Is Bangladesh’s Autocratic History Repeating Itself?

Last month, Bangladesh’s interim government banned the Awami League (AL), the party of ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. The move is a setback to Chief Interim Advisor Muhammad Yunus’ pledge to revive democracy in the country.

Democratic backsliding under Hasina’s 15-year-long autocratic rule notwithstanding, the decision to ban the AL is undemocratic as the party, despite evoking mass outrage, represents millions of Bangladeshis who continue to support it. Banning it will therefore amount to disenfranchising them.

According to Bangladeshi journalist Mohammad Al-Masum Molla, the AL “is not merely a political party” but “a multigenerational institution.” Its ban comes with “a heavy price: the risk of turning democratic renewal [in post-Hasina Bangladesh] into another round of political vengeance,” he wrote in a recent article in The Daily Star.

The ban, he warned, “sets a precedent. Today, it’s the AL. Tomorrow, it could be any party deemed ‘unacceptable.’ Once the door to blanket political bans is opened, it becomes easier to silence dissent and concentrate power under the guise of legality.”

Hasina and the AL came to power in a landslide victory in the December 2008 election. But then she went on to rig successive elections to remain in power. Her government crushed opposition parties, tortured and disappeared thousands of dissidents, and systematically dismantled Bangladesh’s democratic institutions to tighten her grip on power.

When mass protests toppled Hasina’s government on August 5, 2024, the movement triggered hopes for the revival of democracy. Such hopes surged with Yunus taking charge of the interim government; he set up commissions to introduce, among other things, constitutional and electoral reforms to prevent another autocrat’s rise in Bangladesh. It suggested that his government was committed to ushering in structural change to provide Bangladesh’s democracy with a sound foundation.

However, in the months since, Yunus’ commitment and capacity to revive democracy have come under question. He has avoided committing to a date for elections, drawing criticism that he wants to remain in power. Then on May 10, the interim government announced the AL ban, buckling to pressure from the Jamaat-e-Islami and the National Citizen Party.

Democracy in Bangladesh has always been fragile. Not only has it been repeatedly dismantled by the military – the country has experienced multiple coups and long periods of military rule between 1975 and 1990, and again in 2006-2008, as well as several attempted coups during periods of democratic rule – but also, elected governments have undermined democratic processes and institutions.

Indeed, all of Bangladesh’s elected governments have functioned autocratically.

Take Mujibur Rahman, the AL’s founder and Bangladesh’s first prime minister and president. A strong advocate of democracy before and during the Liberation War, his descent into authoritarian rule once he became prime minister was rapid. The first general election in 1973, which the AL was poised to win anyway, given its popularity and Mujib’s stature, was rigged to ensure the AL’s overwhelming dominance in parliament.

Then, when an economic crisis triggered unrest and criticism, Mujib tightened his grip by declaring a state of emergency. The parliamentary system was replaced with an all-powerful executive presidency. As president, all powers were concentrated in his hands and all institutional checks on his authority were removed. He then went on to ban all political parties and set up a one-party system, BAKSAL. His assassination a few months later ended Bangladesh’s first electoral autocracy. Military regimes followed for the next 15 years.

Bangladesh returned to being a multiparty democracy in 1991. However, political parties did little to nurture the nascent democracy.

The two main political parties, the AL and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and their allies eroded democratic institutions and norms. When in power, both the AL and BNP suppressed the opposition, silenced the media, and stacked institutions like the judiciary and the election commission with loyalists.

Whether in power or in opposition, they undermined parliament’s centrality as the forum for debate and discussion in a democracy, and made violent confrontationist politics the dominant discourse in Bangladesh. With dialogue in parliament devalued, street violence became the dominant means for parties to press their demands.

It was the threat of street violence and a shutdown of the Shahbagh intersection in Dhaka issued by the National Citizen Party (NCP) – a newly formed party, largely made up of students, that emerged out of the July-August mass protests – that forced Yunus to ban the AL.

Worryingly, the NCP threat was backed by the Jamaat-e-Islami, AB Party, Chhatra Shibir, Islamic Movement Bangladesh, and Hefazat-e-Islam, among others. These parties and organizations are extremist, violent, misogynist, and dictatorial in their outlook and agenda. Yunus has blundered by buckling to their demand.

The NCP promises a new politics in Bangladesh. However, its leaders and activists have little experience in dialogue and compromise. They have tasted blood, with their intimidatory tactics and threats bringing quick results. They could go the way of their predecessors.

Has Bangladesh’s autocratic history started to repeat itself again?