Meera Gopal

In November, the world gathered in the capital of Azerbaijan, Baku, for the annual United Nations Climate Change Conference. COP29 was characterized by many as the “Finance COP,” a time for developed countries to hammer out a significant agreement on how, and with how much, to support developing countries in meeting the challenges of climate change.

The conference even went into overtime; but the ultimate deal – which called on developed countries to deliver at least $300 billion per year to developing countries by 2035 – left much to be desired.

In the following interview, Meera Gopal – a senior program officer for climate at the Asia Society Policy Institute  – details Asia’s multifaceted positions and concerns in regard to climate change, how countries from India to China approached the negotiations in Baku, and what lies ahead with the United States, soon to be under a second Trump administration, expected to step back from leadership in this space.

As for COP29, Gopal says, “All in all, vulnerable countries lamented that this was a lost opportunity for collective action and the outcome did not reflect a meaningful agreement on climate finance.”

It’s been another year of deadly natural disasters in the Asia-Pacific, particularly in South and Southeast Asia. How did that reality factor in to Asian government’s priorities at COP29?

Climate-related extreme weather events are now a grim reality for climate-vulnerable countries in South and Southeast Asia. For instance, speaking at Bangladesh’s official press conference during COP29, Rizwana Hassan, the adviser for environment, forest, and climate change to Bangladesh’s interim government, shared that two episodes of unprecedented flooding last year impacted 1.7 percent of the national budget. For a country already under financial strain and with limited domestic resources to adapt, these recurring extreme weather events are devastating. This is also true for other climate vulnerable nations in the region including the Pacific Islands, Pakistan, Nepal, and also Central Asian countries.

With unsustainable debt levels, these countries struggle to allocate funds for climate adaptation and resilience year after year, and this was reflected in the calls to action presented by the regional leaders at COP29 for affordable and accessible climate finance. Represented through blocs like the G77+China, the Least Developed Country (LDC) Group, and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), these nations emphasized three key areas to support their efforts to address climate change induced vulnerability: (1) The new climate finance goal incorporating grants or low-cost concessional financing, including specific allocations for SIDS and LDCs which unfortunately did not make it into the final text; (2) ensuring the operationalization of the Loss and Damage Fund, such that it can start disbursing funds at the earliest; and (3) strengthening the framework on the Global Goal on Adaptation, especially developing key indicators, and specific provisions on how it will be implemented.

Notably, even middle-income countries in the region, such as India, are now mainstreaming climate action into governance frameworks. India, for instance, emphasized integrating “means of implementation” indicators – often a proxy for adaptation finance – into the COP agenda.

A point of contention at COP29 was “transformational adaptation,” which entails policy shifts like land-use changes advocated by developed countries, pushing for systemic changes to address the root cause of climate vulnerability. In contrast, developing nations prioritized long-term adaptation plans and the means to implement them effectively. For them, systemic changes can only be undertaken upon provision of support on capacity building and adequate financing.

The UNFCCC process has long been a tug-of-war for competing priorities in the developing world, between demanding emissions cuts and safeguarding their own right to develop, despite the environmental cost (just as today’s developed countries did in the past). How did the balance between an energy transition and climate justice play out this year?

While COP29 was tagged as a “Finance COP,” it was also pivotal for parties to prepare more ambitious nationally determined contributions (NDCs) ahead of the 2025 deadline. Expectations were high for strong mitigation outcomes, with many seeking to embed the COP28 global stocktake conclusions, such as transitioning from fossil fuels, tripling renewable energy capacity, doubling energy efficiency, and aligning NDCs with 1.5 degree C goals.

However, deep divides emerged, particularly between fossil fuel-dependent nations, led by Saudi Arabia and the like-minded developing countries (LMDCs), and groups representing vulnerable countries and developed nations like the EU and U.K. Fossil-fuel dependent states resisted language on transitioning away from fossil fuels, claiming it exceeded mandates and risked imposing prescriptive targets. This contention stalled progress in key tracks: the UAE GST Implementation Dialogue, Mitigation Work Program (MWP), and Just Transition Work Program (JTWP).

On the JTWP front, similar divisions persisted. The G77+China wanted the discussions to focus on finance and adaptation, as well as a work plan for ensuring a just labor transition, whereas developed countries wanted the focus to be on mitigation, i.e. transitioning from fossil fuels, before discussing any work plan.

In fact, several parties and groups expressed their disappointment over not just the lack of progress on the issue, but also Azerbaijan’s failure to create space for such critical discussions to take place. Civil society actors raised concerns about this top-down approach of the presidency. Activist Lidy Nacpil from the Asian People’s Movement on Debt and Development commented at a press conference held by civil societies, “where is the justice in the Just Transition Work Program?” referring to the failure to include equity and common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) considerations into the discussions, and for the lack of adequate time given to the parties to discuss this critical issue.

Ultimately, parties were not able to resolve these contentions. While no texts were adopted on the UAE Dialogue and the JTWP, a heavily watered-down deal on the MWP was adopted during the closing plenary, which stated that discussions on substantive elements will continue to take place. Vulnerable countries, while disappointed with this outcome, were of the view that it was better to reject weaker language on mitigation, rather than lock it in. This also means that negotiations will be picked up next year, which would hopefully open an opportunity to strengthen language.

Moving forward, bridging these divides will require prioritizing adequate financing and technology transfer. Experiences with Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) in Indonesia and Vietnam show loans alone are insufficient. Affordable, accessible climate finance is crucial for fossil-dependent economies like India and Indonesia, ensuring equitable transitions and global climate progress. It is in the world’s interest to support them as they transition from fossil fuels as these countries are yet to peak their emissions

In the end, COP29 overran by a day to reach a deal that calls on developed countries to mobilize at least $300 billion per year by 2035 to help the developing nations that are most vulnerable to climate disasters. How did the final COP29 deal compare to the demands of developing nations?

This is not the first time that a COP has run into overtime, but they do often strain small, resource-constrained nations, forcing them to extend their presence to protect their interests. The outcome on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance, was met with a resounding disappointment from the developing countries. From Day 1, the G77+China group advocated for $1.3 trillion annually by 2030, based on Independent High-Level Expert Group estimates that external financing needs would reach $1 trillion annually by 2030 and $1.3 trillion by 2035. However, developed nations failed to propose a target until the final day, offering $250 billion – a figure rejected by developing countries.

The AOSIS and LDC groups walked out, accusing developed nations of bad faith. As Cedric Schuster, the Samoan Chair of AOSIS, said, “We came here to this COP for a fair deal. We feel that we haven’t been heard.” As the COP ran into overtime, a washed down text reflecting the great compromise made by the parties was hurriedly gaveled through by the COP presidency during the early hours of November 23. And that’s how we got to the $300 billion a year goal.

I do share the disappointment in the lack of ambition in the new goal. It does very little to rebuild the trust in the Global North. There are also several issues with the formulation of the goal. First, on the quantity itself, $300 billion a year, if met, can barely meet the ever-increasing needs of developing countries. Many experts from the Global South pointed out that that $300 billion is basically $100 billion, the goal set in 2009 to be reached by 2020, adjusted to inflation, so there is barely any increase.

Second, on the obligation of developed countries – the decision “calls on all actors,” which conveys very weak obligation and that too on “all actors,” including the private sector, which has till now failed to meet its potential on climate finance mobilization. Furthermore, in respect of the $300 billion a year goal, the text is again weak in conveying obligation, as it states that developed countries will “take the lead.”

Third, despite developing countries, including several Asian countries, and negotiating groups such as the G77+China, LDC, and AOSIS demanding monetary allocation for adaptation and loss and damage as subgoals, and the LDC and AOSIS also demanding specific allocations for their groups, this did not make its way into the final text.

All in all, vulnerable countries lamented that this was a lost opportunity for collective action and the outcome did not reflect a meaningful agreement on climate finance. However, the final text’s inclusion of the “Baku to Belem Roadmap on 1.3T” opens an opportunity for countries to continue these conversations next year on how the larger $1.3 trillion goal can be actualized.

As the deal was reached, Indian delegate Chandni Raina, an adviser to India’s Finance Ministry, said the document was “nothing more than an optical illusion.” What are India’s concerns when it comes to the COP negotiations? How does New Delhi fit into the divide between developed and developing nations when it comes to climate change finance?

On an international stage, India’s stance on climate has remained clear and consistent – it will demonstrate ambition on the emission reduction front, only if there is a flow of adequate finance and transfer of emerging technologies. For a long time, India has zealously advocated the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR). Speaking on behalf of India at COP29, Leela Nandan, top bureaucrat at the Ministry of Environment Forest and Climate Change, commented that “COP after COP, we talk about ‘what’ is to be done (mitigation) without talking about the ‘how’ it is to be done (finance).”

For COP29, India’s strategy seemed less put together than previous COPs – India sent a very lean contingent. Prime Minister Narendra Modi was notably absent and so was the environment minister or any other minister from Modi’s cabinet, except for the second in command (minister of state for environment) who delivered remarks on behalf of India during the high-level segment. I think India may have engaged differently had they sent a higher-level contingent.

But it could also be India’s strategy to represent itself as a Global South country; especially so during the finance negotiations, where there were calls for separating emerging and advanced economies within the developing country bloc from the rest of the poorer and more climate vulnerable countries in the group. The main reason for such a demand is to ensure that these emerging economies do not monopolize the already sparse concessional public climate finance. I also think that part of the reason for sending a smaller delegation had to do with the government’s more pressing concerns back home to ensure its continued stronghold in domestic politics (around the same time, there were two elections in two major states with huge stakes for the ruling party, the BJP).

Raina’s statement was in reference to the NCQG decision, which was hastily adopted at the closing plenary. Essentially, the final decision on NCQG was not the outcome India wanted, which could be due to India’s lack of active participation in the negotiations during Week 1 of COP. India’s strong stance on the draft came in too little, too late during the second week as it opposed language to count voluntary contributions to multilateral development banks (MDBs) toward the $300 billion goal. When the compromise language was being drafted as a U.S.-China-EU effort, it seemed like India was not consulted, and not having a high-level delegation proved detrimental to India’s interests. The language on MDB contributions was included in the final text as “all climate-related outflows from and climate-related finance mobilized by multilateral development banks (MDBs).” There were strong efforts to prevent India from blocking the decision from being adopted, so the statement was the option that India exercised to register its rejection and disappointment.

COP29 took place in the wake of Donald Trump’s re-election in the United States. Trump famously withdrew the U.S. from the Paris Agreement on his first day in office in 2021 and presumably his second administration will take a similar attitude to all things climate change. What impact will the presumed looming absence of the U.S. from climate change action have on the world?

A Trump 2.0 administration in the U.S. will lead to an uncertain and isolationist U.S. stance on climate action, mirroring his approach in 2016. His initial withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and his administration’s climate policies severely damaged U.S. credibility on global climate issues. If his second term follows a similar trajectory, it would exacerbate the already precarious situation of the world, which is on track to exceed the 1.5 degree C temperature rise threshold.

However, I think that the world is slightly more prepared this time to navigate a climate regime without active U.S. participation. While the U.S. was once a central actor in global climate negotiations, future action will likely see more minilateral and bilateral efforts, with key U.S. partners, like the EU and the U.K., expected to assume greater leadership. Yet, this shift could strain these countries’ resources, especially in meeting the climate needs of the developing world.

Global leaders are now more attuned to the transactional nature of U.S. interests under Trump. As a result, climate engagement will likely become more opportunistic, with countries pursuing bilateral agreements with the U.S., emphasizing climate as a co-benefit of broader geopolitical and economic interests. The absence of U.S.-China climate cooperation would be another significant blow. The progress made during the Biden administration to position climate as a key area of collaboration amidst fierce economic competition would be undone, leaving a gap in global climate diplomacy.

With the U.S. stepping back from its leadership role, the vacuum for global climate leadership is wide open. We’ve already seen the U.K. stepping up, as well as China taking a more proactive role during COP29. This could create an opportunity for emerging players to lead, but it also underscores the critical need for strong, collaborative efforts to address the climate crisis.

Interestingly, last year we saw an active push from India, indicating a strong interest to also step up their leadership position, with the G-20 presidency as well as Modi’s proposal for hosting COP33 (which would also be the next global stocktake) in India, in 2028. This year, as I said, the Indian participation was a bit subdued at COP29. India would definitely have to work on its climate diplomacy more if it wants to achieve and fill this gap in leadership. A good starting point would be to put forth ambitious targets in its next NDC.

Did China’s delegation, under their new climate envoy, Liu Zhenmin, take a new approach to the negotiations at COP29? Is China positioning itself for leadership on climate change action and if so, can Beijing live up to that mantle?

China, on its part, was more proactive at COP29. For the first time, Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang announced data on climate finance, stating that since 2016, China has “provided and mobilized” 177 billion yuan ($24.5 billion) for developing countries. This framing on finance “provided and mobilized” follows similar lines as developed nations and reflects a marked departure from China’s usual announcements on “South-South climate cooperation.” This transparency marks a significant shift, with China showing the political will to play a more visible role in international climate initiatives.

COP29 also saw China standing firm on its stand that it will only agree to language on voluntary contributions of climate finance, as it engaged with developed countries to reach the compromised outcome on the new climate finance goal. China’s engagement with EU and U.S. counterparts during the negotiations proved critical for unlocking the deal during the overtime.

Such posturing demonstrates China’s readiness to step into a leadership role. However, it still needs to resolve the dual challenge of being the world’s highest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter and also the highest level of clean energy capacity additions. In this context, China’s next round of NDCs or climate targets under the Paris Agreement would be a crucial factor and could make or break China’s ambition on global leadership.

At COP29, China again signaled that it would include economy wide targets covering all GHGs, although not much was shared on the level of ambition. Given the outcomes of the U.S. elections, China may keep its cards closer until much later in 2025 to announce its targets.

In addition to its domestic efforts, China has been enhancing its South-South cooperation, leveraging initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Global Development Initiative (GDI) to provide climate-related assistance to developing nations. These programs facilitate technology transfer, sustainable infrastructure, and financial support, positioning China as a key partner for climate action in the Global South.

China’s future climate targets will be pivotal in determining whether it can live up to its aspirations for global leadership. While it has signaled an increased commitment to international climate action, its actions in the coming years will reveal whether it can bridge the gap between being a top emitter and a leader in climate solutions.