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Pakistan and India: After the Crisis
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Pakistan and India: After the Crisis

Pakistan is concerned that the ceasefire may not hold. After all, Modi said that hostilities have been only “paused.”

By Umair Jamal

The recent four-day hostilities between India and Pakistan, which were ignited by a militant attack in India-administered Kashmir on April 22, brought the two nuclear-armed rivals dangerously close to full-scale war.

The conflict, which saw both countries using armed drones, high-speed missiles, and next-generation fighter jets, triggered global alarm over a potential nuclear disaster.

The two countries have agreed on a ceasefire, with the international community calling for dialogue and de-escalation. However, fears persist that another flare-up of tensions may be imminent. Among the critical questions is one about the ceasefire. Will it hold?

The two countries have reportedly agreed to withdraw troop reinforcements deployed during the recent conflict back to their peacetime positions by the end of May, as this issue goes to print. Moreover, officials from Pakistan and India confirmed that the agreed ceasefire doesn’t have an expiry date and will remain in force indefinitely.

However, from Pakistan’s perspective, what is making everyone nervous is that the Indian political leadership, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has clearly said that the ceasefire has only “paused” India’s military action against Pakistan. This has left Pakistan’s leaders – who are struggling to understand the motivations behind the Indian government’s inflammatory and provocative posturing – bewildered.

There is a palpable desire in Pakistan to observe the ceasefire and avoid any further military and economic strain. However, concerns exist about India’s rhetoric as policymakers believe that any future incident in India or India-administered Kashmir could again create a crisis. Policymakers in Pakistan argue that terrorism and extremism are India’s internal problems and that Islamabad should not be blamed for any attacks.

Following the ceasefire, there is a desire in Pakistan to protect the diplomatic gains that it was able to secure after India’s strikes in response to the April 22 Pahalgam attack in Kashmir. Pakistan’s policymakers are likely to try to keep China’s backing central for any discussions of future confrontation with India. Beijing made it clear during the recent conflict that it will support Pakistan’s “national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

Moreover, Pakistan would arguably like to ensure that the United States’ mediatory role in the crisis stays in place, allowing Islamabad to build space for Washington-facilitated future dialogue. During the recent crisis, Washington called both India and Pakistan “equals,” which denied New Delhi the unilateral Western backing it may have expected in its operations against Pakistan. India said its strikes targeted alleged militant hideouts.

Moreover, Pakistan can also be expected to go on a diplomatic offensive to tell the world that India’s decision to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) was disproportionate and unjustified. This move is likely going to find a lot of attention globally. The World Bank has already said that the IWT between India and Pakistan cannot be suspended unilaterally. Similarly, Britain’s Foreign Secretary David Lammy has urged “all sides to meet their treaty obligations."

Moreover, to Pakistan’s benefit, India’s military attack on Pakistan rapidly shifted global attention from terrorism to nuclear escalation risks. India’s military overreach, without sharing proof of Pakistan’s involvement in the Pahalgam attack with the international community, made its claims appear politically motivated. Pakistan can be expected to build on these gains in its global outreach in the coming weeks to tell the world that it is not the aggressor in this unfolding dynamic and remains ready for cooperation.

Similarly, Islamabad will likely also go into overdrive to raise the issue of India’s alleged involvement in fomenting terror attacks in Pakistan. The government in Pakistan has already put together a high-level delegation comprising former foreign ministers and foreign secretaries to visit Western capitals to underscore Pakistan’s point of view.

On the Indian side, there is a lot of confusion regarding the future of the ceasefire and India’s overall objectives regarding the latest crisis with Pakistan. According to a New York Times analysis, the recent military confrontation between India and Pakistan was “a clear setback for India.” The report highlighted that such clashes only fuel religious extremism in both India and Pakistan. “In India, the shift to strongman, Hindu-nationalist rule has left it boxed in whenever tensions rise, as the right-wing base of Prime Minister Narendra Modi often calls for blood,” the NYT noted.

Moreover, there seems to be a growing dissatisfaction in India over how the U.S. mediation role has been discussed with respect to the recent crisis with Pakistan. For instance, the lack of a clear victory for India and an abrupt U.S.-mediated ceasefire has created a sense of frustration among Modi’s rightwing base.

The Indian Ministry of External Affairs has gone as far as to say that the United States had no role in mediating the ceasefire between New Delhi and Islamabad. It is possible that Modi and External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar were not expecting the U.S. to take a position that favored Pakistan’s diplomacy and leave them vulnerable to domestic criticism.

This essentially means that hardliners in India's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) may still escalate tensions with Pakistan to shift domestic political narratives. Additionally, the Indian government's characterization of the recent ceasefire as a “pause” likely aims to signal to its electoral base that no peace deal exists with Pakistan and that military action still remains an available option.

It is possible that the Modi government could intensify anti-Pakistan rhetoric again before the upcoming Bihar elections to rally nationalist sentiment and contain political opposition. India’s leader of the opposition, Rahul Gandhi, has said that the Indian foreign minister’s recent statement about informing Pakistan of the military action in advance was a “crime.” He has called on the BJP-led government to explain the number of aircraft that may have been lost due to this decision.

Arguably, the Indian government, seeing no clear victory, may resort to other means, including the use of force by state or non-state actors, to appease public opinion. Any such approach would only complicate the India-Pakistan relationship further and may prompt Islamabad to build on the narrative that New Delhi is behind terror attacks in Pakistan.

With elections looming in India, Modi cannot afford to appear soft on Pakistan in any way. This essentially means that dialogue between the two countries is highly unlikely in the coming months unless forced by the U.S. or a major crisis.

That said, India remains wary of third-party mediation in any dialogue with Pakistan, as evident from its strong opposition to U.S. involvement in the recent ceasefire. Pakistan, conversely, appears more receptive to U.S.-mediated or other third-party negotiations.

The recent crisis should be a lesson for both India and Pakistan that when two nuclear powers clash, the possibility of unintended consequences is far greater than when two conventional powers go to war. A crisis of this scale should lead to some sort of constructive engagement between India and Pakistan. There is an urgent need for both countries to initiate dialogue and actively engage in confidence-building measures to de-escalate tensions and lower the political temperature. For instance, small steps such as India opening the Kartarpur corridor for Sikhs in Punjab could go a long way in restoring a bit of calm between the two sides.

If open discussions are not feasible, engagement should continue through Track II diplomacy or backchannel talks to at least come to some sort of understanding that focuses on contingencies when another incident or attack happens.

For now, the ceasefire holds. However, without a fundamental shift in positions, with both countries acknowledging Kashmir and terrorism as mutual problems that need to be discussed and debated openly, this cycle of violence will repeat indefinitely.

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The Authors

Umair Jamal is a correspondent for The Diplomat, based in Lahore, Pakistan.

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