Kelly Grieco

The previous issue of The Diplomat Magazine highlighted some of the ways U.S. policy impacts countries in the Asia-Pacific, from security to economics, even domestic politics. Countries in the region were thus watching closely as the results from the U.S. presidential election rolled in last month.

In this interview, Kelly A. Grieco, a senior fellow with the Reimagining U.S. Security Program at the Stimson Center in Washington, D.C., explains the reactions in the Asia-Pacific to Donald Trump’s reelection, after a hiatus of four years.

While the jury is still out on which policy directions the incoming administration will ultimately pursue, Trump himself is now “a known entity – both his policies and personality traits,” Grieco tells The Diplomat. “There is no sense of shock or crisis this time around. U.S. allies are resigned to a second Trump presidency.”

How has Donald Trump’s reelection been received in Asia by U.S. allies versus rivals like China?

After Donald Trump won eight years ago, the world reacted with a mixture of shock, dismay, and anxiety. U.S. allies scrambled, holding emergency meetings to prepare for Trump’s “America First” approach to foreign policy and trade. Japan and South Korea were rattled by his claims on the campaign trail that the two allies were free riding on U.S. security guarantees and should pay more for the U.S. forces they host. There was a large measure of uncertainty as to what the future would hold.

There is no sense of shock or crisis this time around. U.S. allies are resigned to a second Trump presidency. Australian, Japanese, and South Korean policymakers, determined not to be caught unprepared for Trump 2.0, hedged their bets over the last year by working to arrange meetings with Trump’s inner circle. In April, Japanese former Prime Minister Taro Aso [at the time, the vice president of the ruling LDP] met with the then-Republican nominee and former president at Trump Tower in New York City. Australia sent its ambassador to mingle with Trump advisers in Milwaukee during the Republican convention in July.

Trump is also a known entity – both his policies and personality traits. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol is practicing his golf swing again, in preparation for the return of “golf diplomacy” under President-elect Trump. The prospect of increased pressure from the Trump White House on trade, as well as a return of his erratic dealings with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, increases concerns in allied capitals. Yet there is no sense of panic.

The view from Manila is a bit more complicated. Philippine officials have expressed confidence that the alliance with the United States will remain “unshakeable” under the incoming administration. But Trump’s election has almost certainly created some anxiety about the future of relations. After years of strained relations under his predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. sought closer defense ties with the Biden White House, as a bulwark against China’s territorial ambitions in the South China Sea.

Over the last two years, Manila has waged a very public campaign of “naming and shaming” China’s harassment of its coastguard and naval vessels. The Marcos administration pursued this “transparency initiative” with reassurance from President Biden, in writing, that American security guarantees extend to the South China Sea. The incoming administration might revisit this commitment, asking what the United States stands to gain from risking war with China over uninhabited reefs and rocks in the South China Sea. Of course, with several China hawks nominated for top positions in his administration, Trump could also double down on these alliance commitments.

China is taking mostly a “wait and see approach.” President Xi Jinping, while in Peru to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, offered an olive branch to the incoming Trump administration. “China is ready to work with the new U.S. administration to maintain communication, expand cooperation and manage differences,” Xi said, advising the way forward was to “keep exploring the right way for two major countries to get along well with each other.”

Xi also issued a warning on Beijing’s red lines – the Taiwan question, democracy and human rights, China’s path and system, and the country’s right to development. “They must not be challenged,” Xi warned, adding, “These are the most important guardrails and safety nets for China-U.S. relations.” Beijing is signaling that it is ready to confront whatever the Trump White House has in store.

At this admittedly early juncture, what do we know about the president-elect's policy plans regarding Asia? What can we glean from his choices for critical positions, such as secretary of state or secretary of defense?

So far, President-elect Trump has surrounded himself with China hawks, with the notable exception of Elon Musk. Both Senator Marco Rubio, whom he nominated to become secretary of state, and Representative Michael Waltz, his pick for national security adviser, have advocated for a tough China policy. “The threat that will define this century is China,” Rubio said in a speech in 2022, alleging Beijing had engaged in decades of duplicity, as it hid its “true ambitions to remake the global order and become the world’s most powerful nation.”

Both Rubio and Waltz have long been outspoken critics of China’s human rights record, with Waltz calling, in 2021, for the United States to boycott the Beijing Winter Olympics over China’s poor human rights record, and Rubio co-sponsoring the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act in 2021, which bars the import of all goods from Xinjiang, on the assumption that everything there is produced using forced labor. Rubio was also among a small group of U.S. lawmakers sanctioned by China in 2020 in retaliation for U.S. sanctions on Chinese officials over allegations of genocide in China’s Xinjiang region and violations of civil liberties in Hong Kong. Still, it could have been worse for China: former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, previously rumored to be in line for a top job, has called for the Chinese people to overturn the regime.

Trump’s nominee for defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, is more of an unknown. He seems far more focused on culture-war battles than Chinese defense issues, with his calls to fire “woke” generals and opposition to women serving in combat roles. Hegseth has voiced concerns about the scale of the China challenge, similar to Rubio and others on Trump’s incoming national security team. For example, he recently claimed China “is building an army specifically dedicated to defeating the United States of America.” Hegseth’s few public comments about China seem to suggest that he will adopt a hardline stance on China, much like Rubio and Waltz.

The one exception thus far is Elon Musk, tapped, alongside Vivek Ramaswamy, to run a new Department of Government Efficiency. Musk, the CEO of Tesla and SpaceX, has extensive business ties in China, and raised eyebrows in 2022 when he suggested Beijing and Taipei reach a “reasonably palatable” arrangement, one that would make Taiwan a “special administrative zone” much like Hong Kong. Musk also stands to lose financially if Trump makes good on his campaign promise to impose 60 percent tariffs on all Chinese goods. Against this backdrop, Musk could be a lone voice and a moderating influence on Trump amid a lineup of advisers set on a path of confrontation with Beijing.

The Biden administration made an effort to institutionalize a number of minilateral groups in the Indo-Pacific, such as the Japan-South Korea-United States trilateral, in part to insulate them from unpredictability and rapid reversals (and not only on the United States’ part). How much staying power do these groups actually have, should an incoming administration (whether Trump or a new leader in South Korea or Japan) show less interest?

Over the last four years, the Biden administration sought to build what it called a “latticework,” linking together U.S. allies and partners through a mix of bilateral and minilateral arrangements, including agreements to create the trilateral security partnership – known as AUKUS – among the governments of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States in September 2021, and deepen U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral ties in August 2023. Biden’s team also sought to embed these agreements into formal structures and processes, including through annual leaders’ summits and ministerial meetings, formal intelligence-sharing arrangements, or establishing a secretariat to coordinate joint cooperation. By institutionalizing these relationships – what some have called “Trump-proofing” – the White House and many U.S. allies believe it will be harder for the incoming administration to scrap or restructure these agreements.

I’m skeptical that these efforts will succeed if Trump is determined to shift policy direction. For one, the level of institutionalization is relatively low, particularly compared to deep and formal security arrangements like NATO in Europe. For another, these institutional mechanisms only stand a chance of restraining Trump if he engages with these trilaterals. If he chooses to skip the leaders’ summits or reverses export control exemptions, he could effectively make these trilaterals a lot less productive, if not altogether irrelevant. I doubt that Trump is sold on these agreements. In his mind, AUKUS and the U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilaterals are likely viewed as Biden initiatives and “bad deals” for the United States.

Trump’s more skeptical approach toward alliances and minilateral security arrangements raises a larger question: How can his administration take a hard line on China and succeed without allied and partner support? The United States cannot effectively counter Chinese power and influence without countries granting needed access to military bases in the region or multinational support for export controls on advanced semiconductors and other critical technologies. The Trump administration can have a tough-on-China policy, or it can have a tough-on-allies policy, but it probably cannot have both. This would be a difficult policy needle to thread for any administration, but Trump’s unpredictability and lack of diplomatic finesse could make it that much harder. 

While on the campaign trail, Trump sparked some alarm in Taiwan when he repeatedly responded to questions about the U.S. defense of Taiwan by accusing the island of “stealing” jobs in the semiconductor industry and demanding “insurance” payments. Yet during his first term, the Trump administration made a point of advancing Taiwan-U.S. ties, whether through arms sales or official exchanges. Should Taiwan be worried about a second Trump term?

Trump’s approach to Taiwan could cut several ways. Many of Trump’s China hawk advisers are also Taiwan backers, suggesting the administration might strengthen political and military support for the island. Trump’s own “America First” outlook, however, suggests he could take U.S. policy in a more transactional direction.

In an April interview, when asked whether the United States should defend Taiwan if China invades, Trump responded, “I wouldn’t want to give away any negotiating abilities by giving information like that to any report.” His answer suggests that he views the Taiwan issue mainly in transactional terms, and is willing to defend or trade away Taiwan depending on what he sees as the best deal for the United States. This is of course Taipei’s main worry: Trump might be willing to sacrifice the island to make some kind of economic deal with China.

Trump’s position on defending Taiwan is thus unknown, but that is not necessarily a bad thing. In fact, it is in keeping with the traditional U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” – a policy Biden undermined when he said on numerous occasions that the United States would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack, including with the use of U.S. military forces. This return to strategic ambiguity could help to reassure Beijing of Washington’s continued commitment to the long-standing One China Policy and possibly reduce tensions with China over the Taiwan issue.

There is also a warning here for Taipei. Taiwanese leaders have long framed the case for why the United States should defend Taiwan in terms of shared democratic values and its dominant role in manufacturing advanced semiconductors – or what Taiwan’s former President Tsai Ing-wen called “democracy chips.” Those arguments will not hold much water with Trump. Yet, after Trump’s win, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te emphasized the “longstanding Taiwan-U.S. partnership, built on shared values and interests” in his congratulatory message to the president-elect. Taipei will have to figure out the most compelling argument for Trump if it wants continued American backing under his presidency.

Given Trump’s demonstrated preference for tariffs, will his administration spell the end of Biden’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework? How will a second Trump term impact the United States’ economic approach to the Asia-Pacific, which is generally viewed as the weakest point of U.S. strategy in the region?

The United States has been out of the free trade business – or at least the business of signing new free trade agreements – for some time now. It is a head scratcher, because the United States stands to gain significantly from a continuation of liberal trade policies. Yet both political parties have turned against the global free trade model, adopting more protectionist economic agendas.

Biden’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) – which addressed concerns around supply-chain resilience, infrastructure and clean energy, tax evasion and corruption, and rules and regulations for digital trade – was no substitute for the market access countries in the region, especially those in Southeast Asia, seek to offset their dependence on Chinese markets. Whether Trump continues with IPEF or not may be beside the point. In a region where many countries value economic ties more than traditional security cooperation and count China as their largest trading partner, the United States lacks a credible trade policy to compete.

This will almost certainly not change under Trump, who has threatened to impose not only 60 percent tariffs on all Chinese goods but also tariffs of 10 to 20 percent on imports from other countries, including U.S. allies. These threats are more likely than not a negotiating tactic to secure better trade deals abroad. But Trump has long favored tariffs, and, when last in the White House, he slapped tariffs on more than $550 billion in Chinese imports. He may well do it again.

But unlike four years ago, China is better prepared to fight back. China has reduced its reliance on American imports, particularly U.S. agricultural goods, and built alternative trade networks with the Global South. Beijing is not looking for a fight, particularly with its weak economy, but it also is not nearly as vulnerable to broad tariffs as Trump clearly believes, even if its options to retaliate are quite limited. As important, these measures could have the effect of pushing some U.S. allies and partners closer to China, particularly if China diverts more trade to Europe.

One of the biggest areas of foreign policy difference between Trump and Biden relates to the Ukraine war, which Trump has pledged to end immediately (likely meaning a deal on terms favorable to Russia). Given that U.S. allies like Japan and South Korea have directly tied the Ukraine war to their own security concerns in Asia, would a decrease in U.S. support for Ukraine under Trump negatively impact U.S. relationships in the Asia-Pacific?

I hear this argument in Washington all the time. If the United States pulls back from a region or ends a commitment elsewhere, some claim, U.S. allies – including those in the Indo-Pacific – will no longer believe America’s security commitments are credible. These fears are overblown.

What matters in credibility calculations are the capabilities the United States can bring to bear and the issues at stake in a given situation. Reputations matter in international relations, but they are not the only – or even necessarily the most important – factor in these calculations. Japanese leaders like to say that “Ukraine today is Asia tomorrow.” But the reality is that Ukraine is not Japan – not only is the latter a treaty ally but the United States has far more at stake in preventing Chinese hegemony in Asia than is the case in the war in Ukraine. These are the hard cold realities.

Indeed, to honor its treaty commitments to allies in the Indo-Pacific, the United States will need to prioritize the Chinese threat and shift resources from Europe and the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific.