What Does Assad’s Fall in Syria Mean for China?

On December 8, after a rapid-fire offensive by rebel forces in Syria, long-time President Bashar al-Assad was driven from the country. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) had led a group of opposition forces in capturing city after city starting in November, culminating in the capture of the capital, Damascus.

The quick crumbling of the Assad regime, which seemed to have solidified its control of the country in recent years, caught observers by surprise – including China. Beijing is “closely following the situation in Syria,” a Foreign Ministry spokesperson told the media on December 9. She added that China “hopes that relevant parties will bear in mind the fundamental interest of the Syrian people and find as soon as possible a political settlement that will restore stability in Syria.”

Later, when pressed for Beijing’s response to Assad’s ouster, the spokesperson declined to take a stand. “China’s friendly relations with Syria are for all Syrian people,” she said. “We hope stability will return as soon as possible.”

China Caught Off Guard

The bland statement that China’s Syria policy is “for all Syrian people” belies Beijing’s past support for Assad’s regime, despite his bloody suppression of dissent amid the civil war. Miriam Verzellino of the China-Global South Project summed up China’s views as the situation developed: “Beijing has clearly favored the survival of the Assad regime, with its representatives at the United Nations playing a supportive role in this regard.”

Into the first week of December, Verzellino noted, many Chinese experts were largely sanguine about Assad’s ability to survive – even as China’s embassy in Damascus warned all Chinese citizens to leave the country on December 5.

In another sign of Beijing’s confidence in Assad, immediately prior to the fall of the regime, from late October through November, China’s Ambassador Shi Hongwei was busy holding exchanges with members of the Assad government. Over the course of just over a month, Shi held meetings with the Syrian ministers of agriculture, health, trade, higher education, natural resources, culture, interior affairs, information, and foreign affairs, as well as the prime minister. The meetings, held even as HTS stepped up its military campaign, revealed China’s strong rhetorical support for the Assad regime, as well as its priorities and interests in Syria.

For example, during the meeting with then-Interior Minister Mohammad Khaled al-Rahmoun, Shi noted that “China supports Syria in combating violent terrorist forces and maintaining national security and stability” and expressed China’s willingness to “continue to strengthen law enforcement and security cooperation.” He also thanked the Syrian government “for actively protecting the security interests of Chinese citizens and institutions in Syria.”

In return, Rahmoun noted that Syria backs the “One China principle,” firmly supports China’s position on “issues related to Xinjiang and human rights,” and “attaches great importance to protesting the safety of Chinese citizens and institutions in Syria” – a checklist of Beijing’s biggest priorities in its diplomacy with Arab states.

In his meeting with Assad’s newly appointed Foreign Minister Bassam al-Sabbagh, Shi also stressed China’s support for “Syria in safeguarding its sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, accelerating recovery and reconstruction, and playing a greater role in regional and international affairs.”

Shi’s flurry of meetings – which came to an abrupt end with the rebels’ advances – represented a broader trend of deepened China-Syria exchanges with the Assad regime over the past year. Assad himself visited China in September 2023, as one of a bevy of heads of state to attend the opening ceremony of the Asian Games in Hangzhou. For Assad, the trip was especially important: It marked the first time Syria’s president had visited China in 19 years, much less since the start of the civil war. To mark the occasion, China and Syria established a strategic partnership.

“China-Syria relations have stood the test of the changing international landscape, and the friendship between the two countries has grown ever stronger,” Xi Jinping declared at the time. He also offered China’s support for “carrying out national reconstruction” and “strengthening capacity building for counterterrorism.”

In his meeting with Assad, Premier Li Qiang was even more blunt about security cooperation: “China is ready to strengthen cooperation with Syria to crack down hard on terrorism and safeguard the common security of the two sides.” He added, “The world today is far from being tranquil, and the two sides should further enhance solidarity and cooperation, withstand risks, oppose hegemony, and safeguard international fairness and justice.”

In response, Assad “thanked China for providing Syria with precious help in its economic and social development.”

China-Syria Relations: Less Then Meets the Eye?

But while China’s help for Syria may be “precious,” it has not been especially large. Despite the flowery words and the marked symbolism of Xi meeting with Assad, no new investment deals were announced at the time. In fact, China’s economic stakes in Assad’s Syria are actually very low.

In 2023, bilateral trade amounted to just $358 million, according to China’s Foreign Ministry. Trade was trending just a tick higher this year, reaching $298 million over the first nine months of 2024.

Meanwhile, after the devastating earthquake in 2023, China provided Syria with just 40 million yuan ($5.9 million) worth of “emergency humanitarian assistance,” according to a summary from the China International Development Cooperation Agency: $2 million in cash and the rest material donations (such as first-aid kits, blankets, tents, and emergency medical equipment). By contrast, the United States provided $50 million in funding, albeit through third party actors like U.N. agencies rather than directly to the Assad regime.

China’s more general “emergency food assistance” to Syria likewise amounted to a similarly modest 30 million yuan – welcome aid, to be sure, but not enough to make a dent for Syria’s impoverished population.

Chinese firms also seem understandably uninterested in investing in war-torn Syria. It’s often pointed out that China has invested over $3 billion in Syria’s oil and gas industry, but all of these investments pre-dated the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011.

In a sign of China’s lack of enthusiasm, Assad repeatedly indicated his interest in joining the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) starting as early as 2017, but was pushed off until 2022. Even after Syria signed on to the BRI, no actual projects materialized. As Guy Burton, Nick Lyall, and Logan Pauley wrote in a previous article for The Diplomat, Assad’s efforts to attract Chinese investment to specific projects – “including the construction of a north-south-east highway, the re-development of the ports of Latakia and Tartus, and the construction of railroads, one in the Damascus region and another that would connect with the Lebanese port of Tripoli” – failed.

China’s Main Priority: Counterterrorism

Instead, as was clear from the points of emphasis during Assad’s visit to China, Beijing’s primary interest in Syria is security. In particular, China does not want to see Syria become a hotbed for terrorism – and a potential training ground for Uyghur militants.

While exact counts are impossible to come by, the Associated Press estimated in 2017 that “thousands” of Uyghurs had traveled to Syria to join the fighting under the umbrella of the Turkestan Islamic Party, a militant group linked to al-Qaida. One Uyghur fighter told AP at the time, “We just wanted to learn how to use the weapons and then go back to China.”

It’s no coincidence that China’s massive crackdown on Uyghurs involved targeting anyone who had traveled abroad. Having a stamp in one’s passport became grounds for detention and “re-education.” The mass detention campaign was sparked by Beijing’s paranoia about Uyghur terrorism, as made clear in China’s official explanations.

It’s this concern that is foremost in Chinese leaders’ minds with regards to Syria, especially with the Islamist military group HTS at the helm of the nascent government in Damascus. HTS is designated as a terrorist group by a wide range of countries, including both Russia and the United States.

A video shared online after HTS’ capture of Damascus would have been chilling viewing for China’s security apparatus. Uyghur fighters, standing in front of a flag of “East Turkestan” – the name for an envisioned Uyghur state carved out of Xinjiang – pledged to “liberate” their homeland next. “This jihad will not stop here,” one fighter vowed.

The example of Taliban-ruled Afghanistan shows that China is capable of forging relatively friendly ties even with an Islamist militant group – provided its security concerns are taken seriously. The big question for Beijing is whether HTS – or whoever ends up in control in Syria – is willing and able to effectively crack down on any Uyghur militant activities.

And even if that happens, the Taliban’s experience in Afghanistan also suggests that Syria’s new government shouldn’t be eagerly awaiting an influx of funding to rebuild their country.