Can Japan Support Ukraine as Long as It Takes?

There was a time when the G-7 nations – or the so-called West at large – professed as one unified voice that they would support Ukraine for as long as it takes. Looking back, such proclamations now appear to be bluster.

The United States, the largest sender of military aid to Ukraine, reckoning with the stalemate on the battlefield, long ago conceded that its support to Ukraine has limits. President Joe Biden has stated that his country will aid Ukraine only as long as it can. Also, the United States has elected a new leader – Donald Trump – one of whose campaign promises was to end the Russia-Ukraine war in “24-hours”: a plan that critics warn would freeze the battle on its current line of demarcation and allow Russia to hold on to the Ukrainian territory it currently occupies.

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has been one of Ukraine’s most stalwart allies on the European continent, and also the seemingly most reliable one – in contrast to Germany and France, which have plunged into domestic political turmoil. Yet in November 2023 Meloni unexpectedly admitted that there is a prevailing “fatigue” caused by supporting Ukraine in absence of a breakthrough, and the time for finding a “way out” from the ongoing war is nearing for all stakeholders involved.

Despite the fading interest and backbone to aid Ukraine among the Western countries, Japan, which has been a part of the broad Western alliance since the early days of the Cold War, is still signaling that they should not correct course prematurely. On November 16, Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru dispatched Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi to Kyiv and delivered a message that his country “stands with Ukraine.” The symbolic visit of Iwaya was also accompanied by the signing of an agreement that would “ensure appropriate protection of classified information shared between the two governments” for the intended purpose of promoting Ukraine’s success not only on the battlefield but also at the negotiating table with Russia when the time is ripe.

The “Japan-Ukraine Agreement on the Security of Information” was a leftover from the Kishida administration, which made supporting Ukraine one of its top foreign policy priorities. In doing so, former Prime Minister Kishida Fumio sacrificed Japan’s superficially cordial relations with Russia, which his predecessors pursued in order to solve territorial issues left over from World War II. Although Kishida had refrained from sending lethal military aid to Ukraine, Japan under his leadership provided significant sums of non-military aid. He even made a speech at the U.S. Capitol to convince the legislators in the chamber – and also the rest of the world – not to abandon Ukraine.

Ishiba echoed Kishida’s pro-Ukraine stance in his first policy speech by arguing that his government will “continue to strongly promote sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine.”

Although there are prominent skeptics – some of whom have a significant following – against supporting Ukraine within most of the G-7 nations, Japan is unique in the sense that no significant domestic opposition has emerged against the overall policy of supporting Ukraine. The reasons for this could be attributed to the geographical distance from the war zone, and the Japanese government’s decision not to send any lethal military aid. Both factors serve to decrease the risk of Japan’s entanglement in the conflict, thus allowing the Japanese people to go along with the status quo policy vis-à-vis Ukraine without any qualms.

However, North Korea’s increasing involvement in the war may change the Japanese public’s understanding that they are mere bystanders and the aid that they provide to Ukraine is risk-free.

In exchange for military technology and battle experience, it is widely reported that North Korean troops have been dispatched to fight along with Russia; they have already begun to fight against Ukrainian soldiers. In response to this development the former Japanese ambassador to Ukraine, Matsuda Kuninori, argued that “the appearance” of the war has changed, implying that it has become truly global in its scope. Matsuda also argued that recent events had increased “the danger of North Korea engaging in adventurist behavior on the Korean Peninsula,” citing real concerns that Pyongyang’s involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war will have spillover effects on Northeast Asia’s regional security, which may affect Japan directly.

North Korea’s threat is ever-present in Japanese society. Whenever a North Korean missile test is conducted, it becomes national news. And when such experiments result in a possible incoming missile, a warning system is activated, setting off alarms on millions of smartphones and TV screens, and within public accommodations across the island nation. In addition, according to the official government figure, 17 Japanese nationals have been abducted by the North Korean government – although the National Policy Agency suspects that the numbers are in the hundreds – an issue that past administrations from Abe to Ishiba have identified as their “most important task.”

As a result, reflecting the level of concern the Japanese people feel toward North Korea, the Japanese government’s language used to describe Pyongyang is much stronger, even compared to Japan’s other potential adversaries. For example, the 2022 National Security Strategy that was drafted by the Kishida administration described “China’s current external stance, military activities, and other activities” as a “serious concern” and “Russia's external and military activities” as a “strong security concern,” but North Korea is perceived to be an “an even more grave and imminent threat to Japan's national security than ever before.”

It is worth noting that the larger reason why Japan has been supporting Ukraine in its full capacity is because they are sympathetic to the suffering of the Ukrainian people, and believe that failure to stop aggression in Europe will encourage actors challenging the status quo in East Asia. However, if continuing to aid Ukraine means risking direct confrontations with North Korea – a threat that a large number of Japanese will perceive – the calculation may have to change. When helping Ukraine entails risks, can Japan confidently say that they will support Ukraine as long as it takes?