Mark Chou

Australian voters went to the polls on May 3, in a general election where foreign policy – particularly the instability wrought by the Trump administration in the United States – played a larger than normal role in the campaign. In the end, Australians voted to return the Labor Party and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese to office – with a strengthened majority, no less.

While the Trump factor did influence Australia’s election, that wasn’t the whole story, says Mark Chou, an associate professor at Australian National University’s Crawford School of Public Policy. In a written interview with The Diplomat, Chou broke down the main factors in the voting, which was more about fear of Opposition Leader Peter Dutton’s governing style than support for Albanese – a dynamic that may influence the second term of Albanese’s government.

Chou also addresses what we can infer from the 2025 general election about the state of Australia’s democracy. “Australia is one the world’s oldest and most stable democracies and remains in comparatively good shape,” he concluded. “...That said, we’re not immune to the pressures facing democracies globally.”

Much of the post-election media coverage focused on Australia’s repudiation of Trump-style politics. Do you think that’s an accurate narrative? If so, what factors made Australian voters reject the Trump-esque populism that the United States embraced?

Yes, I think that's broadly right, and to that extent it’s comparable to what happened recently in Canada’s election. Like their Canadian counterparts, Australian voters have watched the polarization and dysfunction of U.S. politics play out in 2025 and they’ve made a conscious decision to not follow that same path. As Julianne Schultz put it [in an op-ed for The Guardian], Australians made it clear they’re “not angry little Americans” keen on fighting culture wars or embracing libertarian individualism. More broadly, recent polling from the Lowy Institute showed that Australians’ trust in the U.S. to act responsibly has plummeted since Trump took office, falling by 20 points to a two-decade low of 36 percent. This broad sensibility ran counter to the kind of politics [then-Opposition Leader] Peter Dutton came to be associated with.

Unfortunately for Dutton and the Coalition, that memo came too late. His campaign leaned into Trump-style tactics – picking fights over Welcome to Country ceremonies, framing schools as ideological battlegrounds, and amplifying culture war talking points. But these issues didn’t cut through with a public far more concerned about rising cost of living and housing affordability. The fact that Dutton lost his own seat – one he’s held since 2001 – speaks volumes about how out of step he was with the electorate.

But that’s only part of the story. It’s all too easy to forget in the election’s afterglow that less than six months ago, Labor and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese were looking very vulnerable. A hung parliament seemed likely and Dutton was gaining momentum. But once the campaign began in earnest, Dutton faltered time and again – bad policies, lack of policy details, and a raft of policy backflips on EV tax breaks, public service cuts, and the working-from-home crackdown all painted a picture of a party not ready to govern. In contrast, Albanese’s steadiness, and Labor’s focus on practical reforms, won over the public looking for stability and pragmatism.

More generally, how would you assess the health of Australian democracy? Other countries – from the United States to India to Germany – are facing democratic decline and the growth of far-right parties. Do you have similar concerns about Australia?

There’s no doubt that democracy globally is under serious strain. In long-established democracies like the United States, we’re seeing institutional norms eroded, populist strongmen gain traction, and deep polarization take root. Europe, too, is grappling with the resurgence of far-right parties that are increasingly reshaping political debate and mainstreaming exclusionary ideas. Against that backdrop, Australia’s democracy is in comparatively strong shape – but we’d be foolish to think we’re immune.

Australia benefits from some institutional safeguards that many democracies lack: a system of compulsory voting, an independent electoral commission, and robust public institutions. These structures act as bulwarks against the kind of voter suppression, gerrymandering, and political gridlock that have plagued other countries. But democratic resilience isn’t just about systems – it’s about public trust, civic engagement, and belief in the fairness and responsiveness of the political process. And that’s where the warning signs are starting to emerge.

The 2023 Trust and Satisfaction in Australian Democracy survey captured this ambivalence. While a narrow majority (59 percent) are satisfied with how democracy is functioning, nearly half of respondents believe the country is not heading in the right democratic direction. Most strikingly, almost 49 percent agree or strongly agree that politicians are corrupt – and confidence in the federal government has dropped to 38 percent, down sharply from the highs seen early in the Albanese government’s first term.

This erosion of trust is compounded by structural pressures – economic insecurity, housing affordability, and rising inequality – which are undermining the sense of shared opportunity that once underpinned Australia’s political stability. Among younger Australians, the outlook is more mixed. While 67 percent of those aged 18 to 34 report satisfaction with the direction of the country, many are also questioning whether the political system can deliver on its promises. The idea of a “fair go” feels increasingly hollow for those locked out of home ownership or working in precarious jobs. That’s a breeding ground for cynicism, disengagement – or worse, attraction to anti-system alternatives.

And that brings us to the far right. Australia has not been immune to its rise. My own research shows that far-right and conspiratorial groups are becoming more active at the local level, often exploiting community grievances or opposition to specific planning and policy decisions to build a base. At the national level, parties like Pauline Hanson’s One Nation and Trumpet of Patriots secured a combined 8.31 percent of the primary vote in the recent election, and both saw swings in their favor. While still electorally fringe, these parties remain a political warning sign.

So far, the far right in Australia has lacked charismatic, broadly appealing leadership which, along with their internal divisions, party dysfunction, and amateurish campaigns have kept them from gaining real power. But that could change. There’s a view that if the far right actually ran candidates with some popular appeal and political nous and were supported by better organized party structures, then things might well be different here – which is to say, we might be no different to elsewhere, compulsory voting or not. So, this is the counterpoint – an important one – to what I said above about Australians rejecting Trump-style politics.

In short, Australian democracy is not broken by any means, but it is being tested like elsewhere. The challenge now is to renew public confidence – not only by defending institutions, but by delivering tangible outcomes that make people feel heard, secure, and included in the democratic project. Because the lesson from elsewhere is clear: democratic erosion often starts not with a coup, but with disillusionment.

What does the vote share for third parties and independents suggest about the general state of Australian party politics?

One of the big, if less publicized, headlines from this election is that the combined primary vote for independents and minor parties exceeded the Coalition’s. That’s a significant shift and raises serious questions about the Coalition’s viability as the primary opposition in Australia. We’re witnessing a structural reconfiguration of party politics in Australia. We also saw a marked increase in so-called three- and four-cornered contests across the country, involving a number of independents challenging Labor and Liberal candidates, that have resulted in complex and prolonged vote counts in electorates like Calwell in Melbourne’s northern fringe.

Now to the details. Yes, the Greens saw a modest -0.11 percent swing in their national primary vote, and they look set to lose all but one of their lower house seats, including Greens’ leader Adam Bandt’s seat of Melbourne. Even so, the Greens will remain a strong force in the upper house, holding the balance of power there. But the independents actually did quite well, improving their position with a 2 percent swing in their favor. The so-called Teals and Community Independents – even without Zoe Daniel, who lost her seat of Goldstein by the slimmest of margins – remain a powerful force in parliament, though the fight that independent MPs like Monique Ryan had to endure in the Melbourne seat of Kooyong suggests that victory will be brutal and never be assured.

The more important story here – especially in the case of the Greens in the lower house – is what happened with the flow of preferences from the Coalition to Labor. Because of the Coalition’s poor primary vote, their preferences effectively worked to lift Labor over the Greens in electorates like Griffith in Queensland. As Ben Raue, one of Australia’s leading independent pollsters, pointed out, it’s a strange and concerning dynamic when some of the most progressive seats in the country are now being decided by the most conservative voters in those electorates. Now, if the Coalition had performed slightly better and Labor worse, we might’ve seen Labor dropping out earlier and their preferences flowing to the Greens instead. Ultimately, that would have altered the Greens’ fortunes. It’s a reminder of just how powerful – and sometimes distorting – our preferential voting system (used in the lower house) can be.

What issues do you think most concerned Australian voters going into this election? And what will be the priorities for the newly re-empowered Albanese government?

Honestly, like many countries right now, cost of living was the big one here – it was front and center for most voters. People were really feeling the pressure on everyday expenses, interest rates were biting, and housing affordability remained a serious concern, especially for younger Australians and renters. That hip-pocket anxiety shaped a lot of the political mood heading into the campaign.

Housing, in particular, struck a nerve. Labor leaned into that by promising to build 1.2 million new homes, and to be fair, that did land with voters who were looking for some kind of long-term relief. The Coalition, meanwhile, focused more on cuts – to public service jobs and fuel taxes – but that approach felt a bit out of step with what many people were actually asking for, especially in cities.

Climate change was another major issue, particularly among younger voters. Labor stuck with its renewables plan – aiming for 82 percent clean energy by 2030 – while the Coalition made a bit of a gamble by pitching nuclear energy. It generated headlines, but not necessarily support. A lot of people weren’t convinced by the nuclear push, and it likely didn’t help the Coalition win over undecided or more moderate voters.

Healthcare also mattered. Labor promised extra money for Medicare and cheaper medicines, which built on earlier reforms to bulk billing. The Coalition matched some of that in principle, but didn’t really offer a standout alternative.

Immigration became a talking point too, mostly around housing pressure and social services. Both the major parties pushed for lower immigration; the only difference was by how much. In recent years, immigration has also been linked to international student numbers, and both parties were again keen to limit student numbers coming to our shores to study at Australian universities.

Many of these promises will likely translate into priorities for the re-elected Labor government. The big items that Labor will likely tackle first include an energy rebate to help with cost of living pressures, cuts to student loans, tax cuts, cheaper childcare, and a swifter transition to renewables. The test, of course, is whether Labor will actually tackle these and other policy agendas head on – sending the message that they now have a clear mandate to lead on pressing issues.

The October 2023 Voice referendum was seen as a major setback for Albanese and his government. How did Labor flip the script to not only stay in power but actually expand its majority?

The defeat of the Voice referendum in 2023 was a major blow to Anthony Albanese – not just politically, but in terms of policy momentum. It sapped energy from his government, exposed deep divisions, and left many progressive voters disillusioned. In the months that followed, there was a noticeable loss of resolve. Albanese seemed to retreat into cautious, managerial politics. By late 2024, polling reflected that shift – many Australians had lost faith, and a hung parliament looked entirely plausible.

So how did Labor flip the script? Partly, it was a well-run, disciplined campaign that focused on immediate bread-and-butter issues: cost of living, housing, and Medicare. But more importantly, this was an election the Coalition lost. Peter Dutton’s culture-war messaging, inconsistent policies, and lack of a compelling economic alternative drove many voters back to Labor – not necessarily because they were inspired, but because they feared the alternative more.

While I don’t want to take anything from Labor’s historic majority coming out of this election, it perhaps masks a more sobering political reality: that Albanese and Labor were increasingly unpopular not all that long ago. Indeed, were it not for the Peter Dutton factor, Labor's fortunes might have been different. A more accurate read on Albanese's popularity comes not from the historic election outcome – but from those polls, around six months back, that had him on the slide and heading for defeat or minority government.

Albanese may have regained control of the narrative and secured a larger majority, but this second honeymoon will, I think, be short-lived. To hold on to the public’s trust, especially among younger and disillusioned voters, he’ll need to move swiftly from the unimaginative style of politics that came to define Albanese 1.0 and embrace a bolder, values-driven reform agenda. This term has to be about vision and delivery. The mandate is there now – and it’ll be his to lose if he doesn’t think and act big, and quickly.

What do the post-election events tell us about how the opposition will regroup?

The election of Sussan Ley as Liberal leader by a narrow 29-25 party room vote marks an important – if fragile – attempt to shift toward the political center, as the party grapples with its relevance in modern Australia. Ley’s win – defeating Angus Taylor, the conservative faction’s standard-bearer, to become the Liberal’s Party’s first female leader – reflects a recognition that the Liberals can’t continue down the same path if the party is to have any hope of governing for the majority of Australians. With once-safe urban electorates – particularly in inner-city and suburban areas – drifting to Labor, the independents, and Greens, Ley’s win represents at least an attempt to listen to what the electorate has been saying: that the Liberal Party must broaden its appeal or risk political irrelevance.

However, the opposition’s task of regrouping has only become more complicated. The Nationals’ dramatic – though short-lived – decision to walk away from the formal Coalition underscored the growing rift between the two parties: in political identity, geography, and ambition. The backflip to reunite the Coalition, while avoiding a full-blown rupture, has not resolved the underlying tensions.

For Ley, this means she’s leading not only a divided Liberal Party but a strained political alliance. While her leadership may represent a win for the moderates, she faces intense pressure from within her own ranks, particularly from conservatives dismayed by her centrist posture. The Nationals, meanwhile, remain emboldened by their strength in the regions and are increasingly inclined to assert their independence – even while technically back under the same Coalition banner.

What was once a relatively stable marriage of political convenience between urban Liberals and regional Nationals is now a tense cohabitation. The risk is that without genuine strategic cohesion, the center-right vote will continue to splinter, leaving both parties vulnerable to further electoral drift. The Nationals may yet find that their interests are diminished without a strong Liberal partner, while the Liberals could struggle to reclaim relevance in metropolitan areas without the broad policy coordination the Coalition once enabled.

Ley’s challenge is formidable. She must stabilize her leadership, heal party divisions, and articulate a forward-looking agenda capable of winning back disillusioned voters. And she must do so while navigating a Coalition that exists more in name than in substance at present. The next phase of opposition politics will test whether the Liberal-National alliance can reinvent itself – or whether its old formula has finally run its course.