Governing From Weakness: The LDP Under Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru

For much of the postwar era, the Liberal Democratic Party has governed Japan from a position of legislative strength. But today, Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru must lead his country with a minority coalition, alongside the LDP’s longstanding junior partner Komeito. His Cabinet’s public approval rating is low: 40 percent according to a recent Kyodo poll, up from 32 percent a month ago. Within the Diet, the opposition has control over the critical Budget Committee, suggesting that Ishiba’s first trial will be funding next year’s priorities.

The contrast between Ishiba’s weakness at home and the strength of his predecessors could not be starker. An LDP-Komeito supermajority in the Diet since 2012 had facilitated significant changes in Japanese security and foreign policy. Former prime ministers Abe Shinzo and Kishida Fumio used this domestic political strength to develop Japan’s strategic influence on the global stage.

Japan’s weakened political leadership comes at a difficult time globally. Ishiba has far greater volatility to consider as he develops Japan’s ties abroad. Two wars now rage, one in Europe and the other in the Middle East, with no end yet in sight. Donald Trump is returning to power in the United States, bringing with him unpredictability in trade and security priorities. China continues to be Japan’s greatest strategic challenge and military pressures from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) around Japan’s air and maritime region have grown. North Korea is demonstrating the benefits of a new defense arrangement with Russia, and there is concern in Northeast Asia that this will translate into considerable technological advantage to Kim Jong Un’s nuclear aims.

If Japan’s prime minister must spend most of his time negotiating with opposition parties at home, Japan may be a less focused internationally.

Fifth Time Is the Charm

When Kishida announced he was stepping down from office, he called for a “fresh face” for his party, someone who could turn the page on the scandals that plagued the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Kishida also referenced the talent within the LDP, asking his party to put together a “dream team” of policymakers up to the task of tackling Japan’s considerable challenges in the years ahead. Kishida’s withdrawal from consideration for party president opened the door to the largest field of candidates for LDP leadership in history.

Ishiba was quick to raise his hand for what would be his fifth attempt, and he said, his last, to lead Japan’s conservative party. He announced his bid on August 24 and stated that as leader he would return to politics that respected the rules, defend Japan – its territory and its people – protect and revitalize the countryside, and ensure a bright future. His background as a defense expert was amply displayed during the campaign.

Ishiba’s popularity with the public and importantly with the grassroots members of the LDP was his biggest advantage. For example, an Asahi Shimbun poll during the campaign showed Ishiba attracting 21 percent of the voters overall and 23 percent of LDP supporters. Only Koizumi Junichiro could compete with similar numbers in the double digits. LDP rules include regional LDP members in the first round of voting, alongside sitting national legislators.

Eight others joined the race to become party president, and it was an impressive line-up. Many had served in the Cabinet with governance experience, and some had held leading positions within the party. Interestingly, many had experience studying or working in the United States. Several had considerable foreign and security policy experience while others had deep economic policy knowledge.

Ishiba was a finalist for the leadership of the LDP. Yet he had a serious challenger: Takaichi Sanae, a self-proclaimed protégé of Abe Shinzo and a serious social conservative with clearly defined views on bolstering Japan’s military power. In fact, to the surprise of many, Takaichi came out on top in the first round, with an advantage not only with Diet members but also with the grassroots members of the party. Ishiba came in second.

Party rules then required a runoff vote between the two several hours later, and this round included only sitting legislators. The alignments of senior policy leaders began to shift, and Ishiba garnered the support of former prime ministers Kishida and Suga Yoshihide while Takaichi was endorsed by former prime minister Aso Taro. The final vote was close, 215 to 194, revealing a serious divide within the LDP over the choice.

A Punishing Defeat at the Polls

Ishiba’s first decision upon becoming party president was to consider when to dissolve the Diet, Japan’s parliament, and hold an election for the lower house. During televised debates, Ishiba had emphasized the need for the LDP to oversee the budget debates in the Diet before going to the polls. Yet within days, others within the party persuaded him that the LDP had the most advantage by heading to the polls earlier. On September 30, Ishiba conceded to the party’s experts and announced the election would be held on October 27.

Going into the elections, the LDP held 259 seats in the lower house. Twelve members of the party, however, had been expelled or resigned due to the slush fund scandal. Moreover, public polling revealed a decline in support for the party. The conventional wisdom going into the election was that the LDP would receive an electoral setback.

But the extent of that setback was devastating for the ruling coalition. The LDP lost 68 seats and the Komeito lost eight. Together, they came out with only 215 seats, below the 233 needed for a simple majority and far below the 261 required for a stable majority, one that would allow the LDP to control committee chairmanships in the lower house. The head of the LDP’s election effort, Koizumi Shinjiro, himself a contender for party leadership and a popular younger member of the party, resigned.

Ishiba did not. Instead, he began outreach to smaller parties in an effort to corral the votes needed to be elected prime minister. The Democratic Party for the People (DPFP), led by Tamaki Yuichiro, became the primary hope for Ishiba. Even before the election, the DPFP and LDP had been in conversation about legislative cooperation. Tamaki argued for greater economic assistance to struggling Japanese households by raising the poverty line and by offering subsidies for energy costs. Tamaki was also approached by Noda Yoshihiko, the leader of the main opposition party, the constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), which picked up considerable seats in the lower house election.

Tamaki was invited by both Ishiba and Noda to join in formal alignment, but Tamaki had no interest in joining a coalition government. He chose to support neither as prime minister, but this by default allowed Ishiba to win the most votes. Tamaki put forward his terms to the LDP: He wanted to negotiate on tax relief and energy subsidies for households that were struggling economically. With 28 votes, the DPFP was small, but Tamaki was shrewd enough to recognize that his party was situated well and could make or break the minority government’s agenda. Public opinion polls also showed that Japanese welcomed this type of policy coalition approach.

On November 11, a special session of the Diet voted to select Ishiba Shigeru as Japan’s 102nd prime minister, but the LDP is going to have to work hard to govern. On the same day, the Japanese media revealed that Tamaki, who had skillfully maneuvered his small party into a position of considerable leverage, had been having an affair. Tamaki acknowledged the affair in a press conference that evening but managed to escape stepping down from party leadership. The bargaining over the tax breaks for the less well-off would continue.

Ishiba’s Foreign Policy Challenges

Over the next year, Ishiba will face several important challenges. The first is his relationship with the incoming U.S. president, Donald Trump. Many countries are looking to see what a second Trump administration’s priorities might be. Trade policy, the U.S. relationship with China, and decision making on the war in Ukraine are high on Japan’s list of concerns.

The Japan-U.S. alliance is a top priority for Ishiba, who is still looking for an early opportunity to meet with the president-elect after failing to secure a sit-down on his way back from the G-20 summit in Brazil. Abe’s relationship with Trump during his first administration is seen as the model for Ishiba, but the world has changed greatly and so too have the stated goals of a second term Trump.

U.S. policy on tariffs could have a serious impact on Japan’s economy, either directly or indirectly. During Trump’s second presidency, Japan will also need to renegotiate its Host Nation Support Agreement with Washington, opening the door for greater demand for financial support for U.S. forces in Japan. But the biggest challenge will be deepening the military command and control coordination between the two forces and developing a stronger link between the two countries in defense technology innovation, two initiatives begun under the Biden administration. Chinese, Russian, and North Korean military pressure on Japan continues to grow, making alliance cooperation with the United States a priority for Ishiba.

A second foreign policy priority for Japan is its relationship with China. Several irritants have intervened in bilateral diplomacy. The first is the Chinese decision to impose a ban on all seafood products from Japan due to the release of treated water from the failed Fukushima Daiichi reactor, despite the International Atomic Energy Agency’s conclusion that the water had been sufficiently treated to safe levels of radiation.

More recently, the murder of a Japanese child on his way to school in Shenzhen also raised tensions between the two governments. Japanese companies allowed their employees living in China to return home afterward as concerns over their safety peaked. While the Chinese government acknowledged the circumstances of the violence, they claimed it was a random act and Beijing has yet to outline steps to protect Japanese who live in China.

Ishiba met with Premier Li Qiang on the sidelines of the ASEAN meeting in October, agreeing that the time had come to focus on improving bilateral ties. A visit by Li to Japan in 2025 is being considered. Ishiba also met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Peru on the sidelines of the APEC meeting, and a similarly positive tone seemed to characterize their conversation about taking steps to improve Sino-Japanese ties.

Third, Ishiba will want to build on his predecessors’ progress in forging security and trade ties with others in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. Japan now pursues security cooperation with a host of Indo-Pacific partners, including Australia, the Philippines, South Korea, and India. Japan has begun to offer security assistance to Indo-Pacific nations and is increasingly a sought-after partner for the ASEAN nations as they develop their maritime capacities.

Japan’s ties with NATO have also expanded, especially in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Here U.S. decisionmaking on support for Ukraine will have an impact on Japan’s diplomacy, as will any moves to reduce or eliminate sanctions against Russia. Russian military activity around Japan as well as Russian sanctions on Japanese individuals and organizations have grown in the wake of Japan’s participation in the G-7 sanctions regime.

European partners are also critical defense technology partners for Japan. Tokyo has a new initiative with the United Kingdom and Italy to build a next-generation fighter. Maintaining momentum in these partnerships will be critical for Ishiba, and in fact, he just sat down with U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer to establish an economic 2+2 in anticipation of potential U.S. protectionism.

Finally, 2025 is the 60th anniversary of the establishment of Japan’s diplomatic ties with the Republic of Korea. This will be an important occasion for Ishiba to demonstrate Japan’s continued desire for better ties between the Japanese and Korean people. Immediately after assuming the leadership of the LDP, Ishiba made it clear that he intended to continue Kishida’s “summit diplomacy” with South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol.

The trilateral agenda with the United States has also assumed far greater priority for Japan. All three allies now see their future strategic cooperation as indispensable to their own security and to the global rules-based order. New trilateral military exercises, dubbed Freedom Edge, contribute to the effort to build trust and to enhance deterrence. Ishiba met with Yoon at the ASEAN summit and then held a trilateral meeting with Yoon and U.S. President Joe Biden on the sidelines of APEC. Designing an anniversary agenda that improves Japan-South Korea bilateral ties in the coming year will be important to sustaining this momentum.

What’s Ahead

Despite the brutal election results, Ishiba has hung on to his position as Japan’s prime minister. But he will need to govern now by negotiating with the DPFP or others at each step of the way. The LDP, Komeito, and DPFP have just concluded economic stimulus talks. The income tax threshold will be increased from 1.04 million yen (around $6,000) along with a reduction in taxes on gas. Other basic household expenses could be subsidized as well. The agreement also suggests a three-party agreement on the supplementary budget by the end of this year. How high the tax threshold will go depends in large part on Tamaki’s strength rather than Ishiba’s.

The next hurdle will be Ishiba’s effort to negotiate with opposition parties over the next year’s government budget. Japan’s fiscal year begins in April and by then, Ishiba will need to find common ground once more with the DPFP so that he can fund his government. But discussions leading up to that point will also require considerable finesse. The main opposition party, the CDP, now chairs the Budget Committee, and thus the LDP will be hard-pressed to shape the overall spending goals. Social welfare spending as well as defense spending will undoubtedly be two points of contention. Expect the DPFP to be, once again, in a good position to influence the outcome. Ishiba will be vulnerable to those in his own party who might chafe at the extent to which their policy goals are sacrificed for a budget compromise.

Looming large over Ishiba will be next summer’s upper house election. Once more, the LDP will have to demonstrate to voters that it deserves their trust. Political funding legislation is still being refined, and Ishiba has promised full transparency for his party. A new law is in the making. His campaign promise that the LDP will follow the rules will now need to be fulfilled, and the opposition parties too will need to be willing to accept full transparency in their own fundraising.

Ishiba’s fate will, of course, be tied to his ability to navigate this difficult maze of compromise. Fighting for the middle ground on policy from a minority position is perhaps the hardest challenge of all in a parliamentary system. And Japan’s opposition parties will not want to allow Ishiba a win prior to the upper house election. Ishiba will also be challenged from within his own party. The threat of a no confidence vote will hang over him for much of the first half of 2025. Today in Tokyo some wonder if he can survive the budget talks, while most do not expect him to make it past the upper house election.

Expectations are high that Japan will continue to play a leadership role in coalitions of the U.S. and its allies, of the G-7, and of the Indo-Pacific, including the Quad. Ishiba’s ability to navigate politics at home will have a strong bearing on Japan’s partners, and on Japan’s ability to cope with a far more unpredictable United States.