Myanmar’s Big Moment

For a brief moment, it seemed as if Myanmar’s eagerly awaited legislative elections might yet be postponed, ostensibly because of recent flooding. The military-linked Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) favored a delay, but the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) was opposed to any rescheduling. The Union Election Commission (UEC) reconfirmed the original date of November 8, 2015 for the landmark election. Myanmar’s voters will thus be able to cast as planned their ballot for candidates standing in elections for the lower (House of Representatives, Pyithu Hluttaw) and upper house (House of Nationalities, Amyotha Hluttaw) of the union assembly (Pyidaungsu Hlutttaw) as well as Region and State parliaments.

The elections mark an important point in the country’s political history: By voting for their preferred party, Myanmar’s voters are at least implicitly taking a position on whether simply to continue the reform process initiated by President Thein Sein, or whether to endorse the vision of a more radical political and constitutional change at the expense of the military. The leader of the main political opposition party, Aung San Suu Kyi, seems convinced that the NLD will win the elections in a landslide and that she will lead a new government.

Yet that outcome cannot be taken for granted. Indeed, there is much uncertainty over how the election results will play out in political terms. To some extent this uncertainty also extends to Myanmar’s relations with key Western states, such as the United States. This uncertainty will persist until the eventual shape of the new government is known.

Toward the 2015 Elections

The by-elections of 2012 apart, voters in Myanmar last went to the polls five years ago. Still organized by the previous military regime as part of its “roadmap to democracy,” the November 2010 elections have always been regarded as flawed, in part because the political process leading up to the elections was not inclusive. Boycotted by the NLD and comprehensively won by the USDP, the 2010 elections produced a Union parliament that critics of the military have never recognized as being fully legitimate. Nevertheless, parliament has itself arguably performed much better over the years than could be expected in 2010, notwithstanding the constitutional provision whereby appointed military representatives make up 25 percent of legislators in both chambers of the union assembly.

In March 2011, the union assembly elected as president Thein Sein, a former general who had served as the last prime minister when the country was still under military rule. Bearing in mind that Myanmar has a presidential system it is not surprising that Thein Sein has been at the forefront of  many of the economic and political reforms adopted since 2011. Above all, Thein Sein deserves credit for his early determination to achieve political accommodation with the opposition NLD and its leader, which resulted in the latter joining the existing political process. He should also be credited for the government’s sustained efforts to end the long-running conflict between the central government and Myanmar’s many ethnic armed groups. These efforts culminated in the formal signing on October 15 of a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) by the government and military as well as eight armed groups. Importantly, while several ethnic armed organizations decided against signing the agreement, even non-signatories are said to have agreed with the text of the NCA, which among other things sets out a basic roadmap toward peace and ethnic reconciliation on the basis of future political dialogue.

In the view of most observers, all things considered, there has been considerable progress toward democracy in Myanmar, albeit still within the framework of the 2008 Constitution, which guarantees the military a major role in national politics and institutional autonomy to boot.

The forthcoming elections constitute an important milestone on Myanmar’s political journey from military dictatorship to a democratic future yet to be further defined. The elections encapsulate the reality of political reforms undertaken to date, while potentially highlighting entrenched suspicions as well as longstanding political ambitions and antagonisms. A key question is whether the NLD, which resoundingly won the last free and fair elections in 1990, will achieve a similar triumph a quarter of a century later.

Will Suu Kyi’s NLD Win?

In the absence of reliable polling data, there are three basic electoral scenarios. In the first scenario, the NLD does capture more than two-thirds of the seats in both chambers, which would make for a respective overall majority. In the lower house this would involve the party winning 221 of 330 contested seats, whereas in the upper house 113 of 168 seats would be required. The second scenario is that the USDP wins enough seats to form an absolute majority when in coalition with the appointed military representatives. In relation to the House of Representatives, this would require the USDP to win 111 seats and/or 57 seats in the House of Nationalities. Alternative scenarios see the elections leading to a hung parliament with multiple possible permutations, depending on how the many other political parties fare. More than 90 political parties and approximately 320 independent candidates are contesting the various constituencies in the November elections.

According to some reports, Aung San Suu Kyi believes the NLD can win up to 80 percent of the popular vote. Even with the military, by virtue of the 2008 constitution guaranteed 25 percent of the seats in both the lower and upper house of the union parliament, a victory on that scale would translate into a clear NLD majority. It would also imply a crushing defeat for the USDP. Whether that outcome is realistic may be in the eye of the beholder.

Yet Aung San Suu Kyi has a right to be optimistic: First, the NLD won a landslide in the 2012 by-elections, in which neither the incumbent party – the USDP – nor other democratic parties proved a political match. Second, Aung San Suu Kyi knows that as the daughter of General Aung San and the country’s revered democracy icon, she herself remains wildly popular among voters, for most of whom these elections represent the first opportunity since 1990 to cast their ballot for the NLD, and many want to embrace the kind of fundamental political change she represents. Third, by fielding about 1,150 candidates the NLD will, in effect, contest seats across the entire country. Among the parties with the greatest number of candidates only the USDP is making a similar commitment.

There are at least two further factors why the NLD is widely predicted to do well: The first is that the USDP failed to press for the shift from the existing first-past-the-post electoral system to one centered on proportional representation. This failure will make it easier for Aung San Suu Kyi to translate her general popularity into strong NLD election results. Second, and related, remaining votes for other candidates are likely to be split across a plethora of parties, including ethnic ones.

These factors notwithstanding, an overwhelming NLD victory and absolute parliamentary majority should not be taken for granted. Some voters do not recognize the NLD as a party replete with talent and capacity and might prefer candidates from other parties with proven expertise, experience or potential. Other voters might want to reward the USDP for the government’s achievements since 2011, especially if they believe that the flexibility, patience, and a reform-minded attitude exhibited under the ruling hybrid-regime best promises stable foundations and good prospects for positive change in the future. Or they might vote for the USDP because they respect the work and qualities of President Thein Sein. In this context, it is also noteworthy that USDP officials have indicated that the party would back Thein Sein, its chairman, for a second term as president if the party won the elections.

Yet other voters may have been alienated by the way in which NLD election candidates were selected, not least by the decision to spurn pro-democracy activists of great standing linked to the 88 Generation Peace and Open Society group. Also, the NLD might take a hit among nationalist-minded voters swayed by assertions from the influential Association for Protection of Race and Religion (also known by its local acronym as Ma Ba Tha) that not only is the NLD backed by Islamists and foreign countries, but that it would also work to repeal the four race and religion laws recently adopted. Finally, it is also not clear how many votes the NLD will be able to attract in constituencies with strong or predominantly ethnic minority populations that are likely to consider voting for one of the 60 ethnic parties.

To the extent these points count, it is possible that enough voters will not vote for the NLD so that even if the party did win the majority of seats among the 75 percent that are contested, it might still fall short of an absolute majority. That said, the three scenarios sketched here are not equally likely, but none should be dismissed out of hand.          

Myanmar’s Next Leader?

The election results will have implications for the choice of Myanmar’s next president. According to the constitution, the elected representatives of the lower and upper house as well as the appointed military representatives will each be able to nominate a presidential candidate. The candidate with the most votes then cast by members of both houses becomes president. In the event of the NLD achieving a comprehensive victory in the forthcoming elections and controlling the Union Parliament, Aung San Suu Kyi’s party would be in the best possible position to claim and win the presidency. While it would need fewer seats if it enjoyed an understanding with the military appointees in parliament, the same point would in principle also apply to the USDP. In the event of a hung parliament, the leading parties will probably seek to agree on various political deals in order to win support from other parties and legislators to receive backing for their choice of presidential candidate. This search for a compromise candidate could obviously play out in many ways across the two houses. Ultimately, however, all members of the Union assembly would be called upon to determine the next president with the winner requiring only a relative majority. 

It is widely understood that Aung San Suu Kyi would herself not be eligible for the office of president as per the criteria outlined in the 2008 constitution. The key impediment is the foreign citizenship of her children. This has given rise to speculation about what political office Suu Kyi might hold following the November elections.

Until quite recently it was widely assumed that Suu Kyi had entered into a political alliance with Speaker Thura Shwe Mann, and that the NLD would support the former general and former presidential frontrunner in his bid to take over the presidency from Thein Sein. Suu Kyi would settle for succeeding him as speaker of the 440-member Lower House. That would allow Suu Kyi a key role in Myanmar’s politics with the power to significantly shape the legislative agenda and hence a handle on the country’s future reform drive.

However, even if such a quid-pro-quo arrangement was being planned at one point, it looks rather unlikely now. Thura Shwe Mann was ousted as USDP Chairman in August 2015 after he rejected a significant number of retired senior officers that the military had proposed should stand as USDP party candidates in the November elections. Two months earlier Thura Shwe Mann, who retained his position as speaker, raised eyebrows when he unexpectedly allowed parliament to vote on constitutional amendments sought in part by Suu Kyi. Given that neither the USDP nor the military may thus want to nominate or support Thura  Shwe Mann in becoming president, it is also not self-evident that the NLD would be backing him as a candidate of choice.

In any case, it is also not clear that Suu Kyi would want to succeed Thura Shwe Mann as Speaker. Suu Kyi has indeed been quite outspoken about her own leadership aspirations. Since 2013, the Nobel Prize laureate has repeatedly articulated in public her presidential ambitions regardless of the constitution. Significantly, having tried and failed to change the constitution in relation to key articles concerning both the eligibility for the office of president and the requirements for constitutional amendments, Suu Kyi in October said that she expects to lead the country even if she cannot be president.  As she put it: “I’ve made it quite clear that if the NLD wins elections and we form a government, I’m going to be the leader of that government whether or not I’m the president.” Whether this applies only in the case of the NLD winning an absolute majority or also in the case of a hung parliament in which the NLD would have the most seats is not clear.

For now it is also not clear how Aung San Suu Kyi would formally lead an incoming government without being elected president. Some speculate that the post of prime minister, not foreseen by the constitution, could yet be created to accommodate her. Others believe that the incoming parliament might table constitutional amendments before the formation of a new government which might still allow Aung San Suu Kyi to assume the highest office. Be that as it may, her statement has the potential to raise questions and concerns among the wider political elites. And while the Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has vowed to respect the outcome of the elections, the military may well prefer that Aung San Suu Kyi not achieve a resounding electoral victory that would allow her and the NLD to push the political envelope in ways that are potentially at odds with the constitutional status quo, which the military is keen to protect.

Indeed, beyond the question of how Aung San Suu Kyi might want to formalize her leadership, one could also foresee a situation in which on the back of an election victory and notwithstanding her avowed principle of not seeking revenge, she might quickly challenge the military on the contested ground of the its role in politics – regardless of the veto that appointed military representatives can bring to bear on constitutional amendments. The current commander-in-chief, Min Aung Hlaing, certainly seems to have appreciated that President Thein Sein has in effect operated as a buffer between the military leadership and the NLD for the last few years. In short, there is some uncertainty about whether or not greater political tensions will manifest themselves in the aftermath of the November elections. Such a development would likely be of concern to all those observing Myanmar’s elections as a drawn-out and democratic process.

Assessment of the Elections

While it is obviously premature for any definitive assessment of whether the elections qualify as free and fair as promised by the government, serious concerns have already been raised about the credibility of the 2015 elections. One standout issue about which the NLD, among others, has protested vehemently to the Union Election Commission (UEC) concerns the accuracy of voter lists. In this context, concern has not just focused on the UEC placing the onus on eligible voters to examine personal information on the digitalized voter list, but also on recurrent errors in the voter lists. Many eligible voters appear to have used the voter list display period to request inclusion of, or amendments to, their entries. But by some estimates many thousands of unsuspecting voters may yet find themselves locked out of the November electoral contest.

At least from the perspective of outside observers, the credibility of the elections has also already been partially undermined by the disenfranchisement of white-card holders that were still allowed to participate in the 2010 elections. This has affected in particular – albeit not exclusively – self-identifying Rohingya. Notably, the Union Election Commission also disqualified a number of candidates, several from Muslim parties and mostly on the grounds of citizenship, including the member of parliament for Buthidaung, Shwe Maung.

In contrast to the 2010 elections, those organized this coming November are being scrutinized on the ground by an array of local and international election observers. The European Union, for instance, is sending analysts, long-term and short-term observers, as well as EU parliamentarians and diplomats to assess the elections. The Carter Center is also involved in long-term field observation, and many more organizations are actively engaged. Collectively, the election observers will cover the entire electoral process, including the election campaign, the voting, and post-election developments. Their findings are likely to have implications not merely for Myanmar’s international reputation but also for some Naypyidaw’s key bilateral relationships.

Impact on U.S.-Myanmar Relations

For the Obama administration much is at stake with the November elections. Since 2011, the administration has stood by the side of a reforming Myanmar; it has committed both resources and political energy to guide Naypyidaw’s reform measures, to improve livelihoods, to strengthen civil society, and to build democratic mindsets. There is no doubt that the Obama presidency would want to remain heavily invested politically in Myanmar’s continued political transition if it can. The Obama administration ultimately wants a prosperous, stable and democratic Myanmar.

Significantly, the administration’s pragmatic Burma policy remains controversial in Washington where a network consisting of members of Congress, NGO representatives and interested individuals has continued to raise concerns about a number of developments in the country, such as the continued fighting and humanitarian situation in some of Myanmar’s borderlands, the significant challenges in Rakhine State, growing Buddhist extremism and the politicization of religion, as well as the unwillingness of the military to surrender its political role. The Obama administration is very conscious of these concerns, which arguably have in part undermined Washington’s claim that Myanmar’s political transition might serve as a model but have also restrained its enthusiasm for deeper engagement. In an attempt to maintain some political leverage over the Thein Sein government, Congress has repeatedly ruled out military engagement beyond certain limited exchanges and training programs focused on issues such as human rights and civil-military relations, and the administration has not strongly resisted this position. 

U.S. efforts, however, to help prepare Myanmar’s people and government capacity for the elections have been significant. For instance, the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, and International Foundation for Electoral Systems have all provided assistance, be it by providing training for election monitoring and campaigning skills or by offering technical assistance. Several high-ranking officials have travelled to Myanmar to clearly outline the administration’s concerns and expectations regarding the elections.  Further advances in U.S.-Myanmar relations will hinge on credible elections and an orderly and transparent post-election period leading up to government formation.

That said, from what administration officials have indicated, the crucial yardstick for the U.S. government in relation to whether it will deem the elections satisfactory will be the conclusion that the people of Myanmar will themselves reach about the credibility and legitimacy of their elections. There is thus the potential for bilateral relations to experience a setback should a broad base of domestic actors and election observers ultimately conclude that the overall election process was significantly flawed. Conversely, it is possible that elections and the post-election outcome could help boost the bilateral relationship. The administration seems to be hoping for this. In such a scenario, Washington should be expected to think again about how exactly to foster a possible limited security partnership with Naypyidaw that would be acceptable to the government in power.

Impact on China-Myanmar Relations

The election outcome will also be watched with significant interest in the People’s Republic of China, not least because the so-called pauk-phaw (cousin or kin) relationship between Myanmar and China has deteriorated dramatically since 2011. Beijing, in particular, is eager to move the relationship forward once more. This will not be easy, as bilateral ties have arguably plummeted to their lowest ebb since the end of the Cold War over the recent military conflict in the Kokang Special Region. This downturn in relations was illustrated in June 2015, when the Chinese People’s Liberation Army staged live military drills on the border with Myanmar in an apparent demonstration of coercive diplomacy in response to instances of the Myanmar military misfiring as it tried to take out rebel army targets. More fundamentally, however, the downturn in relations has manifested in suspicions and resentment that build on perceived Chinese linkages with ethnic armed groups on the shared border.

The November elections and the ensuing politicking will be keenly watched in China for three reasons in particular. First, Beijing will want to know whether the incoming government is prepared to lift the suspension on the multi-billion dollar Myitsone hydroelectric project. This seems unlikely irrespective of who wins the presidency.

Second, China is keen for signals from Myanmar with regard to bilateral cooperation in relation to the One Belt, One Road project. Beijing remains interested in realizing a transportation corridor that would connect Yunnan with the Bay of Bengal at Kyaukphyu, where the Chinese conglomerate CITIC is a contender for the development of the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone. Notably, cooperation on such projects was seemingly not a high priority for the Thein Sein government and future agreements on strategic infrastructure of the kind contemplated may also require further confidence building.

Finally, China will also be watching closely for signs of deepening U.S.-Myanmar relations, while hoping that any new government in Naypyidaw will take Beijing’s geostrategic interests in Myanmar seriously. These concerns may relate especially to a government headed by Aung San Suu Kyi.

However, what China should expect from a new government in Naypyidaw is foreign policy continuity. Myanmar may strengthen relations with Washington if political circumstances allow but in foreign policy terms it will likely want to maintain balanced relations with the major powers, even if the NLD were to form the government. All the main political parties are committed to an independent and non-aligned foreign policy. By implication, while free and fair elections could reinforce the emerging U.S.-Myanmar partnership, China’s leaders may nevertheless continue to find relations with Myanmar more difficult than during the SPDC period, irrespective of who leads Myanmar’s new government.

Challenges for the Incoming Government

Whatever political party wins the election and whoever ultimately leads the next Myanmar government, it is clear that the country will continue to face numerous challenges, internal as well as in its relations with foreign governments. Having signed a partial nationwide ceasefire agreement, negotiators will find the next steps towards a durable peace equally, if not more challenging. Also, policymakers face crucial questions in relation to what national identity they are trying to foster as Myanmar undergoes its political transition. It is somewhat ironic that while the outgoing government has spelled out a long-term vision for more inclusive federal arrangements as far as the recognized ethnic minorities are concerned, it has sent very different signals to the population of self-identifying Rohingya, in particular.

The way things are going, the new government will also have to face up to the possibility that the increasing politicization of religion may yet lead to renewed violence. How it will respond to these and other challenges will inevitably also matter to Myanmar’s foreign friends, helpers and partners. The forthcoming elections are thus only the next, albeit critical, step into what is a somewhat uncertain future.