Japan’s Delicate Balancing Act Toward China

Shortly after Prime Minister Kishida Fumio delivered his first post-election policy address before the Diet on December 6, Japan faced its first foreign policy challenge. As the number of the countries that announced a “diplomatic boycott” of the February 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing grew, especially after the U.S. announcement on December 6, “to boycott, or not to boycott” became a significant policy decision that could have a lasting impact on the Kishida government’s foreign policy.

Kishida himself has so far not made a formal announcement. Following the Biden administration’s announcement of a U.S. “diplomatic boycott” of the Beijing Games, meaning the United States will not send any government officials to attend, Kishida told a brief press gaggle on December 7 that his government would make its own decision based on a “comprehensive assessment” of various factors. He reiterated his government’s position most recently during a press conference on December 21. While there have been speculative media reports that suggest Japan will ultimately decide against sending any cabinet-level politicians or senior government officials to the upcoming Winter Olympics, it is questionable whether Japan will use the language “diplomatic boycott” when it is time to make a formal announcement.

In fact, what to do with the Beijing Olympics is a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” issue for Kishida. After the U.S. announcement on December 6, China reacted strongly, warning that it would take “countermeasures” against the U.S. and other countries that follow suit. As 2022 marks the landmark 50th anniversary of China-Japan diplomatic normalization, Japan does not want to spoil the chance to re-adjust its China policy to one that will, in Kishida’s words, “pursue a constructive and stable relationship in which we insist on the issues that we must and yet pursue opportunities to tackle on our shared concerns while continue to urge China to behave responsibly.” The appointment of Hayashi Yoshimasa as foreign minister is considered a signal of Kishida’s intention to fine-tune his government’s China policy toward that end.

At the same time, Kishida also identified upholding a liberal international order that places a premium on universal norms and values such as human rights and rule of law, including efforts to uphold a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” as the core foreign policy principle for his government. In this context, he identified economic security, including the protection of advanced technologies, as one of his policy priorities and has also ordered the revision of Japan’s National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and Mid-Term Defense Program. Kishida even created two new positions: minster-at-large in charge of economic security and special advisor to prime minister on human rights issues. The creation of these positions as well as the appointees for them – Kobayashi Takayuki, a former Finance Ministry official who also previously served as parliamentary vice minister for defense, to the former and former Defense Minister Gen Nakatani to the latter – have been taken as a sign of Kishida’s seriousness about tackling these issues. Needless to say, Japan’s concerns vis-à-vis China on these fronts loom large both in these appointments and the upcoming revision of key national security documents.

Kishida is also facing mounting pressure from politicians across party lines who insist on Japan following the U.S. and Australia to equip the government with the ability to impose sanctions out of human rights concerns against China. The total silence from Gen, who chaired the bipartisan parliamentary group that is pushing for such legislation prior to his appointment as the special advisor to the prime minister on human rights issues, has already drawn criticisms as a sign of Kishida’s reluctance to put his words into concrete actions.

Further complicating Kishida’s effort is the special emphasis that the Biden administration has placed on human rights issues. The United States had already enacted what is commonly referred to as the “Uyghur Human Rights Act” during the Trump administration and imposed sanctions against China, directly citing the Chinese government’s oppression of Muslim minorities in Xinjang. The Biden administration not only upholds its predecessor’s legislative action against China, but also took a step further by announcing its diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics to send an unambiguous message to Beijing that Washington takes this issue very seriously. Kishida has an incentive to align his country’s position with that of the U.S. in order to gain credibility as a reliable diplomatic partner for Biden. If Kishida does not act decisively on this issue, his credibility on his announced policy priorities, particularly the ones associated with China, can be called into question.

Japanese public opinion is divided over whether Japan should resort to a diplomatic boycott of the Beijing games. The most recent opinion polls conducted by conservative Sankei Shimbun on December 18-19 show that, while over 60 percent of respondents have consistently supported the Kishida government since its inauguration, only 45.5 percent support a diplomatic boycott with 44.1 percent against it. In light of such circumstances, all eyes are on not only what Kishida will decide but the process behind the decision-making and how he communicates his decision: it will likely be seen as a tone-setter for his government’s foreign policy.