John F. Kennedy’s Forgotten Crisis

On October 16, 1962 National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy opened his top secret morning daily briefing book in his West Wing office at the White House. Two urgent memos were inside. In the first the State Department warned that “fighting on the Sino-Indian border has become much more serious” than normal and that India might soon need American assistance. In the second, the Central Intelligence Agency reported that U2 imagery had confirmed the delivery of offensive intermediate range missiles to Cuba. On opposite sides of the globe President John F. Kennedy was facing urgent crises. In the Caribbean, the United States and the Soviet Union would soon be eyeball to eyeball in a nuclear crisis which could have resulted in Armageddon. In the Himalayas, the two most populous countries in the world, India and China, were at war. A third country, Pakistan seemed poised to enter the conflict. It was perhaps the single most dangerous moment in modern history.

At the time, Americans definitely believed the Cuban missile crisis was the most dangerous event of the Cold War, the closest the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) had come to a direct military clash that would precipitate nuclear war. Decades later we know from Soviet records that the situation was even more dire than was thought in 1962. At the time the CIA estimated there were between 6,000 and 8,000 Soviet troops on the island; in fact there were 50,000. Unbeknownst to the CIA and Kennedy, the Soviets had not only sent medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles to Cuba, they had also deployed tactical missiles called FROGs, with nuclear warheads. Soviet forces on Cuba were ready to fire nuclear weapons at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay with its garrison of 5,000 Marines if the Americans decided to bomb the longer range missiles and warheads that threatened America’s cities.

The president ordered the Pentagon to prepare to invade Cuba. Operation Scabbard envisioned 120,000 troops from eight divisions going ashore in a D-Day style assault. Two U.S. Army airborne divisions would parachute into Cuba. The First Marine Division would conduct a separate landing. Three aircraft carrier battle groups, including the first ever nuclear-powered carrier, USS Enterprise, would provide air support. If the Americans invaded the island, the Russians would use their tactical nuclear weapons to defend the beaches. If Kennedy had accepted the advice of most of his military advisers and attacked the island, nuclear war would have begun immediately.

Meanwhile…

While the American public was fixated on Cuba, on the other side of the globe Mao Zedong’s China invaded India on October 20. The People’s Liberation Army quickly got the upper hand and Indian forces retreated in disarray. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru soon faced the possibility that China would overrun large parts of northeast India. He appealed to Kennedy and British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan for help. The U.S. and U.K. immediately began an airlift of supplies to India to help Nehru stop Mao. The fighting ceased temporarily as the Chinese army paused for several days, only to resume its offensive on November 16.

On November 19, 1962, at the peak of the crisis, Nehru wrote two letters to Kennedy. They were delivered immediately by the Indian embassy to the White House and also given to America’s ambassador in India, John Kenneth Galbraith. The existence of these two letters, especially of the second one, was not revealed at the time. In his diary, published in 1969, Galbraith makes only a cursory mention of them writing that “not one but two pleas for help are coming to us, the second one of them still highly confidential.” For years after the crisis successive Indian governments denied the letters existed. Nehru’s successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, said he had conducted a thorough review of the prime minister’s secretariat and the ministry of external affairs but found no evidence of them.

For its part, the U.S State Department archives acknowledged that two letters had been received by Kennedy from Nehru, but kept the contents secret. Copies were heavily redacted at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, allegedly in part at the request of the government of India. Finally, in 2010, the Library made available the original letters in full. While much of the substance of the letters was known much earlier it was only after the Library posted them that scholars could study the exact text.

The first letter begins with an expression of Nehru’s gratitude for what Kennedy had already done since the attack began in October. “We are extremely grateful to you and the Government and people of the USA for the practical support given to us,” Nehru wrote, and “we particularly appreciate the speed with which the urgently needed small arms and ammunition were rushed to India.” In the “Eyes Only” second letter, Nehru then tells the president that during the lull in fighting in early November the Chinese had “made full preparations” for a second attack. Two Indian divisions, Nehru said, were “fighting difficult rear guard actions” in India’s North East Frontier Agency province and might not last much longer.

Nehru summed up the battlefield situation grimly. “The Chinese are, by and large, in possession of the greater part of the North East Frontier Agency and are poised to overrun Chushul in Ladakh” in Kashmir. “There is nothing to stop them till they reach Leh, the headquarters of the Ladakh Province of Kashmir. We are facing a grim situation in our struggle for survival… against an unscrupulous and powerful aggressor.”

Then Nehru came to the point of the letter. India’s defense experts and Galbraith’s team at the embassy had discussed India’s situation. India needed “air transport and jet fighters to stem the Chinese tide of aggression. A lot more effort, both from us and from our friends will be required to roll back this aggressive tide.” Nehru then made his pitch, writing “I hope we will continue to have the support and assistance of your great country in the gigantic efforts that have to be made.” The Prime Minister closed by telling the president he was also writing a similar message to British Prime Minister Macmillan.

Almost at the same moment as the first message was received at the White House, Galbraith sent an urgent telegram – eyes only for Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara – that “I have just learned under conditions of the greatest confidence that another” letter from Nehru is “in preparation.” The second letter, Galbraith wrote, reflected the “new disasters and further large Chinese advances today and will ask for some form of back up support to the Indian Air Force by USAF amounting to joint Air Defenses to deter attacks on cities and lines of communication while the Indians commit IAF to tactical operations and attacks on Chinese communications which they believe is now the only chance of stopping Chinese and preventing cutoff of eastern India or more.” The Indian leadership had decided they could only stop the Chinese advance and prevent the loss of all of northeast India with air strikes by the Indian Air Force on the PLA’s lines of supply and communications back to Tibet. To ensure the defense of India’s own cities and supply lines Nehru was asking the president to send American pilots and aircraft to back up the Indian Air Force by flying defense missions over India.

Nehru was asking Kennedy to join the war against China.

The Indian prime minister was making a momentous request. America would be partner in an air war to defeat the PLA. Just a decade after American forces had reached a ceasefire with the PLA in Korea, India was asking Kennedy to join a new war against communist China. Galbraith knew he had to buy some time for his boss to consider the huge commitment India was asking for. Galbraith said he would urge the Indians to make “careful consideration of the acceleration of the conflict in the air,” essentially urging Nehru not to start any air strikes prematurely, but he warned the president that the “Indian mood is desperate and the situation indeed grim.” Galbraith’s urgent and immediate cable concluded “I have learned of this move under conditions of greatest confidence even senior Ministers not being yet informed. My staff is not informed. You must protect the fact of my knowledge and this warning now and indefinitely.” The telegram was classified TOP SECRET EYES ONLY FOR PRESIDENT, SECRETARY AND SECRETARY DEFENSE. Galbraith had been briefed on the second letter by Finance Minister M. J. Desai in great secrecy.

Dire Assessment

India’s ambassador in Washington, Braj Kumar Nehru, delivered the second letter late in the evening on November 19. It began with a dire assessment of the situation facing India. “Within a few hours of dispatching my earlier message of today, the situation in the NEFA command has deteriorated still further.” Nehru believed “the entire Brahmaputra Valley is seriously threatened and unless something is done immediately to stem the tide the whole of Assam, Tripura, Manipur and Nagaland would also pass into Chinese hands.” Even worse, Nehru warned, the Chinese had “massive forces” north of Sikkim and Bhutan and “another invasion from that direction appears imminent.” He repeated his concerns about Kashmir and feared “increasing air activity by the Chinese air force in Tibet.” The letter’s assessment of the crisis concluded that “the situation is really desperate. We have to have more comprehensive assistance if the Chinese are to be prevented from taking over the whole of Eastern India.” Without American airpower Nehru believed India faced “a catastrophe for our country.”

India’s only hope was to counter China’s gains on the ground with use of air power, but India lacked “air and radar equipment to defend against retaliatory action by the Chinese.” Nehru made his request specific: “a minimum of 12 squadrons of supersonic all weather fighters are essential. We have no modern radar cover in the country. The United States Air Force personnel will have to man these fighters and radar installations while our personnel are being trained.” The Indian prime minister was explicit about the implications of his request writing that “U.S. fighters and transport planes manned by U.S. personnel will be used for the present to protect our cities and installations” from the Chinese. Moreover, American pilots and fighters would “assist the Indian Air Force in air battles with the Chinese air force over Indian areas” while Indian aircraft attacked Chinese PLA troops and supply lines on the ground. Air attacks inside Tibet would be undertaken by the Indian Air Force alone.

In addition to the fighters and radar installations manned by Americans, Nehru also requested “two squadrons of B-47 Bombers” to strike into Tibet. India would “like to send immediately our pilots and technicians for training in the United States” to operate these sophisticated long range jet bombers. The prime minister assured Kennedy the equipment would not be used against Pakistan but only for “resistance against the Chinese.” The stakes were “not merely the survival of India” Nehru told Kennedy “but the survival of free and independent Governments in the whole of this subcontinent or in Asia.” India was ready to “spare no effort until the threat posed by Chinese expansionist and aggressive militarism to freedom and independence is completely eliminated.”

Ambassador B.K. Nehru was so stunned by the contents of the messages from Nehru that he showed them to none of his staff and kept the only copies in his own desk. He told an American historian many years later that he felt Nehru must have been exhausted and psychologically finished by the news of India’s defeats when he sent the two letters. In his memoirs, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan referred to the similar letters he received as “agitated.” 

In his diary, Galbraith wrote that November 20, 1962 “was the day of ultimate panic in New Delhi, the first time I have ever witnessed the disintegration of public morale. The wildest rumors flew around the town.” He convened his embassy planning team to send three immediate recommendations back to Washington “which I came up with overnight with the benefit of insomnia.” The airlift of supplies needed to be further cranked up, twelve more C-130 transports needed to arrive immediately and, most importantly, “elements of the Seventh Fleet [should] be sent into the Bay of Bengal.” The Indians had not asked for a demonstration of American naval power but Galbraith believed it was essential to have a very visible symbol of American support for India immediately. A U.S. Navy carrier battle group was urgently needed, he felt, to signal China that America was serious and Pacific Fleet Headquarters in Honolulu was asked to send one at once.

Galbraith also had advice for the Indians. He urged them not to start air operations against China until an answer arrived from Kennedy to Nehru’s second letter. He noted that “there is no technical chance that we could accord them immediately the protection that Nehru asked.” It would take time to get the USAF on the scene. Galbraith was also skeptical about the impact airpower would have on the PLA, based on America’s experience in Korea ten years before: “We learned in Korea that even with complete control of the air, we could not keep them from applying their forces or advancing.” Air attacks on the PLA would prompt retaliation, including attacks on Indian cities like Calcutta and perhaps a drive down from Sikkim.   

The U.S. ambassador called on Nehru the morning of November 20 and then shared lunch with the prime minister. After the lunch Galbraith hoped for a nap when “a message came from President Kennedy” replying to Nehru’s urgent two letters. Kennedy proposed to send a high-level mission led by Ambassador Averell Harriman, a longtime friend of Galbraith’s, immediately to assess Indian needs. He also promised to increase the already agreed-upon airlift of supplies and provide the requested deployment of the navy to the Bay of Bengal. Galbraith informed the Indians and then “had dinner with the children” before a long telegram arrived from the Secretary Rusk “asking questions I had answered before” about the “second midnight letter.”

Galbraith reported in his diary that on the morning of November 21, “like a thief in the night peace arrived.” Just before midnight on November 20, the Chinese government publicly announced that in 24 hours Chinese military forces would cease fire and within nine days would begin to withdraw. The Chinese statement said the ceasefire would take place along the entire Sino-Indian border. In addition, beginning on December 1, 1962 Chinese forces would “withdraw to positions twenty kilometers behind the line of actual control which existed between China and India on November 7, 1959.”

The war was over, although no one in Washington or New Delhi knew then whether it was only a truce or an end to hostilities that would endure. Despite decades of talks, the border quarrel is no closer to resolution today than it was in 1962.

Arms Race

The brief 1962 war was also the beginning of an arms race that continues to this day. Two years after the border war China tested its first nuclear weapon. A decade later India tested one, and then in May 1998 it tested a half dozen. In defending its decision to test in 1998. the Indian government specifically cited the 1962 war and China’s hostile attitude toward India, including its clandestine support for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, which began after the 1962 war. Pakistan conducted its own nuclear tests in response to India’s. In 2012 India announced it had built an intermediate range ballistic missile capable of striking Beijing, another milestone in the three-way nuclear arms race.

Indeed, Pakistan was a key third player throughout the crisis and remains so today. Kennedy and Galbraith made an enormous effort to convince the then-Pakistani dictator, Field Marshall Ayub Khan, to remain neutral and stay out of the war. Nehru and his intelligence chiefs were convinced Pakistan would attack to grab Kashmir while they were preoccupied with China. A two-front war would have been an even greater disaster for New Delhi. Only three years later, in 1965, Pakistan would launch a war to grab Kashmir, a plot that had been cooked with Chinese help but which India’s army repelled, thanks in large part to the equipment Kennedy had sent in 1962 and after the war.

The world will never know what Kennedy would have done if Mao had not stopped the war unilaterally. Nehru was asking for 350 American combat aircraft to be urgently sent to defend India. In my judgment, Kennedy almost certainly would have said yes and American pilots, probably with British, Australian and Canadian partners, would have fought in the skies over the Himalayas with Chinese pilots. A year after the war, in 1963, the U.S., U.K, Australia and Canada all sent aircraft and pilots to India to participate in a large training exercise with the Indian Air Force. They practiced precisely the operation Nehru had pleaded for in his frantic messages in November 1962, a clear indication that Kennedy would have come to India’s defense had the war continued or resumed after the Chinese ceasefire.

The events of the fall of 1962 in the Caribbean are well remembered, the war in the Himalayas largely forgotten. More than a half century later, however, the alliance structure that was in its infancy in 1962 – Pakistan and China as close partners and India and America as close partners – has come to fruition. While a war between China and India is very unlikely, the same cannot be said about India and Pakistan. The 1962 crisis will still say much about how the two global giants line up behind their regional partners.

John F. Kennedy rightly deserves great credit for resolving the Cuban missile crisis without an apocalyptic war. When you realize he was simultaneously managing America’s role in another life-and-death struggle on the other side of the world, his leadership becomes even more extraordinary. In JFK’s Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA and the Sino-Indian War we can see Kennedy as we have never seen him before.