Can the US Counter Huawei’s Normalcy?
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Can the US Counter Huawei’s Normalcy?

Most advanced economies in the world have followed the U.S. in taking steps against Huawei. But perceptions, let alone the actual actions taken, are different in the Indo-Pacific. 

By Shihoko Goto

Ads for Huawei smartwatches are ubiquitous across Tokyo this spring, with the latest model promising better record-keeping and ultimately better performance for the wearer on the green. It’s a tantalizing prospect for any avid golfer, and an advertising campaign seen across Asia this season. The smartwatches must, of course, sync with Huawei handsets and other devices, and the company’s telecommunications network provides the backbone to connect the gathered information. 

But lacking in the alluring promotional content is any local government warning about the prospect of data being shared with Beijing through the Chinese telecom group, or international efforts to severe ties to the company’s networks completely.

Japan has already aligned itself with Washington’s staunch position against the proliferation of Huawei over the years, which first began with the United States banning the company from bidding for U.S. government contracts in 2014. In 2018, the ban was expanded to handsets and commercial use of products made by Huawei, which was founded by a PLA engineer. The following year, the company was placed on the Commerce Department’s entity list. 

Just as it adopted much of its predecessor’s economic strategy toward China, the Biden administration has continued the ban against Huawei. What’s more, Washington has sought to cripple the telecommunications giant by developing Open RAN cellular technology, which is anticipated to weaken demand for Huawei worldwide.

Most advanced economies in the world have followed the United States’ lead to take steps against Huawei, if not ban the company altogether. But while public wariness toward the Chinese group in Europe may be similar to that in the United States, perceptions, let alone the actual actions taken, contrast sharply in the Indo-Pacific. 

Advertisements for Huawei handsets are found all across Singapore’s subway system. Meanwhile, one of the first big ads greeting passengers arriving in Bangkok’s international airport is a massive billboard promoting Huawei’s cloud center. Across the Indo-Pacific – including Japan – Huawei remains a hugely popular network carrier as well as device manufacturer. 

According to the company itself, Huawei is used in over 170 countries and has over 207,000 employees worldwide. China has also made contracts with Huawei part of its rollout of infrastructure development projects for digital technology across the Global South, especially in countries that are on the fence in aligning between China and the United States. 

It is noteworthy that Japan – a country that is coordinating closely with the United States on export controls against China and is in alignment regarding the threat posed by Beijing’s abuse of data – is still a market for the latest Huawei products. Given the restrictions facing Huawei’s goods, buying a Huawei smartwatch or smartphone would seem to be limiting to the average user, who supposedly would value easy access to interoperable apps and networks used by everyone else. Huawei is working on developing its own independent operating system that would completely separate it from the Android system. 

Huawei does not disclose its sales figures in the Japanese market, but given the dominance of iPhones and Samsung handsets, it’s unlikely that Huawei products make a significant dent. But the Huawei ads that run non-stop in Tokyo taxi cabs could have a subliminal effect insofar as it could lead some to question the dangers posed by the Chinese group. 

To be sure, Japan has taken on a far more comprehensive approach to the issue of economic security than most other countries, including the United States. But while U.S. lawmakers and the White House have been quick to target highly visible Chinese companies as a threat to national security and have moved to ban their presence, Japan’s public approach to dealing with the Chinese technology challenge has deliberately been more measured. 

For example, the U.S. Congress recently passed a bill that would ban TikTok, unless it is sold by its Chinese parent company. That in turn raised public interest and awareness about the risks posed by Chinese entities. The issue was widely discussed across the country. In Tokyo, meanwhile, the U.S. debate on banning TikTok was noted but the app has not yet come under intense scrutiny in the Diet. 

Similarly, a possible ban on Huawei has not moved forward in Japan – even as the government intensifies efforts to secure supply chains. Since the April 2024 summit between President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio there are even more efforts between the United States and Japan to enhance bilateral cooperation in developing advanced technologies and to coordinate efforts for greater compatibility and development of military technology. 

Huawei may not need to focus on the bottom line as much as its U.S. or Asian counterparts, and its marketing strategy may be as much about advancing Chinese soft power as it is about actually leading to unit sales and capturing market share in advanced economies. The billboards advertising its products across the Indo-Pacific may be an attempt to get the average consumer to question the threat posed by a Chinese telecommunications group that is offering attractive products.

As the United States steps up efforts to coordinate on protection critical technologies together with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in particular, it will be vital for Washington to continue to win the public opinion war too, to ensure that differences in perceptions about the threat China poses to national security and economic expansion do not become too wide. 

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The Authors

Shihoko Goto is the director the Indo-Pacific Program at the Wilson Center.

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