Anatomy of an Insurgency: Balochistan’s Crisis and Pakistan’s Failures

Balochistan is Pakistan’s largest province, comprising 44 percent of the country’s territory, yet it has a relatively small population of approximately 14.8 million. Of this population, only 5.9 million are ethnic Baloch, with Pashtuns forming the other significant demographic group.

The province has been engulfed in an insurgency since 2006, but the conflict has recently undergone a dramatic transformation. What began as a tribal resistance movement has evolved into a formidable insurgency with separatist ambitions, complemented by a broader peaceful political movement. Recent escalations demonstrate both the insurgents’ growing operational capabilities and the Pakistani state’s persistent reliance on heavy-handed military responses that continue to alienate Baloch society.

Federal Overreach: The Catalyst for Modern Insurgency

The roots of contemporary unrest, according to Baloch nationalists, trace back to Pakistan’s founding when in 1948 the State of Kalat was forcibly incorporated into the federation despite local resistance. However, the current insurgency was catalyzed by then-President General Pervez Musharraf’s unilateral decision to construct Gwadar Port, bypassing constitutional structures including the National Assembly, Council of Common Interest, and the Balochistan Provincial government. This decision came despite ongoing negotiations through a Senate Committee led by Senator Mushahid Hussain, then the secretary general of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League (Q), that had nearly achieved consensus.

Akbar Bugti – a veteran political leader and Tumandar of the Bugti tribe who had served as chief minister, governor, and federal minister of state – had opposed the Gwadar project due to concerns about demographic changes from nationwide migration and the lack of guarantees that locals would benefit from development. Musharraf’s handling of political disagreements with Baloch leaders was marked by intimidation, and when security forces initiated operations against protests surrounding the port’s construction, Bugti and his supporters retreated to the mountains where military forces killed him in August 2006.

Bugti’s death transformed him from a collaborator with Islamabad into a nationalist hero, reinvigorating independence demands that had largely lain dormant since General Zia-ul-Haq’s rapprochement with Baloch dissidents in the 1980s. Bugti’s death became a rallying point for the insurgency. The August 2024 surge in insurgent violence coincided with his death anniversary, demonstrating the enduring symbolic power of the event.

It is critical to understand that Balochistan is treated by the center as a repository of resources, and the federal government often overrides constitutional and legal frameworks to enforce its decisions. Federal autonomy is enshrined in Pakistan’s Constitution, particularly recent features introduced by the 18th Amendment on provincial autonomy and rights and devolution of power. However, the center still resorts to coercion to promote its agenda.

The federal government has frequently disregarded constitutional and legal norms to impose its will, through presidential decrees in the case of Gwadar Port or the current use of the Special Investment Facility for granting mining concessions in Reko Diq and elsewhere in Balochistan. This pattern remains consistent across administrations. The province has been subjected to resource extraction, yet locals and the provincial government receive minimal benefits or returns, despite the fact that mining and energy extraction is constitutionally designated as a provincial and not a federal subject. Consequently, Baloch insurgents view Chinese and other foreign investors as co-conspirators in the plunder of the province’s resources.

The Evolution of Violence 

The current phase of the insurgency is nearly two decades old, but its operational sophistication reached unprecedented levels in 2025. This year, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) have escalated their attacks on infrastructure and security forces, particularly targeting the Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps.

The March hijacking of the Jaffar Express marked a critical escalation point. BLA militants attacked the train traveling from Quetta to Peshawar, taking over 440 passengers hostage after detonating explosives on the track. The militants segregated hostages by ethnicity and occupation, and demanded the release of Baloch political prisoners. The subsequent 30-hour military operation, dubbed Operation Green Bolan, resulted in the deaths of 33 militants and the rescue of most hostages, though it also claimed the lives of 21 civilians and four soldiers.

In a premature and audacious move in May 2025, BLA spokesman Mir Yar Baloch declared independence for a Republic of Balochistan, calling on India for recognition and embassy establishment, which New Delhi declined. Simultaneously, the BLA launched Operation Herof, mounting coordinated attacks on Pakistani military installations. This escalation occurred amid the India-Pakistan border clashes, highlighting the insurgency's regional dimensions and its ability to exploit geopolitical tensions.

Even before the headline-grabbing events of this year, the conflict witnessed a major intensification throughout 2024, demonstrating the insurgents’ sustained operational capacity. In August of last year alone, at least 74 people were killed, including 14 soldiers. October 2024 witnessed an attack on a motorway leaving Karachi airport that injured at least 10 people, including two Chinese nationals. In November, a suicide bombing at Quetta Railway Station killed 32 civilians and injured 55 others. The BLA claimed responsibility for these attacks, which consistently targeted infrastructure, Chinese personnel, Punjabi civilians, and military forces.

The recent wave of violence is distinguished by two new factors: the insurgents’ access to U.S.-origin weaponry abandoned in Afghanistan and their increased use of suicide bombings. This operational evolution suggests potential tactical collaboration between Baloch militants, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and other Islamist groups.

Despite government claims that the insurgency has weakened, these coordinated and deadly operations across the region demonstrate the insurgents’ enduring capacity for sophisticated attacks. Under pressure from China to enhance security for its personnel and investments, Islamabad has announced yet another military operation targeting Baloch insurgents, perpetuating a cycle of violence that has failed to address the underlying political grievances driving the conflict.

Civil Society Resistance and State Repression 

Running parallel to the armed insurgency is an ongoing peaceful mobilization led primarily by Baloch women activists protesting the state’s heavy-handed tactics. The military’s actions have disproportionately affected the Baloch middle class, with enforced disappearances and unlawful killings emerging as primary concerns. The true scale of the crisis remains contested, with Baloch advocacy groups estimating around 7,000 cases of enforced disappearances, while Pakistan's Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances acknowledges 2,752. The international NGO Human Rights Watch has independently documented a pattern of serious abuses, including arbitrary detentions and extrajudicial killings allegedly carried out by Pakistani security forces.

The Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (VBMP), led by figures like Mama Qadeer, whose son was found dead in 2012, has documented cases of enforced disappearances and organized high-profile campaigns, including a 2014 march from Quetta to Islamabad via Karachi. The group has conducted hunger strikes, maintained a decade-long protest camp that ranks among the world’s longest-running sit-ins, and testified before the United Nations Human Rights Council, condemning Pakistan’s alleged kill-and-dump policy.

Women-led organizations, particularly the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC), founded in 2020 as the Bramsh Solidarity Committee, have emerged as powerful voices against military abuses. Spearheaded by activists like Mahrang Baloch, whose father’s tortured body was discovered after he was forcibly disappeared and whose brother disappeared before being later released, the BYC has become a symbol of peaceful resistance. The organization has coordinated numerous demonstrations, including the Baloch Long March in December 2023 from Turbat to Islamabad, demanding justice for victims of state violence.

State repression only intensified in response to this peaceful resistance. On July 28, 2024, authorities blocked roads, banned public assemblies, and detained activists ahead of the Baloch Raji Aajoi (Baloch National Jirga) in Gwadar. At least 14 protesters were injured, one fatally. Crackdowns escalated further following the Jaffar Express hijacking in 2025, with security forces opening fire on demonstrators in Quetta, killing three. Mahrang Baloch was arrested the following day at a sit-in with the victims’ bodies, and her lawyer was barred from visiting her.

The state’s hostility reflects its perception of Mahrang as a threat, particularly following her inclusion in the TIME 100 Next 2024 emerging leaders list and her 2025 Nobel Peace Prize nomination. She was placed on a no-fly list, preventing her from attending a TIME event in New York. The director general of the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the media wing of Pakistan’s military, alleged that the BYC serves as a proxy for terrorism. The military’s heavy-handed response has only deepened alienation in Balochistan, undermining prospects for a peaceful resolution.

The Transformation of Resistance: From Tribal to Multi-Class Movement 

This state repression has forged an unprecedented coalition between traditional tribal militants and an increasingly politicized middle class. Today’s political mobilization encompasses diverse Baloch groups with varying objectives, ranging from those calling for fundamental rights and adherence to the rule of law, to hardline factions advocating for complete secession from Pakistan.

The state’s response to Baloch grievances has been characterized by brutal suppression rather than political accommodation. The military’s heavy-handed tactics, including collective punishment, forced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings, have deepened resentment and mistrust. These actions have unified disparate Baloch groupings under a common cause.

While an official counterinsurgency strategy exists on paper, ground-level implementation has ignored root causes in favor of colonial-era collective punishment tactics. Furthermore, it is alleged that the military has promoted vigilantism, including sectarian elements, to divide Baloch society. Two major death squads – Tehreek-e-Nefaz-e-Aman Balochistan, led by Siraj Raisani, and Baloch Musla Defai Tanzeem, headed by Shafiq Mengal – have reportedly abducted and killed activists.

This approach has created a violent ecosystem where Baloch nationalist groups, death squads, and Islamist militants – including the Islamic State Khorasan Province, which recently declared war on Baloch outfits – operate simultaneously. While the majority of Baloch people remain committed to non-violent resistance, state brutality has driven segments of the middle class, including women, to join militant organizations like the BLA. Some have even participated in the organization’s suicide wing, the Majeed Brigade. This represents a significant departure from earlier tribal-dominated resistance movements and indicates the insurgency’s broader social base.

The Sardari System 

Some analysts blame the sardari (tribal chief) system for Balochistan’s problems, arguing that tribal chiefs resist education and development while fueling separatism and providing opportunities for external intervention. However, the tribal system’s role in the insurgency defies simple categorization, and evidence suggests a more complex relationship.

Balochistan’s division into “A” areas, comprising cities and towns regulated by regular security forces, and “B” areas, encompassing rural regions policed by tribally-recruited levies under sardari influence, creates differential dynamics of governance and opportunities for tribal-based resistance to state authority. However, tribal chiefs span the political spectrum, with the chief minister and governor being tribal leaders alongside most Provincial Assembly representatives. Only three tribes – Bugti, Marri, and Mengal – are linked to the rebellion.

The insurgency’s typology and geographical spread further complicate tribal explanations. Significant rebellion occurs not only in the Marri-Bugti area where tribal structure remains strong, but also in cities like Quetta, Khuzdar, and Las Bela, and along the coast where the sardari system is weaker and middle-class leadership predominates. The Baloch middle class, concentrated along the Makran coast and in Karachi, often rejects tribal leaders who lead militant organizations dominated by the Marri and Bugti tribes.

The BLA has experienced a shift in leadership toward a more middle-class, educated movement, particularly under Aslam Baloch. This transition from tribal-based leadership has been accompanied by more aggressive and innovative strategies such as suicide bombing. This suggests that while tribal grievances contribute to the conflict, urbanization and the emergence of middle-class engagement are transforming the insurgency.

The Question of External Involvement

External involvement in the Baloch conflict remains a contentious issue. Pakistan has repeatedly accused India of backing Baloch militants. During a 2009 summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, Islamabad reportedly shared evidence of Brahamdagh Bugti meeting Indian agents in Kabul and alleged that India’s Kandahar consulate was supporting insurgent groups. Bugti is also believed to have traveled to Switzerland on an Indian passport, where he sought asylum.

The case of Kulbhushan Jadhav has been central to Pakistan’s claims of Indian involvement in Balochistan. Arrested in March 2016, Jadhav was accused of being a RAW operative engaged in espionage and sabotage. He was sentenced by a military court the following year and remains on death row. These allegations gained traction during the U.S.-backed Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani administrations in Afghanistan. However, with the U.S. withdrawal in 2021 and India’s reluctance to engage with the Taliban, sustained Indian support for Baloch militancy now seems less plausible. Despite this reality, Pakistan’s military continues to allege that recent attacks in Balochistan were masterminded by New Delhi.

Afghanistan’s involvement appears more plausible, given historical context and ongoing tensions. Kabul has never recognized the Durand Line as the official border, and during the 1970s Baloch insurgency, it hosted training camps for militants. Today, Bugti and Marri fighters have taken refuge in Afghanistan, reportedly launching attacks from across the porous frontier. Whether this represents a coordinated Taliban policy or results from ungoverned border areas exploited by local commanders remains uncertain. While there is uncertainty about Taliban policy, ungoverned spaces in Afghanistan provide ample opportunity for Baloch insurgents to operate freely.

The Diaspora: Internationalizing the Struggle 

While involvement by foreign governments remains in the realm of speculation, what is certain is that the Baloch diaspora plays a crucial role in sustaining and internationalizing the insurgency. There are approximately 10 million Baloch globally, with the largest concentration in Pakistan. There are under 2 million Baloch in Iran, around 1 million in Oman, under half a million in Afghanistan, and a smaller community in Turkmenistan.

Porous borders facilitate movement, and substantial populations in Gulf states – particularly Oman, where Baloch comprise around a quarter of the population and 40 percent of the army – provide potential funding sources. Although political freedoms in Gulf states limit overt activity, anger over Pakistani military brutalities runs high among diaspora communities. Their emotional involvement is sustained by active and targeted use of social media.

Baloch exiles in Europe and North America operate more openly, constructing a transnational Baloch political identity through media engagement and lobbying efforts. Activists from Iranian and Pakistani Balochistan collaborate across borders, maintaining websites documenting disappearances and extrajudicial executions that Pakistani authorities block domestically. Contemporary diaspora activism employs diverse tactics including regular protests outside United Nations offices and in European cities, media appearances on international platforms including Indian television channels, and lobbying international organizations and governments.

The Free Balochistan Movement, founded by Hyrbyair Marri, exemplifies this approach through coordinated protests and media campaigns targeting the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor as a “corridor of death and destruction” for the Baloch. This international activism achieved notable success when then-Republican Congressman Dana Rohrabacher convened in February 2012 U.S. congressional hearings on Balochistan. More recently, the February 2024 U.K. parliamentary debate on Balochistan human rights demonstrated the growing international dimension of the conflict.

A Political Solution?

Political negotiations remain essential in resolving the Balochistan insurgency, but this prospect is increasingly uncertain. Initiatives such as the Aghaz-e-Haqooq reform package launched by President Asif Ali Zardari in 2009 and subsequent efforts at dialogue by Balochistan Chief Minister Dr. Abdul Malik Baloch in 2015 failed largely due to insurgents’ mistrust of the government’s ability to control the military.

In June 2025, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif unveiled a comprehensive development package for Balochistan, allocating 250 billion rupees to address the province's longstanding infrastructure and energy challenges. In parallel, Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz President and former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (the current prime minister’s brother) has advocated for a political resolution to Balochistan’s issues. However, the Baloch insist on accountability for enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings, along with prosecution of those responsible.

The military, meanwhile, resists any process that could expose its human rights violations. Furthermore, the military has exploited the insurgency as a pretext to further consolidate its authority at the national level and to undermine the 18th Amendment’s devolution of power to the provinces.

Federal overreach and contempt for constitutional and legal norms triggered the insurgency in Balochistan. The use of brutal tactics to suppress the insurgency and accompanying political mobilization has made the crisis worse. The harsh response to the legitimate mobilization of the people demanding human rights and rule of law has intensified long-standing grievances over resources and identity. This served to transform what had been a tribal insurgency into a wider mobilization led by the middle class, which the Baloch diaspora have amplified and internationalized. Furthermore, the harsh repression has created opportunities for regional actors to exploit the insurgency.

The army’s preference for military solutions to what is essentially a political problem has manifestly failed. The insurgency now is nearly 20 years old and shows no signs of weakening, while the state’s response has only served to alienate broad sections of Baloch society. Ultimately, the Balochistan conflict highlights a broader democratic crisis in Pakistan, where military dominance perpetuates governance failures and stifles accountability.