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Japan’s Security Agenda: Kishida’s Unfinished Business
U.S. Air Force, Martha Moore
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Japan’s Security Agenda: Kishida’s Unfinished Business

After Kishida, Japan’s next prime minister will face three major challenges in the field of foreign policy and security.

By Takahashi Kosuke

With his Cabinet’s approval rating languishing at its lowest levels, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio announced that he will not run in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)’s leadership election in September. As a result, he will step down from the premiership once a successor is elected. His resignation will come about three years after his first Cabinet was formed in October 2021.

Kishida comes from a traditionally dovish LDP faction called Kochikai, favoring lightly armed forces and emphasizing the economy. But he inherited the hawkish path of former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, who attempted a major transformation of Japan’s postwar security policy and promoted the strengthening of defense capabilities and the deepening of the Japan-U.S. alliance.

The common consensus among political circles in Tokyo is that Kishida has achieved this transformation even more thoroughly than Abe by faithfully walking the path laid out by Japan’s longest-serving prime minister.

Kishida’s greatest achievement was the revision of three key national security-related documents in December 2022, particularly announcing the possession of counterstrike capabilities that enable the Japan Self-Defense Forces to retaliate against bases and installations in the territory of countries attacking Japan. At the same time, the Kishida administration also decided to double defense spending to 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) by fiscal year 2027.

The Kishida administration also revised the “Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology” and “Implementation Guidelines for the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology” based on the National Security Strategy adopted in December 2022. Under the new rules, exports of finished weapons with lethal capabilities are now possible.

As Chinese President Xi Jinping has not ruled out the use of force and the possibility of a Taiwan emergency has become more realistic, Kishida has repeatedly warned that “today's Ukraine may be tomorrow's East Asia.” He embarked on strengthening defense capabilities with Japan National Security Secretariat Secretary General Akiba Takeo as his right-hand person.

The defense strengthening promoted by Kishida has been warmly welcomed by the United States, as it meets Washington’s high expectations. The U.S. is currently seeking to strengthen “integrated deterrence,” a key concept established in its 2022 National Defense Strategy, which brings together the military power of its allies.

Kishida visited Washington as a state guest in April this year, and gave a speech in the U.S. Congress, saying, “Japan is already standing shoulder to shoulder with the United States.” The leaders of Japan and the United States declared the two countries to be “global partners,” impressing upon the audience that the alliance has been deepened to an unprecedented level.

On August 14, when Kishida announced his impending resignation, U.S. President Joe Biden released a statement praising the prime minister for taking “the Japan-U.S. alliance to new heights” and transforming “Japan's role in the world.”

Overall, Kishida’s achievements in further advancing the security policy trend seen since Abe can be highly praised. But Kishida leaves the post of Japan’s prime minister with three major tasks unfinished.

First, Kishida could not solve the issue of North Korea’s abductions of Japanese citizens decades ago, although he has reiterated this issue is one of the highest-priority issues for his administration. Kishida also stressed “realizing summit-level talks” with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, but to no avail.

Why has the abduction issue with North Korea remained unsolved so far? Pyongyang’s main motivation for negotiating with Tokyo has always been the expectation of compensation for Japan’s colonial rule of the peninsula. However, due to United Nations Security Council sanctions imposed on North Korea over its nuclear missile development, no monetary transactions can be made with Pyongyang. Japan firmly adheres to the United Nations Security Council sanctions, and so North Korea sees little possibility of any remittances from Japan. This removes the primary incentive for Pyongyang to engage with Tokyo on this issue.

In addition, the Japanese government places the utmost importance on its alliance with the United States, and is concerned about the risk that a generous attitude toward North Korea could create discord with the U.S. government. It must also keep in step with South Korea’s Yoon Suk-yeol government, which is firmly opposed to North Korea.

The abduction issue will likely continue to stand as a most critical and difficult challenge for the next administration.

Second, Kishida also failed to amend the constitution, which he expressed a strong desire to achieve during his term. Constitutional amendment, centered on the war-renouncing provisions of Article 9, is a party principle of the LDP.  The constitution’s current Article 9 does not recognize the Self-Defense Forces as a military force and is simply unrealistic. But constitutional amendment is something that even the nationalistic Abe administration was unable to achieve, despite setting a record as Japan’s longest-serving government.

Now attention will be focused on whether the next prime minister, unlike Kishida, will be able to demonstrate swift and strong leadership on the issue of constitutional reform.

Third, the issue of U.S. military bases in Okinawa has also remained unsolved.

Both Kishida and Japan’s Defense Minister Kihara Minoru have stated that “reducing the burden of bases in Okinawa is one of the most important issues for the current administration.” In particular, the government aims to realize the early return of the land south of Kadena Air Base, including the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to Henoko in Nago City.

However, Okinawa Governor Denny Tamaki and many Okinawans are strongly opposed to the construction of the new U.S. military base off the coast of Henoko to replace U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. In the wake of recent sexual assaults allegedly committed by U.S. soldiers, anti-U.S. military base sentiment and movement in Okinawa flared up once again.

The burden of hosting U.S. military bases continues to be a serious issue for Okinawa, even more than half a century after its return to Japan. The next administration thus has a tough task on its hands. It has to continue to work to reduce the burden of bases in Okinawa while maintaining the deterrent power of the Japan-U.S. alliance, especially in Japan’s southwestern Nansei Island chain, which spans about 1,200 km from Kagoshima to Okinawa, stretching southwest toward Taiwan.

The issue of U.S. military bases in Okinawa is likely to remain a bitter thorn in Japan-U.S. relations, despite China’s military rise in the western Pacific and elsewhere.

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The Authors

Takahashi Kosuke is Tokyo Correspondent for The Diplomat.

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