Navigating the Iran-Israel Conflict: Pakistan’s Precarious Balancing Act

The escalating tensions between Iran and Israel have put Pakistan’s policymakers in a difficult position. The United States’ decision to target Iranian nuclear facilities as part of the Israeli military campaign has only exacerbated the situation. If the crisis expands into a full-scale war, it would be challenging for Pakistan’s civil-military leadership to shield the country from the geopolitical fallout, which could lead to further foreign policy challenges and unrest at its borders.

It is perhaps this concern that is driving Pakistan’s leadership to actively make efforts not only to insulate the country from the ripple effects of the Iran-Israel conflict but also to potentially play a role in stopping the crisis.

As the conflict escalated between Iran and Israel, Pakistan’s Army Chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, held an extraordinary one-on-one meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump at the White House on June 18. According to the Pakistani military’s media wing, Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the meeting was initially planned for one hour but extended to more than two hours. 

After the meeting, the ISPR said that Trump “lauded Pakistan’s ongoing efforts for regional peace and stability.” 

The statement went on to say that a detailed exchange of views also took place regarding the prevailing tensions between Iran and Israel, with both leaders emphasizing the importance of the resolution of the conflict. 

During the meeting, Pakistan’s military leadership may have explained its perspective on the Iran-Israel crisis, conveying that a wider war or efforts to dismantle the regime in Tehran would undermine Washington’s interests in the region. Moreover, it is possible that Pakistan indicated that a broader destabilization in Iran could effectively create a new front for militant groups like al-Qaida and might embolden Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) in the region. Pakistan and the U.S. are currently collaborating to dismantle ISKP’s presence in Pakistan’s Balochistan province, where the militant group is trying to establish a foothold.

In addition, there are concerns about the influx of thousands of refugees from Iran into Balochistan, which faces greater economic challenges than the rest of the country. Pakistan has hosted more than 2 million Afghan refugees for decades and is currently making efforts to send them back due to security and economic challenges. 

Furthermore, Pakistan is concerned that Baloch militant and separatist groups operating along the Iran-Pakistan border might exploit any potential collapse of authority in Iran. With an over 900 kilometer shared border with Iran, Pakistan faces a significant threat. According to Reuters, should authority in Tehran collapse, Baloch militant groups on both sides of the Pakistan-Iran border could rally around a broader Balochistan movement aimed at creating a new country from the Baloch regions of Pakistan and Iran.

Pakistan’s relations with Iran haven’t been easy. The two sides carried out missile strikes against each other last year. Still, Islamabad wouldn't want to see the Iranian regime fall or a weakened government in Iran because of the ongoing Israeli military campaign. 

Moreover, Pakistan can’t accept the notion of one country attacking the nuclear installations of another, as it sets a dangerous precedent. In this regard, the U.S. decision to join Israel in attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities with strikes on June 22 has sent shockwaves across the region.

This concern is heightened especially in the context of the recent four-day military confrontation between Pakistan and India in May, which raised fears of the conflict between the two escalating into a nuclear exchange. 

Meanwhile, public sentiment in Pakistan is strongly anti-Israel and pro-Iran in the current conflict. This stems in part from the Pakistani population watching the bloodshed in Gaza and the West Bank for close to two years. At this stage, no official in Pakistan entertains the idea of even hinting at supporting the U.S., and therefore also Israel, in any way against Iranian interests.

This places Pakistan in a challenging position: it must support Iran while discreetly engaging with the U.S. to advocate for a resolution of the crisis.

Pakistan's government has issued strong public statements in support of Iran. Islamabad has explicitly affirmed that Tehran has the right to self-defense under the U.N. Charter. This position basically means that Pakistan effectively endorses the idea of Iran's retaliatory strikes against Israel, a U.S. ally, to defend itself.

Arguably, by trying to position itself as an intermediary, Pakistan retains relevance for both Washington and Tehran. It is worth mentioning that Pakistan’s army chief and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif visited Iran on May 27 and met the key civil-military leadership, including the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, to thank Tehran for its support to Pakistan in the four-day war with India.

It is interesting that following his meeting with Munir, Trump told the media that they [Pakistanis] “know Iran very well, better than most,” adding that they are “not happy.” It essentially means that the Pakistani leadership offered a different perspective from Trump’s inner circle on the Iran crisis. This perspective would have arguably urged the U.S. not to let this crisis go beyond a certain point and to end hostilities as soon as possible. 

That said, Pakistan’s positioning and outreach to the U.S. over the Iran-Israel crisis occurs against the backdrop of its “ironclad” partnership with China. China has made massive investments in Iran’s current regime through energy deals, infrastructure projects, and building diplomatic bridges. Most of this has happened under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with Pakistan serving as a key beneficiary via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This interconnected framework alone ensures that Pakistan will not undermine China’s Iran policy, regardless of Islamabad’s diplomatic outreach to Washington or reported mediation efforts.

Seemingly, Pakistan’s active diplomatic role in the Iran-Israel crisis contrasts sharply with India’s noticeably limited involvement. So far, New Delhi has maintained cautious neutrality, avoiding mediation attempts despite its historical ties to both Tehran and Tel Aviv. For instance, India distanced itself from a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) statement condemning Israel's strikes on Iran and called for de-escalation.

China will likely view Pakistan’s conflict diplomacy and outreach to the U.S. in a positive sense. The relationship between Pakistan and China appears to have matured beyond suspicions about Islamabad's U.S. outreach. It is possible that China may encourage Pakistan’s ability to navigate great power politics while protecting mutual interests. Pakistan may very well be coordinating its position over the Iran-Israel conflict with China, particularly regarding the U.S. engagement.

If Pakistan can somehow help defuse the Iran-Israel crisis while maintaining good relations with China, Iran, and the U.S., its strategic profile would certainly improve in the region.

The risk of the Iran-Israel conflict escalating poses significant dangers for Pakistan, and the urgency of its efforts to de-escalate the situation reflects these threats.