The New Red Scare: When Fear Becomes a Political Weapon

Seventy-five years ago, in his February 1950 Wheeling speech, Senator Joseph McCarthy alleged that 205 communists had infiltrated the U.S. State Department, posing a dire threat to U.S. national security. Although unsubstantiated, his bold claims ignited widespread fears of Soviet espionage within the U.S. government, ushering in an era of pervasive anti-communist hysteria.

McCarthy’s rhetoric, in essence, weaponized the country’s collective anxieties to garner fervent support from Americans already gripped by fears of communist subversion and betrayal. Meanwhile, it fueled ungrounded suspicion and distrust, fracturing workplaces, communities, families, and personal relationships under the long shadow of the Red Scare while setting the tone for the Cold War.

The China-U.S. Trade War and China Initiative

More than seven decades later, the legacies of the Red Scare have resurfaced in the United States with striking historical parallels, albeit this time targeting China – now the world’s second-largest economy after the U.S. – instead of the former Soviet Union. The official prelude to this renewed Red Scare was the first Donald Trump administration’s launch of the China-U.S. trade war in March 2018, citing national security concerns. That decision unleashed a tit-for-tat tariff battle between the two nations. In November 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) introduced its China Initiative, purportedly aimed at addressing potential economic espionage and intellectual property theft linked to the Chinese government.

In a related study published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, my collaborators (Yu Xie, Xihong Lin, Ju Li, and Junming Huang) and I found that these DoJ investigations had profound adverse effects on the Asian American scientific community. Conducted in partnership with the Asian American Scholar Forum, our research revealed that a majority of U.S.-based scientists of Chinese descent felt unwelcome and unsafe in the United States. Specifically, 72 percent expressed concerns about professional safety, and 42 percent feared scrutiny for engaging in routine academic activities.

This pervasive climate of fear discouraged many scientists from seeking federal grants or pursuing international collaborations, with some even considering leaving the United States altogether. These trends have driven an increased emigration of scholars to China and other countries, intensifying brain drains that weaken the United States’ current global leadership in science and innovation. By eroding trust and inclusion, the chilling effects of the China Initiative have significantly undermined the foundations of scientific collaboration between the U.S. and China.

Until its official termination in February 2022, the China Initiative had investigated numerous Chinese and Chinese Americans across academia, industry, and other sectors. While some allegations were substantiated, many were misplaced, causing irreversible reputational damage to innocent individuals and perpetuating widespread racial profiling that disproportionately targeted Asian American scholars of Chinese descent. The loyalty of scientists of Chinese origin in the United States were constantly questioned, as many were relegated to the status of perpetual foreigners despite being naturalized American citizens.

COVID-19 and the Burden on Asian Communities

The new Red Scare extends well beyond government-led actions. In early 2020, amidst the escalating trade war and the China Initiative, the COVID-19 pandemic further strained already tense China-U.S. relations.

Slightly more than a year after the China Initiative began, the first known COVID-19 case was reported in Wuhan, China. The highly infectious virus, derogatorily labeled by some the “China Virus” or the “Kung Flu,” quickly escalated into a global health crisis. The United States bore the brunt of the pandemic, reporting the highest number of infections and the greatest death toll of any single country. Amid surging local outbreaks, some of the most pronounced anti-Chinese and anti-Asian sentiments in recent decades swept across America.

In another study published in Social Psychology Quarterly, we revealed that the COVID-19 pandemic significantly heightened anti-Chinese attitudes among Americans, especially in regions with higher local COVID-19 incidence rates. Distrust of Chinese individuals surged in these areas, driven by a behavioral immune system response in which perceived health threats amplified aversion to potential virus carriers. Notably, this distrust was specific to Chinese individuals, as placebo tests showed no similar effects on perceptions of other Asian ethnic groups, such as Japanese or Indians, or Americans in general. Additionally, unfavorable attitudes toward China were closely tied to scapegoating beliefs that the country was responsible for the pandemic and skepticism about its official COVID-19 statistics. These findings highlight how the pandemic exacerbated anti-Chinese prejudicial perceptions and intensified Sinophobia, with profound psychological and societal repercussions across the United States.

While the lethal novel coronavirus undoubtedly served as an explosive trigger, accelerating the downward spiral in China-U.S. relations, it was only part – albeit a significant part – of the story behind the disproportionately high levels of hate crimes, animosity, and discrimination targeting Asians in the U.S. during and after COVID-19. This reality was frequently highlighted by mass and social media. Hostility primarily directed at Chinese individuals often spilled over to other Asian ethnic groups, driven partly by their phenotypical similarities, further undermining the well-being of broader Asian and Asian American communities.

In 2022, we conducted a subsequent study titled “The Moral Filter of Patriotic Prejudice” also published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, to examine further how strained China-U.S. relations during the COVID-19 pandemic shaped Americans’ prejudices against East Asians, substantiating the often-overlooked linkages between international relations and domestic racial and ethnic attitudes. Using a nationally representative online survey experiment, we found that Americans consistently rated Chinese individuals in China as less trustworthy and moral compared to Japanese nationals or Asian Americans, highlighting nationality-specific prejudices.

These negative stereotypes were more salient among individuals who perceived China as a greater threat to the U.S. To capture these perceptions, we assessed Americans’ views across six dimensions: threats to the U.S. economy, intellectual property rights, privacy, the American way of life, democracy, and national security. This multidimensional framework revealed how broader threat perceptions about China’s influence and intentions were strongly linked to prejudicial attitudes toward Chinese people.

Domestic political polarization further shaped these biases: in Republican-leaning counties, residents were more likely to homogenize all East Asians as a single racial outgroup, whereas, in Democrat-leaning counties, perceptions of Chinese nationals were more negative relative to East Asian Americans or Japanese nationals. Our findings pinpoint that China-U.S. geopolitical tensions largely drive anti-Chinese prejudices, reverberating through domestic intergroup relations and reinforcing racialized stereotypes that inflict broader East Asian communities within and outside the United States.

Chinese International Students Navigating the New Red Scare

In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, Chinese scholars and students were under particularly heightened scrutiny upon their arrival in the U.S. – myself included.

After the pandemic’s peak, I re-entered the United States in August 2021 as a postdoctoral researcher at Princeton University. This was less than two months after the Department of State extended the validity of National Interest Exceptions (NIEs) for travelers affected by Presidential Proclamations (PPs) 9984, 9992, 10143, and 10199. Upon arriving at J.F.K. Airport, I was directed to a separate room packed with individuals of color for additional visa-related screening. Based on their appearance, the names called out by immigration officers, and the passports they held, I estimated that over half were of Chinese descent. During my hour-long wait, I witnessed several Chinese students being interrogated – some were visibly distressed and two were ultimately repatriated. Beyond routine fact-checking, the process felt emotionally grueling for almost everyone in the room.

When my turn came, an officer questioned me about my research interests, Ph.D. institution, and postdoc employer. After verifying my responses about “Wisconsin” and “Princeton,” his stern demeanor softened. He returned my documents and allowed me to proceed. Relieved, I took a deep breath as I exited, grateful for my fortune amidst the misfortune of others.

Yet, not every Chinese international student or scholar was fortunate enough to dispel the misplaced suspicions against them. U.S. embassies have tightened restrictions and increased scrutiny on Chinese student and scholarly exchange visas, particularly for STEM, AI, and other fields deemed critical to U.S. national interests. At the same time, amid ongoing China-U.S. geopolitical tensions, many prospective international students from China have also become increasingly aware of the uncertainties surrounding academic pursuits in the U.S. Many worry about whether they can successfully complete their programs (especially at the doctoral level, which demands more extended training) or land good jobs upon graduation.

In recent years, many Chinese students have “voted with their feet” by pursuing educational opportunities elsewhere. Some have chosen to remain in China, including Hong Kong and Macau, for further education. In contrast, others have opted for Western and Asian institutions outside the U.S. Concerns over racism, restrictive U.S. visa policies, and safety have further redirected many Chinese students toward alternative destinations such as Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Singapore.

Indeed, the 2023/24 academic year marked the first time since 2009 that Indian students outnumbered Chinese students at U.S. universities, with Indian enrollment rising and Chinese enrollment declining – a notable reversal after 15 years.

Adding to these challenges, Donald Trump’s return to the White House introduces further uncertainties about pursuing education or careers in the U.S. over the next four years. Recently, some U.S. universities urged their international students – including, but not limited to, Chinese nationals – to return to campus before Trump was inaugurated on January 20, amid concerns over potential travel bans similar to those enacted during his first presidency.

Not only are individual-level academic exchanges between the U.S. and China at serious stake, but many joint academic ventures between American and Chinese universities face the grim prospect of permanent dissolution. Over the past five months alone, Georgia Tech and the University of Michigan announced the closure of their joint programs with Chinese partner universities, citing concerns over institutional-based sanctions restricting federal funding access in the U.S and allegations of espionage involving Chinese students. Numerous other U.S.-China joint academic programs now face similar pressures to terminate their ongoing collaborations. These actions represent significant yet inconvenient institutional-level gestures that further exacerbate barriers to bilateral academic exchange.

Given these factors, the declining trend in Chinese enrollment at U.S. institutions may signal a longer-term shift, reshaping global student mobility and potentially weakening the United States’ traditional dominance as the preferred destination for Chinese students.

The China-U.S. Tech War and Beyond

Apart from the U.S. government’s longstanding concerns over trade deficits with China, the China-U.S. trade war has rapidly evolved over the past seven years, with competition between the two nations intensifying in emerging technologies. The U.S. government has enacted key policy initiatives, including the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, wave after wave of export controls, and the January 2025 AI Diffusion Rule, to limit China’s access to U.S. semiconductor and AI technologies – areas deemed strategically critical to U.S. national security. These measures restrict exports of critical components and technologies to China while incentivizing domestic production and innovation in strategic industries.

In response, China has accelerated efforts to develop its own semiconductor and AI sectors, imposed similar restrictions on exports of rare earth minerals and other essential raw materials for technology manufacturing, and restructured supply chains to reduce reliance on the U.S. and its allies. This China-U.S. geopolitical rivalry is fundamentally reshaping global and domestic supply chains, as both nations pursue decoupling in critical areas, generating ripple effects across economies and industries worldwide. Many smaller nations, particularly developing countries in Asia and beyond, are increasingly grappling with economic and political pressures to align with either the U.S. or China.

These recent developments carry far-reaching implications for the life chances of Asian and Asian American communities in the United States. State-backed legal actions against Chinese companies like Huawei and TikTok have tarnished the collective image of individuals of Chinese descent. Asian professionals in AI, semiconductors, and other high-tech sectors now face an increasingly challenging landscape, marked by heightened visa scrutiny, reduced opportunities for international collaboration, and growing fears of wrongful espionage accusations.

Regardless of whether U.S. visa policies for highly skilled immigrants loosen or tighten in the long run, the full integration of foreign-born Chinese talent into the U.S. science and technology workforce is likely to face significant barriers, as China-U.S. geopolitical tensions show no signs of waning. As the demographic composition of the American immigrant workforce continue to change, many Asian immigrant workers and enterprises may find themselves caught in the crossfire, echoing the experiences of Asian academic scientists during the former China Initiative. Meanwhile, American citizens and businesses in China could encounter challenges similar to those faced by Asians in the U.S., as mutual trust continues to erode, further complicating bilateral relations across all walks of life.

The Future of Asians and Asian Americans

As the largest Asian ethnic group in the U.S., individuals of Chinese descent now account for over one-fifth of the nation’s Asian population. With China’s continued rise on the global stage, the new Red Scare poses not only persistent challenges for Asian and Asian American communities but also a unique opportunity to renegotiate their collective future on their own terms. Overcoming these challenges requires dismantling the enduring barrier of the bamboo ceiling, which has long perpetuated Asians’ underrepresentation in both corporate and political leadership roles in America, despite their outstanding socioeconomic achievements as a group.

Organizations like the Asian American Scholar Forum have demonstrated how collective advocacy can amplify minority voices and drive impactful agendas. Building on such efforts, Asians can shift from their historically passive role as victims of international politics to becoming proactive architects of their own political empowerment. By increasing political participation, forging alliances across diverse communities, and shaping national narratives, they can move beyond current vulnerabilities and enhance their visibility in both domestic policymaking and international relations.

Thus, breaking through the bamboo ceiling requires much more than hard work – it calls for a transformative redefinition of Asians’ involvements in the United States’ political, economic, cultural, and social arenas, especially amid the rapidly evolving dynamics of China-U.S. relations.