The Strategic Conundrum Facing Southeast Asia’s Small Air Forces

Modern air warfare studies are dominated by strategic theories propounded by famous thinkers such as Julio Douhet, Billy Mitchell, Sir Arthur “Bomber” Harris, and Alexander de Seversky, as well as the more modern John Warden III. Nonetheless, all of their air power theories share similar traits: they consider what targets to bomb to generate strategic effects and the importance of achieving air supremacy or superiority in any given conflict. Air power studies also mostly focus on how to use air power in warfighting, and not on the utility of air power in peacetime duties. Similarly, not much has been written about how small air forces can attain strategic utility, if at all possible.

Defining a “small air force” is far from straightforward. Stuart Mackenzie has provided a useful definition that measures the abilities of a particular air force to perform effectively within all four main air power roles: air combat, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) operations, strike attacks, and air mobility. This definition does not focus on the numbers of aircraft, but rather on the capabilities and tasks that an air force is able to perform. Small air forces also have limited capabilities to pursue operations independently, and a limited-to-nonexistent indigenous defense industry to support their air force operational readiness. Based on these definitions, most of Southeast Asia’s air forces, including those of Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam and Indonesia, would be considered “small.”

With limited capabilities, are Southeast Asia’s small air forces prepared for future warfighting or primarily for peacetime roles? Limited resources mean prioritizing capabilities, and the redrawing of doctrines in how best to use limited air assets for air operations. Southeast Asian air forces, therefore, have to make difficult choices in the acquisition of assets.

The region’s air forces face an ongoing challenge of whether to invest their finite resources in future warfighting capabilities, such as by acquiring expensive multirole combat aircraft (MRCA) and their associated maintenance costs. This may not meet current operational demands for peacetime air policing, which requires airborne warning and control aircraft, maritime patrol aircraft, and aerial reconnaissance platforms.

Optimally, small air forces in Southeast Asia would balance their capabilities between the two roles, investing in peacetime capabilities while acquiring a small number of MRCAs for potential air combat operations. However, the small numbers of fighter squadrons may limit the credibility of the deterrence created by these air forces, given that they would lack the ability to intercept foreign aircraft incursions and conduct defensive and offensive air operations. This may result in a dilemma in which an air force has too few assets for too wide a range of tasks, or too many assets useful for limited types of operations. In addition to this, Southeast Asia’s small air forces may soon face serious stress tests on their abilities to monitor, protect, and fight for control of their airspace.

The South China Sea issue and the heating up of China-Taiwan tensions remain the greatest strategic risks for the Southeast Asian region. China and Taiwan claim almost the whole of the South China Sea, including swathes of the continental shelves and EEZs of littoral states, including Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, and to a certain extent, Indonesia.  Meanwhile, the Taiwan issue continues to heat up.  With almost daily Chinese air force flights around Taiwanese airspace, and regular Chinese joint naval and air exercises near Taiwanese waters, and a similar ratcheting up of rhetoric on the U.S. side, cross-straits tensions continue to rise.

In view of these strategic risks, Southeast Asia’s small air forces need to revitalize and expedite their modernization efforts in order to acquire a broad spectrum of air power assets and supporting technologies, to enable them to conduct sustainable, multifaceted air operations. This will help them safeguard their air spaces, not just for today’s peacetime operational context but also for plausible future regional conflicts that may require the deployment of combat aircraft to defend their air space, or if dragged into a conflict, to achieve air superiority or deny the attainment of air space control by an adversary.

Air power serves as a key enabler of peace-time air policing and shows of presence, as well as demonstrating political will to safeguard what is legally provided under international law and norms. It offers policymakers reach, speed, and flexibility to deter and dissuade adversarial actions, and if deterrence fails, the capability to fight for control of sovereign national airspace and strategic flight routes. Southeast Asian countries with small air forces may need to reconsider their budgetary prioritizations, increasing the funds allocated to building modern, sustainable and multi-role-capable air forces to meet future strategic challenges.