The Inner Workings of a Chinese Embassy

China’s global presence is now more significant than ever. Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and other international initiatives, China aims to establish itself as an influential global actor. However, as China expands its footprint abroad, it inevitably exports its domestic political fragmentation.

The Chinese political system is inherently fragmented, shaped by the intersection of vertical structures, composed of ministries and agencies (tiao), and a vast network of horizontal territorial administrations, including provinces, municipalities, counties, and townships (kuai). This complex structure frequently leads to jurisdictional conflicts between the vertical and horizontal systems.

Many of China’s diplomatic challenges stem from its political fragmentation and the central government’s limited ability to control independent actors, such as state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and local governments. For instance, the Yunnan International Power Investment Company, an SOE based in Yunnan, disregarded environmental impact assessments and proceeded with the construction of the Myitsone Dam in Myanmar, resulting in serious environmental issues and local protests. Similarly, the Shanglin government supported its miners in illegally mining gold in Ghana without approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, leading to armed conflicts between local communities and Chinese miners.

Perhaps nothing illustrates the fragmentation of Chinese foreign policy better than its embassies worldwide. While embassies are commonly perceived as unified entities representing their countries abroad, a closer look at China’s embassy system reveals a complex assembly of diverse and sometimes conflicting agencies.

Contrary to the conventional view that embassy staff are primarily Foreign Ministry officials, many personnel in Chinese embassies come from different ministries and agencies in China. In essence, Chinese embassies operate as amalgamations of these distinct and often divergent entities. Reflecting China’s tiao-kuai fragmentation, embassy staff maintain direct relationships with their respective home ministries (tiao) rather than with the embassy as a whole (kuai). They continue to receive their salaries directly from their home ministries in Beijing, reinforcing their loyalty and accountability to those ministries. As a result, embassy staff primarily see their roles as fulfilling assignments from Beijing, while embassy-specific duties take a secondary position and are managed through professional relationships rather than authoritative directives.

This unique structure adds an intriguing layer to the diplomatic landscape, challenging the conventional understanding of embassies as singular and cohesive entities. Understanding the intricate composition of a Chinese embassy sheds light on the multifaceted nature of its operations, where different agencies may have varying priorities and perspectives. This complexity adds an additional dimension to the embassy’s role in foreign affairs, influencing its interactions and engagements on the international stage. This nuanced organizational structure also sheds light on the intricate dynamics within the Chinese political system and its implications for diplomatic representations abroad.

Consequently, the A-level sections within the embassy, which encompass vital areas such as commerce, culture, and the military, functioned as de facto “independent kingdoms” for an extended period. Among these, the Commerce Section stood out for its notable autonomy. Financially detached from the rest of the embassy, it received funds directly from the Commerce Ministry in Beijing. This significant backing allowed the private coffers of the Commerce Section to rival the budget of the entire embassy.

At one embassy (Embassy X) officials from the Commerce Section usually chose to reside in their own separate space rather than within the embassy compound. Notably, this space was often superior to the embassy compound, and the Commerce Section even hired its own service staff to maintain the building. Officials from this section preferred dining in their exclusive establishment and avoided participation in embassy-wide activities.

Consequently, the Commerce Section conducted meetings and made decisions autonomously, occasionally operating behind the ambassador’s back. The chief of the Commerce Section held additional responsibilities overseeing local Chinese Chambers of Commerce and engaging with Chinese companies. As recounted by an Embassy X staff member, decisions made by the Commerce Section prioritized advancing Chinese business interests without adequately considering the potential diplomatic implications in various countries. When these business activities led to diplomatic tensions, the ambassador found himself uninformed and struggled to react appropriately, as the Commerce Section had operated in secrecy throughout the entire process.

Such problems were common at other embassies as well.

A government reform implemented in 2018 sought to address the issue of fragmented authority within the embassy by enhancing the ambassador’s role. One significant change involved the distribution of budgets. While each section still receives budgets from its respective home ministry in Beijing, a crucial alteration was made in the process. Instead of home ministries directly disbursing funds to their sections, they are now required to send the money to the ambassador. Subsequently, the ambassador becomes responsible for allocating funds to each section. Sections must submit applications for funds to the ambassador, who then approves their use. This modification not only keeps the ambassador in the budgetary loop but also grants them a level of control over the distribution of financial resources. Although the ambassador lacks the authority to withhold funds, the power to distribute funds provides a mechanism for oversight.

Furthermore, the reform removed all A-level sections. No one is permitted to reside independently from the embassy compound. Officials from all sections are required to dine together and actively participate in embassy-wide activities. The embassy also hires service staff directly from Foreign Ministry-affiliated companies rather than allowing each section to hire their own. Importantly, each section is now obligated to communicate its decisions to the ambassador and seek approval. For instance, the ambassador now possesses the right to oversee Chinese Chambers of Commerce, signifying a broader and more cohesive approach to decision-making within the embassy.

Another reform aimed at enhancing the ambassador’s authority was strengthening the role of the Communist Party within overseas operations. The ambassador serves as the party secretary for all CCP members posted abroad, including not only embassy staff but also party members among SOE and private company expatriates. Under this party system, the ambassador holds regular criticism and self-criticism sessions, enabling CCP members to report on each other. These meetings provide the ambassador with valuable information and an opportunity to monitor activities.

Additionally, the ambassador has the authority to report any misconduct to Beijing, a power described by one diplomat as a potent tool for controlling embassy staff and SOEs, since “a single negative remark from the ambassador can easily damage someone’s career.” As a result, the party secretary role significantly strengthens the ambassador’s ability to manage fragmentation.

Despite the efforts made through these reforms, an Embassy X official candidly admitted that the ambassador still faces challenges in completely dismantling the concept of independent kingdoms within the embassy. Several factors contribute to this continued struggle. First, the ambassador remains without leadership relationships over each section. Consequently, officials from different sections continue to prioritize the directives and initiatives from their respective home ministries. This allegiance to home ministries can sometimes supersede the authority and influence of the ambassador. In addition, the ambassador has the power to review the budget from each section, but they rarely withhold the budget when sections apply, because ultimately the funds are still coming from home ministries in Beijing.

Second, despite holding the dominant power deriving from the party secretary role, the ambassador exercises the power of control with caution. Therefore, each section retains its independent decision-making power. The ambassador, recognizing the limitations of their expertise across various policy areas, tends not to oppose decisions made by each section. This hands-off approach is partly driven by an acknowledgment of the need to allow specialized sections to manage their daily responsibilities without interference. Additionally, the ambassador may lack the energy or capacity to closely monitor every aspect of the diverse work undertaken by each section.

In essence, while the reform has introduced changes to the budget distribution and physical arrangements within the embassy, deeply ingrained structures and dynamics persist, making it challenging for the ambassador to completely eliminate the notion of independent kingdoms.