PLA Eastern Theater Command Delegation Visits Japan for the First Time in 6 Years

As tensions between Japan and China continue in the East China Sea, particularly over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, relations between the two countries are beginning to show signs of improvement.

Most notably, a delegation from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Eastern Theater Command, which oversees operations involving the Taiwan Strait and Japan’s southwestern Nansei island chain, visited Japan from January 13 to 17.

This was the first time a delegation from the Eastern Theater Command had visited Japan in over six years, since November 2018.

On January 17, Japan’s Defense Minister Nakatani Gen said at a press conference that the Chinese delegation, consisting of six officers, had visited the Self-Defense Forces Central Hospital in Tokyo and the Maritime Self-Defense Force Maizuru Base in Kyoto Prefecture. The PLA officers also held talks with senior officials of the Ministry of Defense in Tokyo during their visit.

Nakatani said their visit to Japan was made possible based on the agreement reached at the Japan-China Defense Ministers’ Meeting, held on the sidelines of the 11th ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) in Vientiane, Laos in November 2024. The ministers agreed on the importance of dialogue and exchanges between defense authorities, including the resumption of military-to-military exchanges, Nakatani said.

“The promotion of mutual understanding and trust through frank communication at the commanders’ level will contribute to building a constructive and stable relationship between Japan and China, which we believe will contribute to the peace and stability of the region,” Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Hayashi Yoshimasa said on January 14.

The Chinese Ministry of National Defense shared the same view.

“The visit is expected to strengthen mutual understanding and trust, while advancing defense exchanges between the two countries,” it announced on January 13.

Meanwhile, a group of lawmakers from Japan’s ruling coalition visited Beijing and met with Chinese Premier Li Qiang on January 15.

The 12-member delegation, led by the secretary-general of the Liberal Democratic Party, Moriyama Hiroshi, and his Komeito counterpart, Nishida Makoto, discussed with Li pending bilateral issues, including China’s possible resumption of Japanese seafood imports at an early date.

According to Japanese media reports, Li said that China-Japan bilateral ties are now at a crucial point in their improvement and development, and that he hopes both countries will work to develop healthy and stable ties to the benefit of both peoples.

Japanese media reported that the delegation handed Li a letter from Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru to Chinese President Xi Jinping, and that Li Qiang requested Ishiba visit Beijing at a convenient time.

A day earlier, on January 14, the delegation also met Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi.  Wang told the delegation that he is willing to visit Tokyo in March to have a China-Japan foreign ministers’ meeting and a foreign ministers’ meeting among Japan, China, and South Korea, with Japan serving as the chair country. Wang may also want to lay the groundwork to explore the timing of a state visit to Tokyo by Xi, which was postponed during the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic and has not been rescheduled to date. Xi has not visited Japan since 2019 when he attended the Group of 20 summit in Osaka along with other world leaders.

On December 25, 2024, Japanese Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi visited Beijing and held talks with his counterpart, Wang, for three hours. It was their first face-to-face meeting.

There are three possible reasons why Beijing is now stepping up the pace of its outreach to Tokyo. The first is that Ishiba regards former Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, who achieved the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China in 1972, as his “political mentor” and inherited Tanaka’s political DNA.

The late Tanaka is praised in China as the “person who dug the well” of Sino-Japanese relations, a reference to a Chinese proverb: “When drinking water, do not forget the person who dug the well.”

A veteran Chinese journalist living in Tokyo told The Diplomat on January 16 that there is no doubt that the Xi administration feels close to Ishiba, a favorite disciple of Tanaka.

On January 13, the Global Times, a newspaper affiliated with the People’s Daily, an organ of the Chinese Communist Party and known as a mouthpiece for the Chinese government, quoted an expert’s comment and praised Ishiba, saying, “Since Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba assumed office, China-Japan relations have begun to ease up and stabilize.”

The second possible reason is that China is likely feeling pressured by the Japanese Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces’ rapid strengthening of defense capabilities in recent years, such as opening Ground Self-Defense Force garrisons one after another in Japan’s Nansei archipelago, which stretches from southern Kagoshima Prefecture to the islands of Okinawa Prefecture, and forming new missile units.

The Chinese military delegation’s visit to Japan is intended to avoid accidental clashes between the two nations in the East China Sea, including around the Senkaku Islands. In fact, the Global Times reported that the visit “will help eliminate misunderstandings and misjudgments between the two sides, reduce the probability of unexpected accidents, and maintain peace and stability in the region.”

The third possible reason relates to the second administration of U.S. President Donald Trump, a hardliner against China. Fearing the renewed Trump administration, which was inaugurated on January 20, Beijing appears to want to drive a wedge between the Japan-U.S. relationship as much as possible.

As for the Japanese side, the Ishiba administration realistically needs to adopt a hybrid strategy of engagement and hedging, which combines promoting dialogue and strengthening deterrence against China. Some conservatives in Tokyo are vocal in their calls for containment of China, but China is Japan’s largest trading partner and Tokyo is heavily dependent on it economically. Japan also shares many common issues and interests with China, including investment, energy, and environmental issues.

Furthermore, considering Japan’s future national strength, which is expected to see even more severe population decline and financial difficulties, it would be rational and expedient to maintain at least some openings for dialogue and safety lines with China in order to prevent accidental clashes and decisive military confrontations.