Are Far Right Parties in Japan Still a Joke?

There was a time when far-right parties in Japan were seen as a joke. In 2014, following the wipeout of the Party for Future Generations (PFG) in the lower house election, some viewed it as a sign that no such parties could seriously penetrate the political scene. The idea that they would ever gain seats in the Diet was considered a pipe dream.

Others highlighted the fierce infighting that ignited within the PFG, despite its core members – Ishihara Shintaro and Hiranuma Takeo – both being prominent conservative politicians. It was a glimpse of the fractious nature of Japanese conservatives and the strong egos that constitute the movement.

However, in recent years, two parties with distinctly far-right characteristics have won seats in consecutive general elections, and one is predicted to grow its base in the upcoming upper house election, set for July 20.

In 2022, Sanseito received 1.76 million votes, electing one representative through the proportional ballot. The party began as part of a joint project among conservative-leaning commentators who were active YouTubers with distinct followings. However, soon after its launch, the party split due to the aftermath of the 2020 U.S. presidential election, as then-President Donald Trump spread false claims that the election was “stolen.” Trump’s allegations gained traction among some leaders of the party and radicalized their base, forcing the moderate members of the leadership to leave.

By the time Sanseito entered its first national contest, the party had further radicalized, with anti-vaccination conspiracy theories amplified online during the pandemic. One of their main policy goals is “vaccine-independent treatment.” Yet support for the party has only grown; Sanseito increased its ballot numbers to 1.87 million in the 2024 lower house election, enough to secure three seats.

The other far-right party that has recently emerged is the Conservative Party of Japan (CPJ). Hyakuta Naoki, a conservative pundit and novelist, founded the party to protest the LGBT Understanding Promotion Act, a 2023 law designed to raise awareness of sexual minorities in Japan. When the CPJ held a press conference to announce its establishment, it was also revealed that the mayor of Nagoya City, Kawamura Takashi, who had established a local party there, would join the party as a co-head. The CPJ won three seats in the party’s first go at a national election, with a total of 1.14 million votes.

Both parties share multiple traits with the now-defunct PFG: a focus on education, fostering patriotism, revising the constitution written by the Americans, and building a strong defense force. However, one aspect that differentiates Sanseito and the CPJ from the PFG is their focus on foreigners – or more broadly, foreign influence – which are framed by these parties as harmful to Japan’s national interests. The PFG never mentioned foreign-related matters such as strict immigration restrictions in its party platforms. By contrast, both Sanseito and the CPJ see these issues as core priorities. In their policy proposals, the two parties express rail against accepting more foreign workers and reject foreign capital from acquiring land and critical infrastructure.

The two parties’ focus on issues related to foreigners is what distinguishes them as “far-right” – as opposed to merely conservative – and aligns them with far-right parties in Western Europe. In the European context, far-right parties are viewed as political organizations that prioritize immigration restrictions. Referring to Kimberly A. Twist’s broader definition of far-right parties as those whose particular concern is the “defense of the nation,” it becomes clear that Sanseito and the CPJ share even more in common with their European counterparts. Twist highlighted the tendency of far-right parties to resist what they consider malign pressures – whether the European Union or criminals. Sanseito and the CPJ do not only take issue with foreigners; Sanseito promises to challenge “globalism” – a euphemism for big business and the wealthy – and the CPJ vilifies “career politicians,” who are accused of profiting off the nation.

Far from a joke to be dismissed, these two parties – now arguably definable as “far-right” even in the Japanese context – mark a notable shift in the country’s political landscape. So what can explain their rapid ascent?

One factor is the Japanese public’s increasing reliance on social media as a source for political information. When social media savvy candidates – like Ishimaru Shinji in the Tokyo gubernatorial race and Hyogo Prefecture Governor Saito Motohiko in his re-election bid – showed strong performances in the 2024 elections, it was seen as a sign. A tipping point has been reached in how voters consume their information – a transition away from traditional media, like newspapers and television news broadcasts, to social media that includes YouTube, X, or TikTok. And this is now impacting voting patterns among Japanese. Since Japanese conservatives have been active for some time on new media and are more fluent in the use of these platforms, that helps explain their rise in recent years – the moment meets the strong suits of the Japanese right-wing, including the far-right.

Also, new organizational strategies may explain the new parties’ relative resilience compared to the PFG. By leveraging party leader Kamiya Sohei’s personal connections – built through years of grassroots activism – Sanseito has established a vast infrastructure across the country. The party was able to slate 95 candidates in the 2024 general election, the fifth-largest number among all national political parties. In the case of the CPJ, their decision to join forces with a local mayor reflected their intention to strengthen their support base. However, in terms of regional outreach, Sanseito has shown particularly impressive results, having elected more than 140 local legislators to date.

While the CPJ is currently facing some internal conflict, recent polls indicate a significant uptick in Sanseito’s support. According to polling data released by NHK in early June, Sanseito recorded 1.9 percent support among the electorate – on par with the Japanese Communist Party, which secured more than 3 million proportional votes in the most recent general election (almost twice Sanseito’s total). A Sankei-FNN poll revealed a similar trend, showing Sanseito surpassing the Communist Party as the more favored choice among voters. This shift may be driven by disaffected conservative voters who initially left the Liberal Democratic Party for the Democratic Party For the People, but subsequently abandoned the latter due to its missteps in fielding candidates with problematic personal histories.

It was once thought that there was a threshold preventing far-right parties from gaining seats in the Japanese Diet. However, new technology has introduced issues once considered foreign to domestic politics – such as immigration, LGBTQ+ rights, and foreign elections like the 2020 U.S. presidential race – into the public discourse. At the same time, Japan’s changing demographics, with foreign residents more visible in daily life, are making it increasingly possible for far-right parties to gain traction and be heard.

It will likely be some time before Japan’s far-right gains enough prominence to participate in coalition talks, as is the case in parts of Western Europe. Given that their platforms remain largely intolerable to the general public, such a development may still be far off. Much will depend on how smoothly Japan – a country with a deeply rooted sense of national homogeneity – adjusts to the growing presence of foreigners in local communities. As the government cautiously moves forward with a de facto immigration policy, the Japanese public’s response may determine whether more far-right parties, resembling their European counterparts, emerge in the future.