What Is New (and Not New) About the Japanese Diet

The Japanese Diet is open to outside visitors; if they are lucky enough, they can observe the procedure of the plenary session from the upper balcony of the session hall. From there, visitors can look down upon the entirety of the chamber where about 400 members are seated. Facing the members are the prime minister and his Cabinet. When the prime minister is scheduled to make a policy speech, visitors will notice that a lot of heckling goes on, generally coming from the opposition side. It often takes observers by surprise, as the jeers are much louder than expected.

At least for a while, the heckling in the House of Representatives, the Diet’s lower chamber, ought to be much louder due to the sheer number of the newly elected opposition members.

The new lower house members were ushered in on November 11, approximately two weeks after the latest general election. The most important business for the new members was to elect a new prime minister. From the general election on October 27 up until the Diet session on November 11 the political news in Japan was all about how the final tally of the prime ministerial election would turn out, and about the new coalition that would emerge from the hectic negotiation among parties. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had lost its majority, even when counting the seats held by its coalition partner, Komeito. Noda Yoshihiko, the leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), was seemingly trying to convince the heads of the center-right parties – Nippon Ishin no Kai and the Democratic Party for the People (DPFP) – to elect him as prime minister.

However, Noda's efforts were to no avail. Although he succeeded in vetoing LDP leader Ishiba Shigeru's nomination on the first ballot, in the second round of voting where he faced Ishiba head to head, he was defeated by the LDP-Komeito coalition – which still has a relative majority – as the other opposition parties declined to support Noda’s bid. Still, even forcing a runoff vote was a rare feat; it was the first time a Japanese prime minister was not elected in the first round of voting since 1994 when an LDP-backed Socialist party leader faced off against a former LDP prime minister who was the head of the opposition.

The drama surrounding the prime ministerial election was a telling reminder that the LDP-Komeito coalition lacks a majority and nothing will be business as usual.

However, more unprecedented outcomes were announced a couple of days after Ishiba was given a mandate to head a minority government. Thanks to the opposition parties’ newly acquired bargaining power, the opposition as a whole was able to receive committee chairmanships in seven out of the 17 standing committees, and four of the seven special committees. In order to get concessions from the opposition, the LDP was forced to let go of the chairmanship of the budgetary committee, which was then handed to the CDP. This means that the schedule of deliberation on the budget – and thus the fate of the Isiba administration's wishlist for next fiscal year – will be highly dependent on how chair Azumi Jun presides over his committee. And the fact that the opposition is able to oversee 11 committees suggests that they will have much more agenda-setting power on a host of issues.

Even if the budget – and other drafts of bills – makes it out of the committee, which may take a while for Ishiba’s minority government, another task lies ahead in the plenary session, where each bill will be up for a vote. The current government does not have enough support to pass a bill on its own.

The LDP-Komeito coalition seems to prefer DPFP, which is close ideologically, as an outside partner to pass the budget. Allying with the DPFP will allow them to cross the 233-seat threshold needed to pass legislation in the lower house. However, DPFP leader Tamaki Yuichiro has publicly stated that if the ruling party does not grant one of his campaign promises – to raise the amount of income tax deduction – his party will not cooperate on anything, meaning that the budget and other bills would not be passed.

On the surface, a lot has changed in the newly refreshed Japanese Diet, which has been widely seen to downgrade the LDP’s legislative grip. Nonetheless, the squandered majority of the LDP-Komeito coalition in the lower house does not make them powerless. Even if the opposition, which collectively holds a majority, attempts to pass a bill through the lower house, they will have to face an upper house in which the LDP-Komeito coalition holds a solid majority, giving them the power to veto any proposal.

And in the lower house, despite the turbulent political headwinds that they faced during the elections, the current ruling parties were able to secure a relative majority, a feat that shows they remain a powerful force. The overall superiority that the governing parties have in the combined chambers will mean that although the opposition may have the final say on some issues, the loudest and most unified voice in the room will be represented by the LDP and Komeito.

The upcoming Diet will be convened in the shadow of next year's House of Councillors elections, and the actions and calculations of parties will inadvertently be shaped by the upper house race. Both the DPFP and the CDP perceive the next Diet as an opportunity to appeal to their base and widen their support. The CDP in particular hopes to use its new chair of the Judicial Affairs Committee to move for a vote on a selective surname system, which would allow Japanese married couples to have different family names – an issue that excites Japanese liberals and has broad public support.

The extent to which the LDP will acquiesce to demands from the opposition parties is still in question. Ishiba’s need to unify the party and solidify his power base may make him unwilling to undertake radical changes. However, refusing such overtures entirely would not be a wise choice, since bipartisan cooperation is a must if Ishiba wants to achieve anything before he faces the electorate again in July. And the real possibility of a motion of no-confidence being adopted will provide another reason for the ruling coalition to cede some ground to the opposition.

The worst case scenario for the new Japanese Diet would be that it becomes one of the most unproductive Diet sessions and turns into a deadlock. On the other hand, if the opposition is able to propose bills and ideas that have been long ignored or deprioritized by the LDP, and force them to show willingness to compromise, the new Diet may turn out to be productive and fruitful after all.

If the latter scenario actually is the case, it may enact changes so that many Japanese people are actually able to feel a difference in their lives – an experience that has been absent from Japan for a long time.