Beyond the Binary: Can New Political Parties Revive Democracy in Bangladesh?

The collapse of traditional party systems is a familiar crisis across many contemporary democracies. Italian political scientist Piero Ignazi, writing in “The Crisis of Parties and the Rise of New Political Parties” (1996), diagnosed the disaffection with traditional mass parties in post-Cold War Europe. Citizens, alienated by rigid hierarchies and unresponsive elites, turned toward new political formations promising transparency, participation, and contemporary democratic values, civil liberties, environmental justice, gender equity, and decentralization.

Today, post-uprising Bangladesh offers a vivid new case of this global pattern, and a critical test of whether such surges in party formation can genuinely renew democracy or instead deepen political instability.

Following the student-led mass uprising of July-August 2024, which triggered the collapse of authoritarian Awami League regime, Bangladesh is experiencing an unprecedented political opening. In less than a year, at least 66 new political parties have registered or applied for registration. Their emergence reflects more than a transient reaction to regime change; it signals deep dissatisfaction with decades of binary dominance by the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and a public hunger for new models of representation.

Yet this political boom also raises crucial questions: will these new parties institutionalize democratic practices and offer citizens meaningful alternatives, or will they fragment the political landscape, opening space for opportunism and elite manipulation?

Since independence in 1971, Bangladesh’s political sphere has been shaped by the duopoly of the Awami League and the BNP. Both arose from major moments of social rupture, the Liberation War and the post-1975 transition, but evolved into hierarchical, patronage-driven machines. Across four decades, smaller parties sporadically emerged, particularly after key mass uprisings such as the 1990 democratic transition and the 2007-08 military-backed caretaker government. But these parties largely failed to build grassroots legitimacy or organizational capacity.

During the Awami League’s extended rule from 2009 to 2024, political space was systematically closed. State institutions were weakened, dissent criminalized, and electoral competition rendered hollow. As many scholars and activists have described, this produced a “closure of the political field,” narrowing citizens’ ability to imagine alternatives.

The 2024 uprising shattered this closure. The current moment marks what Sabina Chowdhury termed a “return of politics,” a phase where long-suppressed demands and marginalized actors are re-entering public life. Former Jahangirnagar University professor Dilara Chowdhury called this period a “renewed commitment to restoring democracy after 16 years of stagnation.”

The Awami League was banned from political activity on May 11, 2025. In its place a new political duopoly is emerging, now dominated by Jamaat-e-Islami and the BNP. Many citizens view this binary as equally unappealing, prompting a search for new alternatives.

It is in this context that the proliferation of new parties must be understood. The very first, the Nucleus Party of Bangladesh, was launched just weeks after the uprising. The latest, the Bangladesh Republic Party, was formally announced last month.

The diversity of these emerging parties mirrors trends that Ignazi observed in Europe’s “New Politics” – these are flexible, participatory, and issue-focused parties that critique the institutional rigidity of legacy organizations.

At first glance, this wave of political reorganization appears promising. For years, Bangladesh’s political space was monopolized by entrenched elites, leaving voters with few real choices. The sudden surge of new parties reflects a grassroots political awakening. Students, workers, intellectuals, and community organizers are attempting to claim space in the newly opened public sphere.

Such pluralism is vital for democratic health. Expanded political competition can strengthen accountability, foster new ideas, and test institutions. In this sense, Bangladesh’s post-uprising party boom could provide the foundation for a more representative and participatory democracy.

But risks abound. Many new parties are what Chowdhury terms “signboard parties,” entities without clear ideology or mass support, often led by figures linked to past corruption or elite networks. One newly minted political actor, Mohammad Rafiqul Amin, admitted in a BBC Bangla interview that his entry into politics was motivated not by ideals but by a desire to regain influence after being excluded from post-uprising political amnesties.

Moreover, Bangladesh’s political marketplace remains vulnerable to elite manipulation. Former power brokers and business interests may use new parties to rebrand themselves or broker transactional alliances, diluting the transformative potential of this moment.

The key question is whether this burst of new parties will institutionalize democratic practices or entrench fragmentation and instability. Without shared democratic values, ideological coherence, and grassroots mobilization, the sheer number of new actors risks overwhelming the political system.

Crucially, the culture of internal democracy remains weak across Bangladesh’s political spectrum. Unless new parties break with the personalized, patronage-driven politics of the past, they may simply replicate older pathologies in new forms.

Some observers propose that the strategic convergence of smaller, ideologically aligned forces into credible coalitions could help mitigate these risks. Mere multiplication of parties is not enough; a broader political consensus rooted in accountability, inclusiveness, and ideological clarity is essential for rebuilding public trust.

Whether Bangladesh’s post-uprising political renaissance leads to lasting democratic renewal remains uncertain. What is clear is that this moment constitutes a critical juncture. The choices made by these new parties, and by Bangladesh’s broader political culture, in the coming months will shape the future trajectory of the country’s democracy.

If this opening is squandered through fragmentation and opportunism, the cycle of disillusionment may deepen. But if new parties can institutionalize democratic norms and articulate substantive political programs, Bangladesh could yet chart a path toward a more inclusive and vibrant democratic order.