Will Lee Jae-myung Rise From South Korea’s Political Chaos?

South Korea is amid a high-stakes political moment, and Lee Jae-myung is front and center. President Yoon Suk-yeol faces potential removal from office by the Constitutional Court, which is deliberating impeachment charges stemming from his attempt to impose martial law in December 2024. The impeachment motion accuses Yoon of violating constitutional order, with the court’s pending decision set to determine his political fate. As of this writing, at the end of March 2025, the Constitutional Court still has not issued its ruling in Yoon’s impeachment case.

If the court upholds Yoon’s impeachment, thus removing him from office, there will be a snap presidential election. Lee, leader of the liberal opposition Democratic Party (DP), has positioned himself as the frontrunner to represent his party if such an election occurs. His supporters celebrate him as a defender of democracy, ready to take the presidency if Yoon is removed, while conservatives see him as a polarizing, ideological firebrand.

Lee enjoys substantial leads in hypothetical polling matchups against all likely opponents, strongly suggesting he would be the favorite to win a snap presidential election, but his overall appeal faces notable constraints due to intense negative partisanship and persistent unease among moderate voters.

How exactly did Lee reach this pivotal moment? Understanding his rise as the liberal frontrunner requires examining his formative background, political career, and especially his strategic consolidation of power following the 2022 election defeat.

Who Is Lee Jae-myung?

Born into poverty in Andong, Lee often emphasizes his humble beginnings, recounting childhood experiences of hardship as foundational to his political beliefs. After compulsory military service, Lee passed the notoriously difficult national bar exam entirely through self-study, subsequently gaining prominence as a lawyer advocating labor rights and social justice cases.

Lee’s trajectory closely parallels the careers of previous progressive presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in. Both rose from modest backgrounds, gained prominence by passing the bar exam without formal legal education, and built reputations as lawyers advocating for labor and human rights during South Korea’s democratization period.

Lee entered electoral politics as mayor of Seongnam City (2010–2018), pursuing progressive and populist policies such as youth welfare allowances and the expansion of public services. As governor of Gyeonggi Province (2018–2021), he further solidified his reputation as a pragmatic yet populist leader, launching initiatives such as universal basic income pilots and ambitious public housing programs.

However, Lee’s tenure as an executive leader was also marred by ethical controversies, most notably those surrounding alleged corruption in real estate development and football club sponsorship. Such accusations have persisted, significantly shaping negative public perceptions about his character.

Nevertheless, Lee’s early life experiences and legal career have reinforced his image as a populist champion of the disadvantaged, aligning him ideologically and personally with the lineage of progressive South Korean leaders. With that advantage, he secured the DP’s presidential nomination in 2022.

Lee After 2022: From Defeat to Dominance

Lee Jae-myung’s political trajectory since 2022 can be defined as one of rapid recovery and power consolidation. After his razor-thin defeat to Yoon in the presidential election, Lee worked stridently to remain politically relevant. He ran for and won a seat in the National Assembly just months later, giving him a parliamentary platform despite losing the presidency. By August 2022, he had leveraged his popularity within the party to win the DP’s chairmanship. Once at the helm, Lee moved to consolidate control and cement his preferred policy and political agenda as the party’s platform.

As party leader, Lee pursued a dual strategy: aggressively confronting the ruling conservatives in the legislature while promoting pragmatic and populist policies to the public. He initiated an economic agenda focused on people’s livelihoods, captured in the slogan “meoksanism” – derived from a Korean phrase concerning “eating and living” issues. The goal was to make practical concerns like jobs, housing, and social welfare – rather than abstract ideals or ideology – the party’s issues-based foundation and primary public focus. This emphasis on everyday economic matters aimed to broaden the DP’s appeal to moderate voters, even as Lee maintained a tough – and arguably ideological – stance against the Yoon administration in daily politics.

Lee’s takeover, however, was not without resistance. Many of the DP old guard, including former Prime Minister Lee Nak-yon, initially harbored doubts about him. In addition to clashes over control of the party’s direction, they warned that the swirl of corruption accusations around Lee – often dubbed the “Lee Jae-myung judicial risk” – could doom the DP’s fortunes. There were also ideological and stylistic splits: Lee’s left-leaning populism and combative style clashed with the more cautious, centrist approach preferred by some DP lawmakers.

These internal tensions came to a head in early 2023 when prosecutors, under Yoon’s direction, sought to jail Lee ahead of trial on corruption charges related to a development project in Seongnam City while Lee was mayor, and illegal remittances to North Korea when he was governor of Gyeonggi Province. Typically, lawmakers are immune from arrest while parliament is in session, but prosecutors took the extraordinary step of requesting a pre-trial arrest warrant, forcing the National Assembly to vote on waiving Lee’s immunity.

In February 2023, DP lawmakers closed ranks and voted to shield their leader, although more than a few intra-party dissidents failed to reject the motion. By September 2023, however, the cracks in party unity widened: a significant number of DP members broke ranks and joined the ruling party in approving Lee’s arrest – a potentially devasting development brought about by Lee’s own caucus. Lee was on the brink of imprisonment, saved only when a judge threw out the warrant for lack of evidence.

The near-arrest was likely humbling for Lee, but ultimately, it strengthened his hold on the party. After the court’s reprieve, Lee and his backers swiftly marginalized those who opposed his control. Key dissenters were stripped of positions and effectively put on notice, making it clear that disloyalty would not be tolerated. By quashing the revolt within his party’s ranks, Lee solidified his position as the dominant figure in the DP.

Lee’s consolidation of power within the DP was also notably strengthened by the influence of highly engaged online party activists, whose digital presence and coordinated campaigns have disrupted traditional local-to-national hierarchies in shaping party agendas. One prominent example is the Gaeddal (from a combination of words for “reform” and “daughters”) group – young, predominantly female online supporters of Lee – whose intense online activism notably pressured DP lawmakers during critical party decisions. Heading into 2024, the intense intraparty dynamics meant the DP had effectively become Lee’s party, for better or worse.

Legal and Prosecution as Political Weapon

Consideration for the veracity and legality of legal charges notwithstanding, Lee has been beset by a litany of investigations and indictments since Yoon Suk-yeol took office. Lee insists these probes are a political conspiracy orchestrated by Yoon – a former chief prosecutor himself – to thwart the opposition. The overt politicization of prosecution is undoubtedly true, but the political effect – and perhaps intent – has been to keep Lee under a cloud of suspicion.

Several high-profile cases are pending against Lee Jae-myung. The most consequential involved his alleged violation of election law. In November 2024, the Seoul Central District Court found Lee guilty of spreading false information during a televised debate in 2021 and sentenced him to one year in prison, with the sentence suspended for two years. Lee appealed, and on March 26, 2025, the Seoul High Court overturned this conviction. Prosecutors from the Seoul Central District Prosecutors' Office have indicated they will appeal to the Supreme Court.

If the Supreme Court, which will have the final say on the matter, sides with prosecutors and reinstates Lee’s original conviction, it would immediately disqualify him from public office, barring him from the presidency for 10 years – if he is not yet president. This judicial uncertainty remains especially critical, as Lee could potentially be campaigning in a snap election if Yoon is removed from office by the Constitutional Court.

In practical terms, a final ruling might not arrive until after any early election – his defense team will undoubtedly seek to buy time. Still, the possibility looms that a court could abruptly disqualify the frontrunner in the middle of a presidential campaign. It is a wild card that haunts Lee’s camp.

Other cases add further political baggage, even if their legal resolution is some time away. In addition to the corruption charges that nearly jailed Lee in 2023, he is also implicated in a municipal football club sponsorship case. Although a judicial resolution remains unlikely in the short term, these unresolved cases lend ammunition to Lee’s opponents. Headlines regularly highlight developments in Lee’s court proceedings, bolstering conservative portrayals of the DP leader as inherently corrupt, while his supporters consistently denounce these investigations as politically motivated and representative of selective justice

Institutional Deadlock and Political Polarization

Lee’s story unfolds against a deeply polarized institutional struggle in Seoul. Since 2022, the South Korean government has been effectively gridlocked. Throughout that time, Lee’s DP has maintained a significant majority in the National Assembly, while Yoon’s conservative People Power Party (PPP) has controlled the presidency. This divide led to a form of political trench warfare between the legislature and the executive, with each side leveraging its power to undermine the other.

In the National Assembly, the opposition led by Lee utilized its majority to obstruct Yoon’s policy agenda and political priorities. Key administration initiatives – from business deregulation to labor law reforms – were stalled or voted down. The Assembly even took the unprecedented step of impeaching a Cabinet official appointed by Yoon. In February 2023, months after a tragic Halloween crowd crush in Seoul’s Itaewon district, which officials failed to prevent, the opposition impeached Interior Minister Lee Sang-min, a close ally of Yoon. Although the Constitutional Court later reversed the impeachment, ruling that the failures did not meet the “grave violation of law” threshold for removal, it marked the first impeachment of a minister in Korean political history – a dramatic display of the legislative power that the DP was willing to wield. Lee Sang-min was the first Korean minister to be impeached, but not the last; some 30 impeachment attempts followed.

Yoon, for his part, actively used his presidential powers to counter an opposition-dominated legislature. Facing gridlock, Yoon increasingly resorted to executive actions and the prosecutorial apparatus to advance his agenda and challenge opponents. His administration initiated audits of opposition-led local governments and filed lawsuits against labor unions protesting his policies. Most visibly, Yoon leveraged the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office – a powerful judicial body under his administration’s influence – to aggressively investigate Lee and other opposition politicians, prompting DP lawmakers to accuse him of governing through a “prosecutorial dictatorship.” Additionally, Yoon has exercised his veto power on 21 occasions since taking office in May 2022, a notably high number compared to his predecessors.

These maneuvers fueled a cycle of escalating political hostility. Lee’s supporters argue that Yoon’s reliance on the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office and executive decrees recalls the authoritarian tactics of past regimes, warning that democracy is endangered when the executive bypasses legislative authority. Conversely, conservatives accuse the DP of manipulating party rules specifically to protect Lee – highlighting, for example, the controversial amendment of the party’s charter in June 2024, which allowed an indicted party leader to remain in office. Yoon’s allies have criticized this move, claiming the DP has devolved into “Lee Jae-myung’s bulletproof vest,” prioritizing his personal legal battles over normal party governance.

Each side has increasingly portrayed the other as an existential threat to the country’s democracy, eroding neutral ground in South Korea’s political discourse and causing even routine governance tasks, such as annual budget negotiations, to deteriorate into bitter confrontations.

South Korea’s constitutional design arguably magnifies these tensions. The president serves a single five-year term without the possibility of re-election, and mid-term legislative elections can result in a divided government. This structure often leads to a zero-sum power struggle, where the opposition is motivated to obstruct and wait out the presidency, while the president may be inclined to advance their agenda unilaterally before their term concludes. Impeachment, originally intended as a last resort, is increasingly employed as a political tool in this environment. Consequently, there is a growing consensus on the necessity of constitutional amendments to address these systemic issues. ​

The specter of political deadlock escalating into a constitutional crisis became a stark reality on December 3, 2024, when Yoon declared martial law, citing, among other things, opposition lawmakers’ “anti-state” obstruction. This unprecedented move was met with a relatively swift backlash from the National Assembly. Accusing Yoon of abusing presidential authority and undermining democratic norms, the Assembly voted to impeach him on December 14, marking the first presidential impeachment in South Korean history based on charges unrelated to corruption.​

Initially, conservative lawmakers from the PPP resisted the impeachment motion, viewing it as a politically motivated attack on the presidency. However, as public outcry intensified and concerns over democratic erosion grew, key conservative figures began to reconsider their positions.​ Notably, Han Dong-hoon, then the PPP’s party leader, shifted his stance to support the impeachment after learning that Yoon had ordered the arrest of prominent politicians, including Han himself, during the martial law period.

​In contrast, Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon maintained his opposition to the impeachment, although both Oh and Han opposed the martial law declaration. Oh advocated for a transition to a responsible prime minister system to stabilize the government, emphasizing that impeachment was not the only solution.

Divergent positions among conservative leaders during this turbulent period highlight internal divisions within the PPP. Nevertheless, the PPP has demonstrated significantly greater internal cohesion than its predecessor, the Saenuri Party, did during President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment and removal from office in 2017. Whereas Saenuri fractured under pressure and eventually collapsed, the PPP has maintained strategic party discipline despite some notable dissent from high-profile members.

Yoon’s impeachment has further divided the public, intensifying political polarization and sparking mass protests nationwide. In contrast to the bipartisan consensus that characterized the impeachment of Park Geun-hye, the politics of Yoon’s impeachment has unfolded along markedly partisan lines. Polls show the majority of the public (and a plurality of conservatives) supported Yoon’s impeachment due to the severity of his martial law declaration, but negative partisanship and general unfavorability toward Lee remains strong, significantly limiting the public consensus around the opposition’s actions.

The sustained resilience within conservative ranks heightens the risk of political backlash against the DP and specifically Lee. While the vast majority supported Yoon’s impeachment, conservative support has not collapsed, in part because centrist and undecided voters have expressed growing unease over the opposition’s aggressive tactics.

Public Opinion and the Path to an Electoral Comeback

Amid the political turmoil caused more immediately by Yoon, Lee Jae-myung and the Democratic Party have been positioning themselves for a return to power. However, they are acutely aware that victory is not guaranteed, given the volatility of public sentiment.

By late 2024, widespread disillusionment with Yoon's administration was evident. His approval ratings plummeted to 13 percent, the lowest since his inauguration. This pervasive anti-incumbent sentiment was a significant factor in the DP’s landslide victory in the April 2024 National Assembly elections. The party secured 175 out of 300 seats, decisively retaining its parliamentary majority.

The election served as a mid-term referendum on Yoon’s performance, delivering a substantial blow to the conservatives and indicating that a significant portion of the electorate was ready to rebuke the ruling party and, perhaps, endorse – or at least tolerate – the leader of the opposition. While many voters are dissatisfied with Yoon’s leadership, negative sentiments toward Lee persist. This juxtaposition underscores the challenges Lee and the DP face in consolidating public support. As it stands, they risk being perceived as aggravating an already polarized political climate or, worse, mirroring the corruption associated with Yoon. While Lee and the DP have capitalized on the ruling party’s missteps, they must also address internal issues and public skepticism to ensure a sustainable path to governance.​

Indeed, Lee cannot rely solely on voter dissatisfaction with Yoon; he must also address significant public skepticism about his own political image. The cloud of scandals, relentless prosecutorial scrutiny, and aggressive rhetoric that have followed Lee since his narrow defeat in the 2022 presidential election have profoundly shaped his public image. Even some younger voters, who traditionally lean progressive, see Lee as a political figure burdened with ethical baggage – another typical politician rather than a genuine reformer. As one former DP youth member, who was ostracized from party involvement for being critical of Lee, pointed out, beyond the party’s loyal supporters, many young voters view Lee as corrupt. Since the last election in 2022, youth support for Lee has been mixed.

Lee’s core base, however, admires precisely his combative, resilient persona. He has consistently taken his opposition to the streets, notably leading large-scale protests against Yoon’s administration and engaging in a dramatic 24-day hunger strike in September 2023 to denounce what he called the president’s authoritarian drift and abuse of prosecutorial powers. Yet, while these tactics energize committed supporters, they risk alienating moderate voters who prioritize political stability and moderation over confrontation. Such polarizing strategies may consolidate Lee’s progressive core but simultaneously harden perceptions among centrists that his leadership could deepen political divisions rather than bridge them.

Aware of these vulnerabilities, Lee has consciously begun recalibrating his public image since late 2023 and with greater purpose lately in preparation for a presidential campaign. Recognizing that centrist, middle-class, and younger voters hold the key to victory, he has increasingly avoided partisan attacks, instead focusing on bread-and-butter and doubling down on meoksanism.

In a controversial rhetorical gambit in early 2025, Lee even described the DP as a “centrist-conservative” party – claiming the party has always balanced moderate and conservative values – in an effort to reassure voters outside the left-liberal orbit that he can represent them. Supporters called it a bold rebranding to broaden the DP’s appeal, while critics (and the PPP) derided it as a cynical ploy that “rewrites history.” The claim that the DP is “conservative” is certainly untrue, but there is a clear political logic to it.

Whether such maneuvers can overcome Lee’s polarizing reputation remains uncertain. What is clear is that Lee’s electoral strategy now involves a tightrope: He must keep his progressive base mobilized through anti-Yoon fervor and populist promises while also convincing skeptical centrists that the DP can govern responsibly despite the swirl of scandals surrounding its leader.

Striking the right balance is now the central focus of Lee’s electoral strategy. He will likely need to keep his progressive base energized – voters who want an all-out crusade against Yoon’s legacy and conservative policies – yet also reassure swing voters that a government led by him would focus on practical solutions, not revenge. The message the DP has honed in recent months reflects this tightrope act: tough on Yoon’s misrule, but not extreme; populist on economic pain points, but pledging responsible governance. So far, this calibrated approach seems to be working so that the needle on public opinion can be moved in a highly polarized environment. It carried the legislative election and has kept Lee atop presidential preference polls.

The ultimate test, however, will come if and when a presidential campaign kicks off in earnest and then, if the outcome is as polls indicate, when Lee is president.

Conclusion: A Critical Juncture for South Korea’s Democracy?

Whether Lee Jae-myung ultimately secures the presidency or not, the current political situation will dictate South Korea’s political trajectory. Lee’s rapid resurgence from electoral defeat in 2022 to frontrunner status amid scandal and an impeachment crisis underscores the volatility of South Korea’s political status quo. It also reveals deeper institutional problems, including prosecutorial authority wielded as a partisan weapon, impeachment employed as a political tactic rather than a measure of last resort, and a party system dominated by personality-driven leadership rather than coherent policy platforms. Collectively, these trends pose serious challenges to South Korean democracy’s long-term stability.

If Lee runs and wins in a snap election, South Korea would witness yet another dramatic power shift following an impeachment. This would repeat the 2017 experience and essentially complete a cycle that began with Yoon’s tenure. This could pave the way for reforms (the DP has vowed to curb prosecutorial overreach, for instance), but it might also tempt a triumphant Lee to settle scores, further entrenching the cycle of political retribution.

Alternatively, if the courts or the voters halt Lee’s rise – whether through a disqualifying verdict or an electoral upset – it would signal a different reckoning and another crisis. The conservatives would feel vindicated in portraying Lee as unfit, and the DP would face pressure to reinvent itself beyond its embattled figurehead. Or, worse, it would invite even greater political chaos and social unrest.

Regardless of the outcome, South Korea is at an inflection point. The coming weeks will reveal whether the country can steer itself toward more stable politics or if the Lee-versus-Yoon saga merely reflects a highly polarized and confrontational new normal. Politics in South Korea today suggest the latter is much more likely.

Lee Jae-myung’s strategic bet – that he can leverage widespread public discontent and overcome his legal battles without further deepening societal divisions – will likely be tested. Whether he succeeds or fails, the broader implications will extend far beyond Lee himself. The outcome will reverberate far beyond this one man’s career, shaping the health of South Korea’s democracy and society in the months and years to come.