Why China Isn’t Bothered by North Korean Soldiers Joining the Russia-Ukraine War

In mid-November, China’s President Xi Jinping visited Peru and Brazil for two international summits: the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Meeting in Lima and the G-20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro. While there, several of Xi’s sideline meetings with other national leaders were focused on something happening thousands of miles away from South America: North Korea’s deployment of troops to the Russian front in the war against Ukraine.

Xi met with South Korea President Yoon Suk-yeol in Lima on November 17. Yoon told his Chinese counterpart, “I hope that South Korea and China will cooperate to promote stability and peace in the region in response to North Korea’s continued provocations, the war in Ukraine and military cooperation between Russia and North Korea.”

Reports that over 10,000 North Korea soldiers are in Russia – and specifically in Kursk, where Ukraine’s military has had a foothold since August – also featured prominently in the conversation between Xi and outgoing U.S. President Joe Biden on November 16. According to the U.S. readout, “President Biden condemned the deployment of thousands of DPRK troops to Russia, a dangerous expansion of Russia’s unlawful war against Ukraine with serious consequences for both European and Indo-Pacific peace and security.” (DPRK is an abbreviation of North Korea’s formal name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.)

Sullivan, Biden’s national security adviser, expanded on that in remarks to the media after the Biden-Xi summit. “President Biden pointed out that the PRC’s [People’s Republic of China’s] publicly stated position with respect to the war in Ukraine is there should be no escalation or no broadening of the conflict, and the introduction of DPRK troops runs fourscore against that,” Sullivan said. “... So, it’s not a sufficient answer to simply say, ‘Well, that’s up to these other countries.  There’s nothing we can really do about it.’”

Sullivan warned that the presence of North Korean troops on the Russia-Ukraine battlefield “is a deeply dangerous development… [that is] likely to enhance the possibility of provocative behavior by the DPRK.”

Despite the diplomatic push to pressure Xi on the issue, China’s response to North Korea’s military deployment to Russia continues to be the foreign policy equivalent of a shrug emoji.

In the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s daily press briefings, ministry spokespeople have repeatedly declined to comment on the issue. First, they denied any knowledge of such a deployment; now, with the evidence overwhelming, spokespeople simply insist that it’s none of China’s business. “The DPRK and Russia are two independent sovereign states, and how to develop bilateral relations is a matter for themselves,” spokesperson Lin Jian said on November 1. “China is not aware of the specifics of bilateral exchanges and cooperation between the DPRK and Russia.” 

Saying that North Korea and Russia, as “independent sovereign states,” have free rein to tighten military cooperation as they see fit is markedly different from China’s perspective on, say, the Philippines and the United States – also “two independent sovereign states,” but whose bilateral defense relations China feels free to criticize.

For example, on November 18 – two days after Xi shrugged off Biden’s concern over North Korean troops in Russia – the United States and Philippines signed a new military intelligence sharing agreement. China’s response was markedly different from its hands-off take on North Korea-Russia military cooperation:

No military agreement, or defense and security cooperation, in whatever form, should target any third party or harm the interests of any third party. Nor should it undermine regional peace or exacerbate regional tensions. The only right choice for safeguarding national security and regional peace and stability is to uphold good-neighborliness and friendship and maintain strategic independence.

This entire paragraph could very easily apply to Russia-North Korea cooperation in Ukraine, which directly “targets a third party” and “exacerbates regional tensions” – even more so given that Russia and Ukraine are actively at war, while China and the Philippines are not.

In another comment on potential U.S. military sales to the Philippines, Lin chastized the Philippines for “enabling a country outside the region to fuel tensions and antagonism in this region, and incite geopolitical confrontation and arms race.” The same could be said of North Korea – “a country outside the region” of Eastern Europe – selling arms to Russia to continue its war against Ukraine.

The real issue, clearly, is not that China legitimately thinks it has no right to comment on two other countries’ military cooperation. Rather, it’s that Beijing doesn’t think North Korea’s deployment of troops in a Russian war is a problem.

Xi essentially told Biden as much in their meeting. When the U.S. president suggested that the development would have negative ramifications for China, Xi responded by saying: “China does not allow conflict and turmoil to happen on the Korean Peninsula. It will not sit idly by when its strategic security and core interests are under threat.”

While some more optimistic analysts read this as a warning to Kim Jong Un not to go too far, the real implication is that China doesn’t agree with the U.S. insistence that its interests are being harmed by North Korea-Russia cooperation. China is very much “sitting idly by” as North Korea sends troops to Eastern Europe; the obvious inference from Xi’s remark, then, is that China’s “strategic security and core interests” are not, in fact, being threatened by this development.

Similarly, Xi’s comment that Beijing will not allow “conflict and turmoil” on the Korean Peninsula is more of a warning to the United States and South Korea than to Pyongyang. After all, since the North Korea-U.S. dialogue process fell apart in 2019 China has made it clear that it holds Washington responsible for the deadlock and resulting spike in tensions. Beijing has thus declined to criticize North Korea even for actions that previously sparked ire. After North Korea’s latest ICBM launch, for instance, China’s Foreign Ministry only said that “China noted the reports.”

Beijing not only doesn’t perceive a threat to its interests from North Korea-Russia security cooperation, but may even see itself as benefiting. Russian officials certainly make that case; Russia’s Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu said as much during his visit to China from November 11 to 15 (just days before Biden tried to convince Xi of the opposite perspective).

China-Russia ties are not an alliance but “surpass this form of interstate relations,” Shoigu reportedly told Wang Yi, his Chinese counterpart. And their top priority, Shoigu said, is to “counter the ‘dual containment’ policy directed against Russia and China by the United States and its satellites.” Russia likely had Ukraine in mind as a U.S. “satellite,” but China may consider South Korea to be one as well.

While Wang didn’t explicitly agree with Shoigu’s comment, Chinese officials have made it abundantly clear that they believe the United States is engaged in a containment policy attempting to stymie China’s rise. They see breaking out of this box as a top priority – and that would be easier with friends.

Anyone hoping that China would decry or somehow attempt to stop North Korea’s deployments to Russia should listen to what Wang told Shoigu: “The more complex the international situation and the more external challenges there are, the more important it is for both sides to solidify unity and cooperate to defend common interests.”

In other words, when the going gets tough, China plans to stick even closer to Russia.