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Zardari in Beijing: Reaffirming China-Pakistan Ties Amid US Pressures
Pakistan may have urged China to understand its delicate position and slow down on demands, such as deploying Chinese forces and militarizing Gwadar Port.
Amid the growing complexities in China-Pakistan relations, Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari’s visit to Beijing in early February was crucial for addressing mutual concerns and reinforcing the “ironclad” partnership between the two nations.
The visit, which began with a ceremonial red-carpet welcome, underscored China’s enduring commitment to Pakistan despite the turbulence surrounding the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). However, beneath the surface of this reaffirmed friendship lies a delicate relationship, requiring careful navigation to address emerging challenges.
Zardari’s visit was long overdue for several reasons. It aimed to limit growing distrust, open another round of top-level dialogue, and work on existing proposals related to security cooperation.
During the visit, Pakistan also likely sought to convey its apprehensions about mounting U.S. pressures, urging China to understand its delicate position and perhaps slow down on certain demands, such as the deployment of Chinese security forces and the militarization of Gwadar Port. Islamabad may have also requested Beijing’s patience regarding financial repayments and CPEC project delays, given Pakistan’s economic constraints and security challenges.
The visit highlighted both resilience and challenges in the bilateral relationship. While China reaffirmed its support for Pakistan’s economic stability, the progress of CPEC has been hampered by financial disputes, security threats to Chinese workers, and Beijing’s insistence on deploying its security forces to protect CPEC assets – a demand Pakistan has resisted for many reasons, including fears of international backlash, particularly from the United States.
These tensions are set to intensify under Donald Trump’s second presidency. His administration could adopt a more combative stance toward China while favoring India, leaving Islamabad to navigate a precarious balancing act between its strategic ally and a resurgent Washington.
CPEC, once hailed as a $62 billion “game-changer,” has slowed amid Pakistan’s economic crisis and China’s growing risk aversion. Islamabad’s inability to repay Chinese loans for energy projects has led to delays, while militant attacks targeting Chinese nationals have heightened Beijing’s frustration. In the last ten months, there have been at least two high-profile attacks on Chinese workers in Pakistan. In March 2024, five Chinese nationals were killed in a terrorist attack near Besham in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Another suicide bombing near Karachi airport in October 2024 killed at least two Chinese engineers, leading Beijing to openly question Pakistan’s ability to protect its interests.
In response to these attacks, China has pushed for greater security control, including proposals to station its security personnel in Pakistan. This has sparked debates over sovereignty, particularly regarding Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, where Beijing reportedly seeks enhanced naval access to secure its Indian Ocean interests. Reports suggest China envisions Gwadar as a dual-use commercial-military hub, akin to its facilities in Djibouti, to project power and safeguard maritime routes.
However, Pakistan’s military has resisted such overt militarization, wary of inflaming local tensions in restive Balochistan and of provoking U.S. accusations that Gwadar is hosting a Chinese military foothold.
A second Trump term could exacerbate these challenges for Pakistan. During his first administration, Trump’s “America First” policy prioritized countering China while courting India as a strategic counterweight in the region.
The new Trump presidency is likely to deepen India-U.S. defense ties – including advanced arms sales and technology sharing – and amplify pressure on Pakistan to distance itself from Beijing.
Trump’s transactional approach, combined with his administration’s probable reliance on pro-India voices, could see Washington weaponize financial leverage, such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan conditions or Financial Action Task Force (FATF) scrutiny, to curb Pakistan’s engagement with China. These dynamics could isolate Islamabad diplomatically, forcing the country to make concessions on CPEC or security cooperation with Beijing.
Against this backdrop, Zardari’s Beijing visit seemingly aimed to reassure China of Pakistan’s commitment. To revive CPEC, Islamabad is likely to offer enhanced counterterrorism measures, including expanded intelligence-sharing and joint operations against militant groups targeting Chinese interests, such as the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA).
Pakistan may also seek China’s support in managing Afghanistan-related security threats, leveraging Beijing’s influence over the Afghan Taliban to stabilize its western border. Additionally, Islamabad could greenlight limited Chinese security deployments under discreet arrangements, such as hiring private Chinese security firms or embedding personnel within Pakistani forces.
Under Trump’s second administration, Pakistan will face mounting pressure to temper its China ties while managing CPEC’s security and economic risks. However, abandoning Beijing does not seem to be an option for cash-strapped Islamabad, which relies on Chinese loans and diplomatic backing.
Instead, Pakistan will likely pursue a dual-track strategy – discreetly advancing CPEC with pragmatic security compromises while cautiously engaging Washington to avert punitive measures.
For China, Pakistan remains a critical actor in its Belt and Road Initiative. However, Beijing may demand stricter counterterror guarantees and financial reforms as prerequisites for any renewed investment.
To navigate the Trump administration’s likely anti-China posture, Pakistan must adopt a pragmatic strategy: maintain critical economic ties with China while avoiding overt militarization that could provoke U.S. ire. It should diversify partnerships to reduce dependency on either power. This would require calibrated diplomacy, economic reforms, and security compromises.
The road ahead is fraught, but Pakistan’s survival hinges on balancing its “all-weather” friendship with China against the storms of a Trump-led world order.
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Umair Jamal is a correspondent for The Diplomat, based in Lahore, Pakistan.