Turbulence in Japan’s Power Corridors Amid Trump’s Return

Despite the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) losing majority in the October 27 general election, Prime Minister Ishiba has managed to hang on to the premiership. In a vote on November 11, Ishiba beat opposition leader Noda Yoshihiko to remain prime minister – although it took a runoff for Ishiba to do so.

Will the minority government led by Ishiba survive the rough and tumble of global geopolitics amid Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency? Ishiba, operating with a severely dented domestic power base, lacks decisive leadership at a time when Japan can ill afford it. He is on a weak foot both at home and abroad. 

Following the lower house election in October,  three “Ds” are dominating the political pulse in Japan. The first “D” pertains to the deep divisions within the LDP and the deep dissatisfaction of the electorate with the ruling dispensation given a series of political scandals. The second “D” is the democratic space of the Japanese opposition parties and the conversation around a different brand of politics. The final “D” concerns the decisive leadership of Japan in the Indo-Pacific, which has been a constant feature since late Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s second tenure. Now Japan’s regional leadership may be diluted due to turbulence in the domestic political space.

Meanwhile, the return of Trump to the White House in January will bring back the trade and tariff variable in Japan-U.S. relations, testing Ishiba’s political mettle and keeping alliance managers anxious.

Japan is in its own season of elections. Two already unfolded: the LDP presidential race in late September and the subsequent lower house election in late October. Meanwhile, the upper house election remains on the horizon for sometime in the middle of 2025. While the LDP’s presidential election put Ishiba Shigeru in the office of prime minister on October 1, marking an end to Prime Minister Kishida Fumio’s tenure, the snap election of the consequential lower house on October 27 has led to tectonic shifts in domestic politics, with the LDP-led coalition losing its majority. Japan is in a new era of political instability.

There is no room for mediocrity in leadership as Japan weathers monumental strategic, security, foreign policy and economic challenges, including a change of leadership in Washington and navigating the complexity of a Sino-U.S. strategic competition. A leadership deficit that sees Japan slip back to its legacy of revolving-door prime ministers will adversely affect key policy matters and Japan’s strategic outlook. However, given the emerging trends in domestic politics, this looks likely to be the case.

Japanese analysts stress a new polarization within the LDP, with the once-ascendent Abe loyalists marginalized by the progressives within the party. Ishiba reached the post of party president with the support of two former prime ministers, Kishida and Suga Yoshihide, who both backed Ishiba over Takaichi Sanae, often considered as a protégé of Abe. This demonstrates a strong desire to erode the power base of the conservative strand of LDP. There are views suggesting that by positioning Ishiba in office, Kishida sought to marginalize Abe loyalists, a process that he initiated during his time in office by stripping Abe’s closest allies of their party posts following the slush fund scandal.

Decoding the power balance within the party, the victory by Ishiba, a staunch Abe rival, puts the moderate liberal section of the LDP front and center. Takaichi was not given an influential post, despite placing second in the election, and other Abe allies have also been sidelined: Aso Taro was demoted from LDP vice president to senior adviser and Imai Takaya was ousted from his special advisory position in the Cabinet.

On the other hand, Ishiba’s team reflects the clout of Kishida. For instance Hayashi Yoshimasa, a former member of Kishida’s now-disbanded Kochikai faction, has remained in the crucial post of chief cabinet secretary. Clearly the LDP’s internal power balance has changed.

In contrast to Kishida’s reputation as a consensus builder, Ishiba has long remained an antithesis of the Abe-Aso power base. LDP appointments reflect his determination to freeze out the Abe faction.

While Ishiba took a conscious decision to deny party endorsements to a few LDP candidates, citing their role in the slush fund scandal, they were mostly from the former Abe faction, including former Trade Minister Hagiuda Koichi and Nishimura Yasutoshi, former minister in charge of economic revitalization. Nevertheless, the LDP’s election strategy of paying 20 million yen to the local chapters, and later bringing them back into the fold to help Ishiba reach the numbers needed for his election, has created a perception of opportunism and endorsing corruption.

The credibility of the LDP has remained in question for over a year due to the slush fund and the Unification Church scandals. This was reflected in the Kishida administration’s consistently poor approval ratings. Japan needs a leader who can demonstrate statesmanship and political vision; any power vacuum is not good news amid the international flux. The LDP needs to undo the erosion of public trust before the upper house election next year, and this will be contingent on urgent political reforms.

As Ishiba is not operating from a position of strength, he will have severe limitations in pushing through his agenda. This is already evident in the form of extending concessions to the opposition with regard to chairing important standing committees, including the lower house’s Budget Committee.

Amid growing calls for Ishiba’s resignation within the LDP, nurturing future leaders is indispensable. For Takaichi, this may not be the opportune moment to seize the top spot, even though she secured the second position in the party race. As the LDP is in disarray, her own support base has eroded, with many former Abe faction members marginalized. It will take some time to consolidate her power. Furthermore, popular candidates including Koizumi Junichiro and Kono Taro, both political blue bloods, have enormous global exposure but may need some more time to strengthen their positions.  

Meanwhile, for opposition parties, despite making a dent in LDP strongholds, which is unusual in Japanese politics, the fundamental question remains: Are they ready to contribute effectively in crafting policy solutions or they will add to the confusion that Japanese politics has plunged into and lead to policy paralysis? While the Democratic Party for the People drew attention with its impressive electoral gains in this election, the leading Constitutional Democratic Party has not succeeded in uniting the anti-LDP forces. Meanwhile, Nippon Ishin no Kai has remained Osaka-centric and despite being center-right, the fault lines on the issue of politics and money have kept them away from LDP.

As the Indo-Pacific braces for Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency, Ishiba faces strong headwinds at home. He can hardly afford to be casual in his strategic articulations. Yet Ishiba miscalculated the strategic impact of his pitch for an “Asian NATO” shortly before the LDP presidential election. Arguing in favor of a collective self-defense system by “creating an Asian version of NATO to deter China” in Taiwan on the one hand and remaining open to the idea of collective security involving China on the other demonstrates a lack of strategic clarity. There are no takers for Ishiba’s Asian NATO and as such the concept did not feature in his diplomatic debut at the ASEAN related summits.

While Ishiba has argued for revisiting the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), seeking equality in the alliance and support for stationing Japan Self-Defense Force troops on Guam, alliance management under Trump both geopolitically and geoeconomically will be a litmus test for Ishida. Japanese business lobbies would want Ishiba to strike an early rapport with the incoming president, much like late Prime Minister Abe did during Trump’s first term, but Ishiba may lack the personal charisma to do so.

Meanwhile, the contours of his China strategy have yet to crystallize, but it apparently looks as an extension of Kishida’s line, marking a departure from the impact of Abe's former faction.

Amid disruption and disorder in the Indo-Pacific, Japan’s allies and strategic partners would only hope Tokyo avoids political instability, which may lead to a power vacuum and policy paralysis.